<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005' xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536</id><updated>2011-11-27T16:50:10.119-08:00</updated><title type='text'>topics I like</title><subtitle type='html'></subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default?max-results=100'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>93</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>100</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-5572976444540896266</id><published>2011-04-12T02:25:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2011-04-12T02:35:19.504-07:00</updated><title type='text'>news related to patents</title><content type='html'>I've recently read 2 interesting articles related to patents (see below to read them) :&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;*&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ZTE sues Ericsson in China&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704662604576256440263520456.html&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt;(by Owen Fletcher)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt;BEIJING—Chinese telecommunications hardware maker &lt;a href="http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;amp;symbol=000063.SZ" class="companyRollover link11unvisited"&gt;ZTE&lt;/a&gt; Corp. on Monday filed a lawsuit in China against a unit of Swedish rival &lt;a href="http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&amp;amp;symbol=ERIC" class="companyRollover link11unvisited"&gt;Telefon AB L.M. Ericsson&lt;/a&gt; over alleged patent infringement, said Wang Haibo, ZTE's intellectual-property director.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt;The move escalates a legal battle that began when Ericsson said  earlier this month it filed patent-infringement lawsuits against ZTE in  the U.K., Italy and Germany, and highlights ZTE's growth overseas in  competition with Western rivals. Such lawsuits are common between global  rivals in high-tech industries.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="overflow: hidden; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; text-decoration: none; border: medium none; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;ZTE's suit against Ericsson (China) Communications Co. alleges  Ericsson products sold in China violated ZTE patents covering core  networks, global system for mobile communications, and fourth-generation  mobile technology, and asks that the company be ordered to cease the  infringement and pay unspecified damages, Mr. Wang told Dow Jones  Newswires.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;He said the number of ZTE patents in the case is "less than 10" and declined to say in which court ZTE filed the suit.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;The "possibility exists" that ZTE could file further lawsuits against  Ericsson in China or abroad, Mr. Wang said, declining to say what  patents they might involve.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Ericsson spokesman Fredrik Hallstan said the company hasn't received notice of the lawsuit yet and declined to comment further.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="overflow: hidden; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; text-decoration: none; border: medium none;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;Ericsson said earlier it filed its lawsuits against ZTE in Europe as a  "last resort" to obtain a licensing agreement with ZTE and payment for  its use of Ericsson patents, after years of talks. Ericsson alleged ZTE  was using the patented technologies covering areas such as mobile  technology WCDMA in its handsets, network infrastructure, or both, in  the three European countries.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;ZTE responded earlier this month by saying it would launch "patent  invalidation procedures" against Ericsson in China. In a submission to  China's State Intellectual Property Office, ZTE argued that three  Ericsson patents covering second- and third-generation mobile technology  should be invalidated since they don't meet criteria such as  "creativeness" required for a patent, Mr. Wang said.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Mr. Wang said there is a chance the invalidation request could be  processed this year but emphasized the time frame is hard to predict.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="overflow: hidden; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; text-decoration: none; border: medium none;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;* Google bids $900 million for Nortel patent portfolio&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;http://www.engadget.com/2011/04/04/google-bids-900-million-for-nortel-patent-portfolio-will-use-i/&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;         &lt;span class="caption"&gt;By Vlad Savov&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span class="caption"&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span class="caption"&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Google and Nortel have agreed on the princely sum of $900 million to  start off a "stalking horse" auction -- wherein outside parties are  still free to outdo Google's bid -- for the acquisition of Nortel's  rather vast patent portfolio. The sale comes as part of the latter  company's bankruptcy selloff and involves some 6,000 patents and patent  applications, which encompass both wired and &lt;a href="http://www.engadget.com/2009/01/30/nortel-quits-the-mobile-wimax-game/"&gt;wireless&lt;/a&gt;  communications, semiconductors, data networking, voice, and the  internet -- going so far as to even touch on web search and social  networking. The thing is, Google's not &lt;em&gt;really&lt;/em&gt; enamored with  these tidbits of intellectual property to the tune of nearly a billion  dollars. No sir, a rather bitter blog post from the company this morning  makes it quite clear that Google's acting in order to bolster its own  intellectual property library and to "create a disincentive for others  to &lt;a href="http://www.engadget.com/2011/02/16/voip-inc-sues-google-alleges-theft-of-trade-secrets-for-click/"&gt;sue&lt;/a&gt;."  Both Android and Chrome get obliquely mentioned in Google's  announcement as benefiting from the move, which should be completed by  June of this year pending other bids and regulatory approvals.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Update:&lt;/strong&gt; Microsoft has &lt;a href="http://www.geekwire.com/2011/900m-bid-google-line-6000-nortel-patents"&gt;noted&lt;/a&gt;  that it has "a worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free license to all of  Nortel's patents that covers all Microsoft products and services,  resulting from the patent cross-license signed with Nortel in 2006."  That license will also transfer with the sale of the patent rights. All  that means is that Microsoft cannot be sued for infringing on that  bundle of rights as it is already licensed to use them. That means  Microsoft is extremely unlikely to participate in this auction -- other  than, of course, as a means to prevent others from obtaining the same  rights.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-5572976444540896266?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/5572976444540896266/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=5572976444540896266' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5572976444540896266'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5572976444540896266'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2011/04/news-related-to-patents.html' title='news related to patents'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-816609736641336880</id><published>2011-03-15T06:52:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2011-03-15T07:09:29.095-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Japan...</title><content type='html'>"L'argent est un bon serviteur et un mauvais maître."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;"Money is like muck, not good except it be spread." (Francis Bacon)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.croix-rouge.fr/Je-donne/Don-ponctuel?elk_dc_id=158"&gt;https://www.croix-rouge.fr/Je-donne/Don-ponctuel?elk_dc_id=158&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thx&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-816609736641336880?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/816609736641336880/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=816609736641336880' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/816609736641336880'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/816609736641336880'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2011/03/japan.html' title='Japan...'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-2908638362808510981</id><published>2011-02-23T01:19:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2011-02-23T01:25:44.246-08:00</updated><title type='text'>"Pré-diagnostics propriété industrielle"</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Hello,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In France, for some small companies, there is a way to obtain a kind of audit for intellectual property issues. For more information, see the following links : &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.inpi.fr/?id=2413"&gt;http://www.inpi.fr/?id=2413&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.inpi.fr/fileadmin/mediatheque/pdf/INPI_Pre-diagnostic.pdf"&gt;http://www.inpi.fr/fileadmin/mediatheque/pdf/INPI_Pre-diagnostic.pdf&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Regards,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-2908638362808510981?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/2908638362808510981/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=2908638362808510981' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2908638362808510981'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2908638362808510981'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2011/02/pre-diagnostics-propriete-industrielle.html' title='&quot;Pré-diagnostics propriété industrielle&quot;'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-2323389020355262389</id><published>2010-09-03T05:54:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2010-09-03T05:57:02.493-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Asiacrypt 2010</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Accepted Papers&lt;br /&gt;http://www.spms.ntu.edu.sg/Asiacrypt2010/Common/AcceptedPapers.html&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Short Pairing-based Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jens Groth (University College London)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Short Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jens Groth (University College London)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Group Signature Scheme from Lattice Assumptions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Dov Gordon and Jonathan Katz (University of Maryland) and Vinod Vaikuntanathan (Microsoft Research)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Advanced Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks: First Results on Full Tiger, and Improved Results on MD4 and SHA-2&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jian Guo, San Ling (Nanyang Technological University), Christian Rechberger&lt;br /&gt; (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven), and Huaxiong Wang (Nanyang Technological University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Byte-based Guess and Determine Attack on SOSEMANUK&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Xiutao Feng and Jun Liu and Zhaocun Zhou and Chuankun Wu and Dengguo Feng (Institute of Software of China)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Improved Single-Key Attacks on 8-round AES-192 and AES-256&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Orr Dunkelman, Nathan Keller, and Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute of Science)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Improved Generic Attacks on Unbalanced Feistel Schemes with Expanding Functions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Emmanuel Volte and Valerie Nachef (University of Cergy-Pontoise) and Jacques&lt;br /&gt;Patarin (Université de Versailles)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Collision Attacks against the Knudsen-Preneel Compression Functions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Onur Özen and Martijn Stam (EPFL)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Conditional Differential Cryptanalysis of NLFSR-based Cryptosystems&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Simon Knellwolf and Willi Meier and Maria Naya-Plasencia (FHNW)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Multiparty Computation for Modulo Reduction without Bit-Decomposition and a Generalization to Bit-Decomposition&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Chao Ning and Qiuliang Xu (Shandong University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Faster Fully Homomorphic Encryption&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Damien Stehlé (CNRS, ENS de Lyon) and Ron Steinfeld (Macquarie University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Semi-Generic Group Model and Applications to Pairing-based Cryptography&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tibor Jager (Ruhr-University Bochum) and Andy Rupp (University of Trier)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Closer Look at Anonymity and Robustness in Encryption Schemes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Payman Mohassel (University of Calgary)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;New Approach of Super-Sbox Analysis on AES-Based Permutations: Applications to ECHO and Gr{\o}stl&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yu Sasaki (NTT Corporation), Yang Li, Lei Wang, Kazuo Sakiyama, Kazuo Ohta (The University of Electro-Communications)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Leakage Resilient ElGamal Encryption&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Eike Kiltz and Krzysztof Pietrzak (CWI)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The World is Not Enough: Another Look on Second-Order DPA&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;F.-X. Standaert and N. Veyrat Charvillon and E. Oswald and B. Gierlichs and M. Medwed and M. Kasper and S. Mangard (UCL)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient Public-Key Cryptography in the Presence of Key Leakage&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yevgeniy Dodis and Kristiyan Haralambiev and Adriana Lopez-Alt and Daniel Wichs (NYU)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Static Diffie-Hellman Problem on Elliptic Curves over Extension Fields&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Robert Granger (Dublin City University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Finding Second Preimages of Digests of Short Messages for Hamsi-256&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thomas Fuhr (ANSSI and TELECOM-ParisTech)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient String-Commitment from Weak Bit-Commitment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kai-Min Chung (Harvard University), Feng-Hao Liu (Brown Univiersity), Chi-Jen Lu (Academia Sinica), and Bo-Yin Yang (Academia Sinica)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Degree of Regularity of HFE Systems&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vivien Dubois (DGA-MI) and Nicolas Gama (EPFL)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Constant-Size Commitments to Polynomials and Their Applications&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Aniket Kate (MPI-SWS), Gregory M. Zaverucha (Certicom Research), and Ian Goldberg (University of Waterloo)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Linear-Complexity Private Set Intersection Protocols Secure in Malicious Model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Emiliano De Cristofaro (UC Irvine), Jihye Kim (Seoul National University), and Gene Tsudik (UC Irvine)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Rotational Rebound Attacks on Reduced Skein&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Dmitry Khovratovich (University of Luxembourg and Microsoft Research), Ivica Nikolic (University of Luxembourg), and Christian Rechberger (K.U. Leuven)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Lattice-based Blind Signatures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Markus Rückert (Technische Universität Darmstadt)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Forward-Secure Symmetric-Key Derivation Protocol - How to Improve Classical DUKPT&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Eric Brier and Thomas Peyrin (Ingenico)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Structured Encryption and Controlled Disclosure&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Melissa Chase and Seny Kamara (Microsoft Research)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Limitations on Transformations from Composite-Order to Prime-Order Groups: The Case of Round-Optimal Blind Signatures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sarah Meiklejohn and Hovav Shacham (UC San Diego)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;General Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Using Linear Codes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Qiushi Yang and Yvo Desmedt (University College London)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Random Oracles With(out) Programmability&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Marc Fischlin (Darmstadt University of Technology), Anja Lehmann (IBM Research Zurich), Thomas Ristenpart (UCSD), Thomas Shrimpton (Portland State University), Martijn Stam (EPFL), and Stefano Tessaro (ETH Zurich)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Generic Compilers for Authenticated Key Exchange&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tibor Jager and Florian Kohlar and Sven Schäge and Jörg Schwenk (Ruhr-University Bochum)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Round Complexity of Verifiable Secret Sharing: The Statistical Case&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ranjit Kumaresan (UMD), Arpita Patra (IIT Madras), C. Pandu Rangan (IIT Madras)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Computationally Secure Pattern Matching in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Carmit Hazay and Tomas Toft (Aarhus University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On Invertible Sampling and Adaptive Security&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yuval Ishai (Technion and UCLA), Abishek Kumarasubramanian (UCLA), Claudio Orlandi (Aarhus University) and Amit Sahai (UCLA)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-2323389020355262389?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/2323389020355262389/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=2323389020355262389' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2323389020355262389'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2323389020355262389'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2010/09/asiacrypt-2010.html' title='Asiacrypt 2010'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-5782977826001190325</id><published>2010-09-03T05:42:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2010-09-03T05:43:46.334-07:00</updated><title type='text'>CHES 2010</title><content type='html'>&lt;h2&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:100%;"&gt;Accepted Papers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;http://www.iacr.org/workshops/ches/ches2010/accepted.html&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;" id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;A high speed coprocessor for elliptic curve scalar multiplications over Fp&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Nicolas Guillermin&lt;br /&gt;  DGA Information Superiority and IRMAR Université Rennes 1&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Quark: a lightweight hash&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Jean-Philippe Aumasson and Luca Henzen and Willi Meier and Maria Naya-Plasencia&lt;br /&gt;  Nagravision SA / ETH Zurich / FHNW Windisch&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Coordinate Blinding over Large Prime Fields&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Michael Tunstall and Marc Joye&lt;br /&gt;  University of Bristol / Technicolor&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mixed Bases for Efficient Inversion in F_{((2^2)^2)^2} and Conversion Matrices of SubBytes of AES&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Y. Nogami and K. Nekado and T. Toyota and N. Hongo and Y. Morikawa&lt;br /&gt;  Okayama University&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Efficient Techniques for High-Speed Elliptic Curve Cryptography&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Patrick Longa and Catherine Gebotys&lt;br /&gt;  University of Waterloo&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;XBX: eXternal Benchmarking eXtension for the SUPERCOP crypto benchmarking framework&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Christian Wenzel-Benner and Jens Graef&lt;br /&gt;  ITK Engineering AG / LiNetCo GmbH&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Glitch PUF: A New Delay-PUF Architecture Exploiting Glitch Shapes&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Daisuke Suzuki and Koichi Shimizu&lt;br /&gt;  Mitsubishi Electric Corporation / Yokohama National University&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Public Key Perturbation of Randomized RSA Implementations&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Alexandre Berzati and Cécile Canovas-Dumas and Louis Goubin&lt;br /&gt;  CEA Leti Minatec / Versailles Saint Quentin University&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fault Sensitivity Analysis&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Yang Li and Kazuo Sakiyama and Shigeto Gomisawa and Toshinori Fukunaga and Junko Takahashi and Kazuo Ohta&lt;br /&gt;  The university of Electro-Communications / Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Analysis and Improvement of the Random Delay Countermeasure of CHES 2009&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Jean-Sebastien Coron and Ilya Kizhvatov&lt;br /&gt;  University of Luxembourg&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Algebraic Side-Channel Analysis in the Presence of Errors&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Yossef Oren and Mario Kirschbaum and Thomas Popp and Avishai Wool&lt;br /&gt;  Tel-Aviv University / Graz University Of Technology&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sponge-based pseudo-random number generators&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Guido Bertoni and Joan Daemen and Michaël Peeters and Gilles Van Assche&lt;br /&gt;  STMicroelectronics / NXP Semiconductors&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Provably Secure Higher-Order Masking of AES&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Matthieu Rivain and Emmanuel Prouff&lt;br /&gt;  CryptoExperts and Oberthur Technologies&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;An Alternative to Error Correction for SRAM-Like PUFs&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Maximilian Hofer and Christoph Boehm&lt;br /&gt;  Graz University Of Technology&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Side-channel Analysis of Six SHA-3 Candidates&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Olivier Benoit and Thomas Peyrin&lt;br /&gt;  Ingenico&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;256 bit Standardized Crypto for 650 GE - GOST Revisited&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Axel Poschmann and Huaxiong Wang and San Ling&lt;br /&gt;  Nanyang Technological University&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;When Failure Analysis Meets Side-Channel Attacks&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Jérôme Di-Battista and Jean-Christophe Courrège and Bruno Rouzeyre and Lionel Torres and Philippe Perdu&lt;br /&gt;  Thales / LIRMM / CNES&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;ARMADILLO: a Multi-Purpose Cryptographic Primitive Dedicated to Hardware&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Stéphane Badel, Nilay Dağtekin, Jorge Nakahara Jr, Khaled Ouafi, Nicolas Reffé, Pouyan Sepehrdad, Petr Sušil, Serge Vaudenay&lt;br /&gt;  EPFL / Oridao&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;PRINTcipher: A Block Cipher for IC-Printing&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Lars R. Knudsen and Gregor Leander and Axel Poschmann and Matt J.B. Robshaw&lt;br /&gt;  DTU Denmark / Nanyang Technological University / Orange Labs&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Correlation-Enhanced Power Analysis Collision Attack&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Amir Moradi and Oliver Mischke and Thomas Eisenbarth&lt;br /&gt;  Ruhr University Bochum / Florida Atlantic University&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Developing a Hardware Evaluation Method for SHA-3 Candidates&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Luca Henzen and Pietro Gendotti and Patrice Guillet and Enrico Pargaetzi and Martin Zoller and Frank K. Gurkaynak&lt;br /&gt;  ETH Zurich&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Flash Memory 'Bumping' Attacks&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Sergei Skorobogatov&lt;br /&gt;  University of Cambridge&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Garbled Circuits for Leakage-Resilience: Hardware Implementation and Evaluation of One-Time Programs&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Kimmo Järvinen and Vladimir Kolesnikov and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Thomas Schneider&lt;br /&gt;  Aalto University / Alcatel-Lucent Bell Laboratories / Ruhr-University Bochum&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;New Results on Instruction Cache Attacks&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Onur Aciicmez and Billy Bob Brumley and Philipp Grabher&lt;br /&gt;  Samsung Electronics / Aalto University School of Science and Technology / University of Bristol&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fast Exhaustive Search for Polynomial Systems in F_2&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Charles Bouillaguet and Hsieh-Chung Chen and Chen-Mou Cheng and Tony Chou and Ruben Niederhagen and Adi Shamir and Bo-Yin Yang&lt;br /&gt;Ecole Normale Supérieure / Academia Sinica / Nat'l Taiwan University / Technische Universiteit Eindhoven / Weizmann Institute of Science&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Performance Analysis of the SHA-3 Candidates on Exotic Multi-Core Architectures&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Joppe W. Bos and Deian Stefan&lt;br /&gt;  EPFL / The Cooper Union&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;New High Entropy Element for FPGA Based True Random Number Generators&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Michal Varchola and Milos Drutarovsky&lt;br /&gt;  Technical University of Kosice&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Co-Z Addition Formulae and Binary Ladders on Elliptic Curves&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Raveen Ravinesh Goundar and Marc Joye and Atsuko Miyaji&lt;br /&gt;  Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology / Technicolor&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fair and Comprehensive Methodology for Comparing Hardware Performance of Fourteen Round Two SHA-3 Candidates using FPGAs&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Kris Gaj, Ekawat Homsirikamol, Marcin Rogawski&lt;br /&gt;  George Mason University&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Self-Referencing: A Scalable Side-Channel Approach for Hardware Trojan Detection&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Dongdong Du, Seetharam Narasimhan, Rajat Subhra Chakraborty, Swarup Bhunia&lt;br /&gt;  Case Western Reserve University&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-5782977826001190325?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/5782977826001190325/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=5782977826001190325' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5782977826001190325'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5782977826001190325'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2010/09/ches-2010.html' title='CHES 2010'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-4222391143537230594</id><published>2010-09-03T05:40:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2010-09-03T06:03:18.030-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Crypto 2010</title><content type='html'>&lt;h1&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2010/accepted.html"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: normal;"&gt;http://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2010/accepted.html&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h1&gt;&lt;h1 style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;CRYPTO 2010 Accepted Papers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h1&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;a name="crypto01"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:100%;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Circular and Leakage Resilient Public-Key Encryption Under  Subgroup Indistinguishability (or: Quadratic Residuosity Strikes Back)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Zvika Brakerski and Shafi Goldwasser&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt;The main results of this work are new public-key encryption schemes that, under the quadratic residuosity (QR) assumption (or Paillier's decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption), achieve key-dependent message security as well as high resilience to secret key leakage and high resilience to the presence of auxiliary input information.&lt;br /&gt;In particular, under what we call the {\it subgroup indistinguishability assumption}, of which the QR and DCR are special cases, we can construct a scheme that has:&lt;br /&gt;1.  Key-dependant message (circular) security. Achieves security even when encrypting affine functions of its own secret-key (in fact, w.r.t. affine "key-cycles" of predefined length). Our scheme also meets the requirements for extending key-dependant message security to broader classes of functions beyond affine functions using the techniques of [BGK, ePrint09] or [BHHI, ePrint09].&lt;br /&gt;2. Leakage resiliency. Remains secure even if any adversarial low-entropy (efficiently computable) function of the secret-key is given to the adversary. A proper selection of parameters allows for a "leakage rate" of (1-o(1)) of the length of the secret-key.&lt;br /&gt;3. Auxiliary-input security. Remains secure even if any sufficiently hard to invert (efficiently computable) function of the secret-key is given to the adversary.&lt;br /&gt;Our scheme is the first to achieve key-dependant security and auxiliary-input security based on the DCR and QR assumptions. All previous schemes to achieve these properties relied either on the DDH or LWE assumptions. Our scheme is also the first to achieve leakage resiliency for leakage rate (1-o(1)) of the secret-key length, under the QR assumption. Leakage resilient schemes under the DCR and the QR assumptions (for the restricted case of composite modulus product of safe primes) were implied by the work of [NS, Crypto09], using hash proof systems. However, known constructions of hash proof systems under the QR assumption only allowed for a leakage rate of o(1) of the secret-key length.   &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;a name="crypto02"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:100%;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Leakage-Resilient Pseudorandom Functions and  Side-Channel Attacks on Feistel Networks&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Yevgeniy Dodis and Krzysztof Pietrzak&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt;A cryptographic primitive is leakage-resilient, if it remains secure even if an adversary can learn a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the computation with every invocation. As a consequence, the physical implementation of a leakage-resilient primitive is secure against every side-channel as long as the amount of information leaked per invocation is bounded.  In this paper we prove positive and negative results about the feasibility of constructing leakage-resilient pseudorandom functions and permutations (i.e. block-ciphers). Our results are three fold:&lt;br /&gt;1. We construct (from any standard PRF) a PRF which satisfies a relaxed notion of leakage-resilience where (1) the leakage function is fixed (and not adaptively chosen with each query.) and (2) the computation is split into several steps which leak individually (a "step" will be the invocation of the underlying PRF.)&lt;br /&gt;2. We prove that a Feistel network with a super-logarithmic number of rounds, each instantiated with a leakage-resilient PRF, is a leakage resilient PRP. This reduction also holds for the non-adaptive notion just discussed, we thus get a block-cipher which is leakage-resilient (against non-adaptive leakage).&lt;br /&gt;3. We propose generic side-channel attacks against Feistel networks. The attacks are generic in the sense that they work for any round functions (e.g. uniformly random functions) and only require some simple leakage from the inputs to the round functions. For example we show how to invert an $r$ round Feistel network over $2n$ bits making $4\cdot (n+1)^{r-2}$ forward queries, if with each query we are also given as leakage the Hamming weight of the inputs to the $r$ round functions. This complements the result from the previous item showing that a super-constant number of rounds is necessary. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto03"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; This talk is a combination of the following two papers: &lt;/div&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:100%;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. On Protecting Cryptographic Keys Against Side-Channel Attacks&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Ali Juma and Yevgeniy Vahlis&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt;Side-channel attacks have often proven to have a devastating effect on the security of cryptographic schemes. In this paper we address the problem of storing cryptographic keys and computing on them in a manner that preserves security even when the adversary is able to obtain information leakage during the computation on the key.&lt;br /&gt;Using the recently achieved fully homomorphic encryption, we show how to encapsulate a key and repeatedly evaluate arbitrary functions on it so that no adversary can gain any useful information from a large class of side-channel attacks. We work in the model of Micali and Reyzin -- assuming that only the active part of memory during computation leaks information. Similarly to previous works, our construction makes use of a single "leak-proof" hardware token that samples from a globally fixed distribution that does not depend on the key. If the amount of computation that will be performed on the key is known in advance then our construction requires no leak-proof tokens at all -- the values produced by the token can be pre-computed and then accessed sequentially. In addition, we describe a simple variant of our scheme that splits the key between two devices, and preserves the secrecy of the key even if the memory contents of one device are leaked completely. This provides a meaningful protection against the powerful cold boot attacks of Halderman \etal (USENIX Security 08) where the complete memory contents of a device can be recovered.&lt;br /&gt;In contrast to previous general compilers that achieve resilience to side-channel attacks, we allow leakage functions to be arbitrary polynomial size circuits with a sufficiently short output, and our construction does not require the amount of computation to grow with the amount of leakage that the adversary is able to obtain. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2. How to Play Mental Solitaire under Continuous Side-Channels: A Completeness Theorem using Secure Hardware&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Shafi Goldwasser and Guy Rothblum&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt;we present a general method to compile any cryptographic algorithms into one which resists side channel attacks of the {\it only computation leaks information} variety for an unbounded number of executions. our method uses as a building block a semantically secure bit encryption scheme with the following additional operations: key refreshing, oblivious generation of cipher texts, cipher-text re-generation, and blinded homomorphic evaluation of one single complete gate (e.g. nand). furthermore, the security properties of the encryption scheme should withstand bounded leakage incurred while performing each of the above operations.&lt;br /&gt;we show how to implement such an encryption scheme under the ddh intractability assumption and the existence of a simple secure hardware component. the hardware component is independent of the encryption scheme secret key. the encryption scheme resists leakage attacks which are polynomial time computable function, whose output size is bounded by a constant fraction of the secret key size.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto04"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;An Efficient and Parallel Gaussian Sampler for Lattices&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Chris Peikert&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; At the heart of many recent lattice-based cryptographic schemes is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a `high-quality' basis, generates a lattice point according to a Gaussian-like distribution. Unlike most other operations in lattice-based cryptography, however, the known algorithm for this task (due to Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan; STOC 2008) is rather inefficient, and is inherently sequential.  We present a new Gaussian sampling algorithm for lattices that is \emph{efficient} and \emph{highly parallelizable}.  We also show that in most cryptographic applications, the algorithm's efficiency comes at almost no cost in asymptotic security.  At a high level, our algorithm resembles the ``perturbation'' heuristic proposed as part of NTRUSign (Hoffstein \etal, CT-RSA 2003), though the details are quite different.  To our knowledge, this is the first algorithm and rigorous analysis demonstrating the security of a perturbation-like technique. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto07"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Toward Basing Fully Homomorphic Encryption on Worst-Case Hardness&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Craig Gentry&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt;Gentry proposed a fully homomorphic public key encryption scheme that uses ideal lattices. He based the security of his scheme on the hardness of two problems: an average-case decision problem over ideal lattices, and the sparse (or "low-weight") subset sum problem (SSSP).&lt;br /&gt;We provide a key generation algorithm for Gentry's scheme that generates ideal lattices according to a "nice" average-case distribution. Then, we prove a worst-case / average-case connection that bases Gentry's scheme (in part) on the quantum hardness of the shortest independent vector problem (SIVP) over ideal lattices in the worst-case. (We cannot remove the need to assume that the SSSP is hard.) Our worst-case / average-case connection is the first where the average-case lattice is an ideal lattice, which seems to be necessary to support the security of Gentry's scheme.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto08"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Additively Homomorphic Encryption with d-Operand Multiplications &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Carlos Aguilar, Philippe Gaborit and Javier Herranz&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; The search for encryption schemes that allow to evaluate functions (or circuits) over encrypted data has attracted a lot of attention since the seminal work on this subject by Rivest, Adelman and Dertouzos in 1978.&lt;br /&gt;In this work we define a theoretical object, chained encryption schemes, which allow a compact evaluation of polynomials of degree $d$ over encrypted data (without function privacy). Chained encryption schemes are generically constructed by concatenating cryptosystems with the appropriate homomorphic properties, which are common in lattice-based encryption. As a particular instantiation we propose a chained encryption scheme whose IND-CPA security is based on a worst-case/average-case reduction to uSVP. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto09"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;i-Hop Homomorphic Encryption and Rerandomizable Yao Circuits&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi and Vinod Vaikuntanathan&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; Homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes enable computing functions on encrypted data, by means of a public $\Eval$ procedure that can be applied to ciphertexts. But the evaluated ciphertexts so generated may differ from freshly encrypted ones. This brings up the question of whether one can keep computing on evaluated ciphertexts. An \emph{$i$-hop} homomorphic encryption is a scheme where $\Eval$ can be called on its own output upto $i$~times, while still being able to decrypt the result. A \emph{multi-hop} homomorphic encryption is a scheme which is $i$-hop for all~$i$.  In this work we study $i$-hop and multi-hop schemes in conjunction  with the properties of function-privacy (i.e., $\Eval$'s output hides the function) and compactness (i.e., the output of $\Eval$ is short).  We provide formal definitions and describe several constructions.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;First, we observe that ``bootstrapping'' techniques can be used to convert any (1-hop) homomorphic encryption scheme into an $i$-hop scheme for any~$i$, and the result inherits the function-privacy and/or compactness of the underlying scheme. However, if the underlying scheme is not compact (such as schemes derived from Yao circuits)  then the complexity of the resulting $i$-hop scheme can be as high as $n^{O(i)}$.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We then describe a specific DDH-based multi-hop homomorphic encryption scheme that does not suffer from this exponential blowup. Although not compact, this scheme has complexity linear in the size of the composed function, independently of the number of hops. The main technical ingredient in this solution is a \emph{re-randomizable} variant of the Yao circuits.  Namely, given a garbled circuit, anyone can re-garble it in such a way that even the party that generated the original garbled circuit cannot recognize it. This construction may be of independent interest. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto10"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Interactive Locking, Zero-Knowledge PCPs, and Unconditional Cryptography &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Vipul Goyal and Yuval Ishai and Mohammad Mahmoody and Amit Sahai&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; Motivated by the question of basing cryptographic protocols on stateless tamper-proof hardware tokens, we revisit the question of unconditional two-prover zero-knowledge proofs for NP. We show that such protocols exist in the interactive PCP model of Kalai and Raz (ICALP '08), where one of the provers is replaced by a PCP oracle. This strengthens the feasibility result of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, and Wigderson (STOC '88) which requires two stateful provers. In contrast to previous zero-knowledge PCPs of Kilian, Petrank, and Tardos (STOC '97), in our protocol both the prover and the PCP oracle are efficient given an NP witness.  Our main technical tool is a new primitive that we call interactive locking, an efficient realization of an unconditionally secure commitment scheme in the interactive PCP model. We implement interactive locking by adapting previous constructions of interactive hashing protocols to our setting, and also provide a direct construction which uses a minimal amount of interaction and improves over our interactive hashing based constructions.  Finally, we apply the above results towards showing the feasibility of basing unconditional cryptography on stateless tamper-proof hardware tokens, and obtain the following results: *) We show that if tokens can be used to encapsulate other tokens, then there exist unconditional and statistically secure (in fact, UC secure) protocols for general secure computation.  *) Even if token encapsulation is not possible, there are unconditional and statistically secure commitment protocols and zero-knowledge proofs for NP.  *) Finally, if token encapsulation is not possible, then no protocol can realize statistically secure oblivious transfer. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto11"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Fully Secure Functional Encryption with General Relations from the Decisional Linear Assumption&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Tatsuaki Okamoto and Katsuyuki Takashima&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt;This paper presents a fully secure functional encryption (FE) scheme for a wide class of relations, that are specified by non-monotone access structures combined with inner-product relations. The security is proven under a simple and well-examined assumption, the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption, in the standard model. The proposed FE scheme covers, as special cases, (1) the key-policy (KP) and ciphertext-policy (CP) attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes with non-monotone access structures, and (2) the FE schemes with zero and non-zero inner-product relations. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto12"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Structure-Preserving Signatures and Commitments to Group Elements &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Masayuki Abe, Georg Fuchsbauer, Jens Groth,  Kristiyan Haralambiev and Miyako Ohkubo &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto13"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Efficient Indifferentiable Hashing into Ordinary Elliptic Curves&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Eric Brier, Jean-Sebastien Coron, Thomas Icart, David    Madore,  Hugues Randriam and Mehdi Tibouchi &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt;We provide the first construction of a hash function into ordinary elliptic curves that is indifferentiable from a random oracle, based on Icart's deterministic encoding from Crypto 2009. While almost as efficient as Icart's encoding, this hash function can be plugged into any cryptosystem that requires hashing into elliptic curves, while not compromising proofs of security in the random oracle model.&lt;br /&gt;We also describe a more general (but less efficient) construction that works for a large class of encodings into elliptic curves, for example the Shallue-Woestijne-Ulas (SWU) algorithm. Finally we describe the first deterministic encoding algorithm into elliptic curves in characteristic $3$. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto14"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Credential Authenticated Identification and Key Exchange&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Jan Camenisch, Nathalie Casati, Thomas Gross and Victor Shoup&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; Secure two-party authentication and key exchange are fundamental problems.  Traditionally, the parties authenticate each other by means of their identities, using a public-key infrastructure (PKI).  However, this is not always feasible or desirable: an appropriate PKI may not be available, or the parties may want to remain anonymous, and not reveal their identities.&lt;br /&gt;To address these needs, we introduce the notions of credential-authenticated identification (CAID) and key exchange (CAKE), where the compatibility of the parties' \emph{credentials} is the criteria for authentication, rather than the parties' \emph{identities} relative to some PKI.  We formalize CAID and CAKE in the universal composability (UC) framework, with natural ideal functionalities, and we give practical, modularly designed protocol realizations.  We prove all our protocols UC-secure in the adaptive corruption model with erasures, assuming a common reference string (CRS).  The proofs are based on standard cryptographic assumptions and do not rely on random oracles.&lt;br /&gt;CAKE includes password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) as a special case, and we present two new PAKE protocols.  The first one is interesting in that it is uses completly different techniques than known practical PAKE protocols, and also achieves UC-security in the adaptive corruption model with erasures; the second one is the first practical PAKE protocol that provides a meaningful form of resilience against server compromise without relying on random oracles. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto15"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Concurrent Password-Authenticated Key Exchange in the Plain Model&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Vipul Goyal, Abhishek Jain and Rafail Ostrovsky&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; The problem of password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) has been extensively studied. However to date, no construction is known for a PAKE protocol that is secure in the plain model in the setting of concurrent self-composition, where polynomially many protocol sessions with the same password may be executed on the network in an arbitrarily interleaved manner, and where the adversary may corrupt any number of parties.  In this paper, we resolve this open problem. In particular, we give the first construction of a PAKE protocol that is secure (with respect to the definition of Goldreich and Lindell) in the concurrent setting in the plain model. We stress that we allow any unbounded polynomially-many concurrent sessions. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto16"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Instantiability of RSA-OEAP under Chosen-Plaintext Attack&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Eike Kiltz, Adam O'Neill and Adam Smith&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; We give the first non-trivial positive standard model instantiation result about the influential RSA-OAEP encryption scheme of Bellare and Rogaway (Eurocrypt~'94), and indeed about \emph{any} encryption or signature scheme appearing in the PKCS \#1 v2.1 standard.&lt;br /&gt;Specifically, we show that $f$-OAEP is semantically secure if the trapdoor function $f$ is \emph{lossy} in the sense of Peikert and Waters (STOC~'08) and the initial hash function is \emph{$t$-wise independent} for appropriate $t$ (in particular, neither hash function is modeled as a random oracle). Furthermore, under the $\Phi$-Hiding Assumption of Cachin et al. (Eurocrypt~'99), we show that RSA is lossy (by a factor $1/e$, where $e$ is the public RSA exponent). Taken together, these results refute "uninstantiability" of RSA-OAEP in the sense of Canetti et al.~(STOC~'98); \emph{i.e.}, there exists (a family of) efficiently computable functions that can securely replace its random oracles under reasonable assumptions. In particular, they increase our confidence that chosen-plaintext attacks are unlikely to be found against RSA-OAEP. In contrast, OAEP's predecessor in PKCS \#1 v1.5 was shown to be vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attacks by Coron et al.~(Eurocrypt~'00).  Our first result is actually much more general: for \emph{any} "padding-based" encryption scheme whose trapdoor permutation is lossy, we show that in order to prove semantic security it suffices to argue that the padding function "fools" small-output distinguishers on a class of high-entropy input distributions. We then show that the first round of the OAEP padding satisfies this "fooling" condition.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto17"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Efficient Chosen-Ciphertext Security via Extractable Hash Proofs&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Hoeteck Wee&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; We introduce the notion of an extractable hash proof system. Essentially, this is a special kind of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge system where the secret keys may be generated in one of two modes to allow for either simulation or extraction.&lt;br /&gt;-- We show how to derive efficient CCA-secure encryption schemes via extractable hash proofs in a simple and modular fashion. Our construction clarifies and generalizes the recent factoring-based cryptosystem of Hofheinz and Kiltz (Eurocrypt 09), and is reminiscent of an approach proposed by Rackoff and Simon (Crypto 91). We show how to instantiate extractable hash proof system for hard search problems, notably factoring and computational Diffie-Hellman. Using our framework, we obtain the first CCA-secure encryption scheme based on CDH where the public key is a constant number of group elements and a more modular and conceptually simpler variant of the Hofheinz-Kiltz cryptosystem (though less efficient).&lt;br /&gt;-- We introduce adaptive weakly trapdoor functions, a relaxation of the adaptive trapdoor functions considered by Kiltz, Mohassel and O'Neil (Eurocrypt '10), but nonetheless imply CCA-secure encryption schemes. We show how to construct such functions using extractable hash proofs, which in turn yields realizations from hardness of factoring and CDH. This is the first general assumption that implies CCA-secure encryption while simultaneously admitting instantations from hardness of factoring, CDH and lattice-based assumptions. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto18"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Factorization of a 768-bit RSA modulus&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;IT. Kleinjung and K. Aoki and J. Franke and A.K. Lenstra and E. Thomé and J.W. Bos and P. Gaudry and A. Kruppa and P.L. Montgomery and D.A. Osvik and H. te Riele and A. Timofeev and P. Zimmermann&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt;  This paper reports on the factorization of the 768-bit number RSA-768 by the number field sieve factoring method and discusses some implications for RSA. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto19"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Correcting Errors in RSA Private Keys&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Wilko Henecka, Alexander May and Alexander Meurer&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; Let $pk=(N,e)$ be an RSA public key with corresponding secret key $sk=(p,q,d,d_p,d_q, q_p^{-1})$. Assume that we obtain partial error-free information of $sk$, e.g., assume that we obtain half of the most significant bits of $p$. Then there are well-known algorithms to recover the full secret key. As opposed to these algorithms that allow for {\em correcting erasures} of the key $sk$, we present for the first time a heuristic probabilistic algorithm that is capable of {\em correcting errors} in $sk$ provided that $e$ is small. That is, on input of a full but error-prone secret key $\tilde{sk}$ we reconstruct the original $sk$ by correcting the faults.&lt;br /&gt;More precisely, consider an error rate of $\delta \in [0,\frac 1 2)$, where we flip each bit in $sk$ with probability $\delta$ resulting in an erroneous key $\tilde{sk}$. Our Las-Vegas type algorithm allows to recover $sk$ from $\tilde {sk}$ in expected time polynomial in $\log N$ with success probability close to 1, provided that $\delta &lt;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto20"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Improved Differential Attacks for ECHO and Grostl&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Thomas Peyrin&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; We present improved cryptanalysis of two second-round SHA-3 candidates: the AES-based hash functions ECHO and Grostl. We explain methods for building better differential trails for ECHO by increasing the granularity of the truncated differential paths previously considered. In the case of Grostl, we describe a new technique, the internal differential attack, which shows that when using parallel computations designers should also consider the differential security between the parallel branches. Then, we exploit the recently introduced start-from-the-middle or Super-Sbox attacks, that proved to be very efficient when attacking AES-like permutations, to achieve a very efficient utilization of the available freedom degrees. Finally, we obtain the best known attacks so far for both ECHO and Grostl. In particular, we are able to mount a distinguishing attack for the full Grostl-256 compression function. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto21"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;A Practical-Time Attack on the KASUMI Cryptosystem Used in GSM and 3G Telephony&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Orr Dunkelman and Nathan Keller and Adi Shamir&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; The privacy of most GSM phone conversations is currently protected by the 20+ years old A5/1 and A5/2 stream ciphers, which were repeatedly shown to be cryptographically weak. They will soon be replaced by the new A5/3 (and the soon to be announced A5/4) algorithm based on the block cipher KASUMI, which is a modified version of MISTY. In this paper we describe a new type of attack called a sandwich attack, and use it to construct a simple distinguisher for 7 of the 8 rounds of KASUMI with an amazingly high probability of 2^{-14}. By using this distinguisher and analyzing the single remaining round, we can derive the complete 128 bit key of the full KASUMI by using only 4~related keys, 2^{26} data, 2^{30} bytes of memory, and 2^{32} time. These complexities are so small that we have actually simulated the attack in less than two hours on a single PC, and experimentally verified its correctness and complexity. Interestingly, neither our technique nor any other published attack can break MISTY in less than the 2^{128} complexity of exhaustive search, which indicates that the changes made by ETSI's SAGE group in moving from MISTY to KASUMI resulted in a much weaker cipher. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto22"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Universally Composable Incoercibility&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Dominique Unruh and Jörn Müller-Quade&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; We present the UC/c framework, a general definition for secure and incoercible multi-party protocols. Our framework allows to model arbitrary reactive protocol tasks (by specifying an ideal functionality) and comes with a universal composition theorem. We show that given natural setup assumptions, we can construct incoercible two-party protocols realising arbitrary functionalities (with respect to static adversaries).  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto23"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Concurrent Non-Malleable Zero Knowledge Proofs&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Huijia Lin, Rafael Pass, Wei-lung Dustin Tseng, and Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; Concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge (NMZK) considers the concurrent execution of zero-knowledge protocols in a setting where the attacker can simultaneously corrupt multiple provers and verifiers. Barak, Prabhakaran and Sahai (FOCS'06) recently provided the first construction of a concurrent NMZK protocol without any set-up assumptions. Their protocol, however, is only computationally sound (a.k.a., a concurrent NMZK \emph{argument}). In this work we present the first construction of a concurrent NMZK \emph{proof} without any set-up assumptions. Our protocol requires $O(n)$ rounds assuming one-way functions, or $\tilde{O}(\log n)$ rounds assuming collision-resistant hash functions.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto24"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt; Equivalence of Uniform Key Agreement and Composition Insecurity&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Chongwon Cho and Chen-Kuei Lee and Rafail Ostrovsky&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; It is well known that proving the security of a key agreement protocol (even in a special case where the protocol transcript looks random to an outside observer) is at least as difficult as proving $P \not = NP$. Another (seemingly unrelated) statement in cryptography is the existence of two or more non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions that do not become adaptively secure under sequential or parallel composition. In 2006, Pietrzak showed that {\em at least one} of these two seemingly unrelated statements is true. In other words, the existence of key agreement or the existence of the adaptively insecure composition of non-adaptively secure functions is true. Pietrzak's result was significant since it showed a surprising connection between the worlds of public-key (i.e., "cryptomania") and private-key cryptography (i.e., "minicrypt"). In this paper we show that this duality is far stronger: we show that {\em at least one} of these two statements must also be false. In other words, we show their {\em equivalence}.&lt;br /&gt;More specifically, Pietrzak's paper shows that if sequential composition of two non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions is not adaptively secure, then there exists a key agreement protocol. However, Pietrzak's construction implies a slightly stronger fact: If sequential composition does not imply adaptive security (in the above sense), then a {\em uniform-transcript} key agreement protocol exists, where by uniform-transcript we mean a key agreement protocol where the transcript of the protocol execution is indistinguishable from uniform to eavesdroppers. In this paper, we complete the picture, and show the reverse direction as well as a strong equivalence between these two notions. More specifically, as our main result, we show that if there exists {\em any} uniform-transcript key agreement protocol, then composition does not imply adaptive security. Our result holds for both parallel and sequential composition in the contexts of general-composition and self-composition. Our implication holds based on virtually all known key agreement protocols, and can also be based on general complexity assumptions of the existence of dense trapdoor permutations. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto25"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Non-Interactive Verifiable Computing: Outsourcing Computation to Untrusted Workers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Rosario Gennaro, Craig Gentry and Bryan Parno&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; We introduce and formalize the notion of Verifiable Computation, which enables a computationally weak client to "outsource" the computation of a function F on various dynamically-chosen inputs x_1,...,x_k to one or more workers. The workers return the result of the function evaluation, e.g., y_i=F(x_i), as well as a proof that the computation of F was carried out correctly on the given value x_i. The primary constraint is that the verification of the proof should require substantially less computational effort than computing F(x_i) from scratch.&lt;br /&gt;We present a protocol that allows the worker to return a computationally-sound, non-interactive proof that can be verified in O(m) time, where m is the bit-length of the output of F. The protocol requires a one-time pre-processing stage by the client which takes O(|C|) time, where C is the smallest known Boolean circuit computing F. Unlike previous work in this area, our scheme also provides (at no additional cost) input and output privacy for the client, meaning that the workers do not learn any information about the x_i or y_i values. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto26"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt; Improved Delegation of Computation using Fully Homomorphic Encryption&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Kai-Min Chung, Yael Kalai and Salil Vadhan&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; Following Gennaro, Gentry, and Parno (Cryptology ePrint Archive 2009/547), we use fully homomorphic encryption to design improved schemes for delegating computation. In such schemes, a {\em delegator} outsources the computation of a function $F$ on many, dynamically chosen inputs $x_i$ to a {\em worker} in such a way that it is infeasible for the worker to make the delegator accept a result other than $F(x_i)$. The "online phase" of the Gennaro et al. scheme is very efficient: the parties exchange two messages, the delegator runs in time $\poly(\log T)$, and the worker runs in time $\poly(T)$, where $T$ is the time complexity of $F$. However, the "offline phase" (which depends on the function $F$ but not the inputs to be delegated) is inefficient: the delegator runs in time $\poly(T)$ and generates a public key of length $\poly(T)$ that needs to be accessed by the worker during the online phase.&lt;br /&gt;Our first construction eliminates the large public key from the Gennaro et al. scheme. The delegator still invests $\poly(T)$ time in the offline phase, but does not need to communicate or publish anything. Our second construction reduces the work of the delegator in the offline phase to $\poly(\log T)$ at the price of a 4-message (offline) interaction with a $\poly(T)$-time worker (which need not be the same as the workers used in the online phase). Finally, we describe a "pipelined" implementation of the second construction that avoids the need to re-run the offline construction after errors are detected (assuming errors are not too frequent).  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto27"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Oblivious RAM Revisited&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Benny Pinkas and Tzachy Reinman&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; We reinvestigate the oblivious RAM concept introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky, which enables a client, that can store locally only a constant amount of data, to store remotely $n$ data items, and access them while hiding the identities of items which are accessed.  Oblivious RAM is often cited as a powerful tool, which can be used, for example, for search on encrypted data or for preventing cache attacks. However, it is also commonly considered to be impractical due to its overhead, which is asymptotically efficient but is quite high: each data request is replaced by $O(\log^4 n)$ requests, or by $O(\log^3 n)$ requests where the constant in the "$O$" notation is a few thousands. In addition, $O(n \log n)$ external memory is required in order to store the $n$ data items.  We redesign the oblivious RAM protocol using modern tools, namely Cuckoo hashing and a new oblivious sorting algorithm. The resulting protocol uses only $O(n)$ external memory, and replaces each data request by only $O(\log^2 n)$ requests (with a small constant). This analysis is validated by experiments that we ran.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto28"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt; On Strong Simulation and Composable Point Obfuscation&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Nir Bitansky and Ran Canetti&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt; The Virtual Black Box (VBB) property for program obfuscators provides a strong guarantee: Anything computable by an efficient adversary given the obfuscated program can also be computed by an efficient simulator that has only oracle access to the program.  However, we know how to achieve this notion only for very restricted classes of programs.&lt;br /&gt;This work proposes a simple relaxation of VBB: Allow the simulator unbounded computation time, while still allowing only polynomially many queries to the oracle. We then demonstrate the viability of this relaxed notion, which we call Virtual Grey Box (VGB), in the context of fully composable obfuscators of point programs: It is known that, w.r.t. VBB, if such obfuscators exist then there exist multi-bit point obfuscators (aka "digital lockers") and subsequently also very strong variants of encryption that remain secure under key leakage and key-dependent-messages. However, no composable VBB-obfuscators for point programs have been shown. We show fully composable {\em VGB}-obfuscators for point programs under a strong variant of the Decision Diffie Hellman assumption, and show they still suffice for the above applications &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto29"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Protocols for Multiparty Coin Toss With Dishonest Majority&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Amos Beimel, Eran Omri and Ilan Orlov&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt;Generating random bits is a fundamental problem in cryptography. Coin-tossing protocols, which generate a random bit with uniform distribution, are used as a building box in many cryptographic protocols. Cleve [STOC 1986] has shown that if at least half of the parties can be malicious, then, in any $r$-round coin-tossing protocol, the malicious parties can cause a bias of $\Omega(1/r)$ in the bit that the honest parties output. However, for more than two decades the best known protocols had bias $t/\sqrt{r}$, where $t$ is the number of corrupted parties. Recently, in a surprising result, Moran, Naor, and Segev [TCC 2009] have shown that there is an $r$-round two-party coin-tossing protocol with the optimal bias of $O(1/r)$. We extend Moran et al.~results to the multiparty model when less than 2/3 of the parties are malicious. The bias of our protocol is proportional to $1/r$ and depends on the gap between the number of malicious parties and the number of honest parties in the protocol. Specifically, for a constant number of parties or when the number of malicious parties is somewhat larger than half, we present an $r$-round $m$-party coin-tossing protocol with optimal bias of $O(1/r)$. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto30"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Multiparty Computation for Dishonest Majority: from Passive to Active Security at Low Cost&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Ivan Damgard and Claudio Orlandi (Aarhus University)&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="fixed"&gt;Multiparty computation protocols have been known for more than twenty years now, but due to their lack of efficiency their use is still limited in real-world applications: the goal of this paper is the design of efficient two and multi party computation aimed to fill the gap between theory and practice. We propose a new protocol to securely evaluate reactive arithmetic circuits, that offers security against an active adversary in the universally composable security framework. Instead of the "do-and-compile" approach (where the parties use zero-knowledge proofs to show that they are following the protocol) our key ingredient is an efficient version of the "cut-and-choose" technique, that allow us to achieve active security for just a (small) constant amount of work more than for passive security. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="crypto31"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Secure Multiparty Computation with Minimal Interaction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz and Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; We revisit the question of secure multiparty computation (MPC) with two rounds of interaction. It was previously shown by Gennaro et al.\ (Crypto 2002) that three or more communication rounds are necessary for general MPC protocols with guaranteed output delivery, assuming that there may be $t\ge 2$ corrupted parties. This negative result holds regardless of the total number of parties, even if {\em broadcast} messages are allowed in each round, and even if only {\em fairness} is required. We complement this negative result by presenting matching positive results.&lt;br /&gt;Our first main result is that if only {\em one} party may be corrupted, then $n\ge 5$ parties can securely compute any function of their inputs using only {\em two} rounds of interaction over secure point-to-point channels (without broadcast or any additional setup). The protocol makes a black-box use of a pseudorandom generator, or alternatively can offer unconditional security for functionalities in $\NCone$.&lt;br /&gt;We also prove a similar result in a client-server setting, where there are $m\ge 2$ clients who hold inputs and should receive outputs, and $n$ additional servers with no inputs and outputs. For this setting we obtain a general MPC protocol which requires a single message from each client to each server, followed by a single message from each server to each client. The protocol is secure against a single corrupted client and against coalitions of $t&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;  &lt;a name="crypto32"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;A Zero-One Law for Cryptographic Complexity with Respect to Computational UC Security&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;/div&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Hemanta K. Maji and Manoj Prabhakaran and Mike Rosulek&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;div class="fixed"&gt;We use security in the Universal Composition framework as a means to study the "cryptographic complexity" of 2-party secure computation tasks (functionalities). We say that a functionality F {\em reduces to} another functionality G if there is a UC-secure protocol for F using ideal access to G This reduction is a natural and fine-grained way to compare the relative complexities of cryptographic tasks. There are two natural "extremes" of complexity under the reduction: the {\em trivial} functionalities, which can be reduced to any other functionality; and the {\em complete} functionalities, to which any other functionality can be reduced. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;In this work we show that under a natural computational assumption (the existence of a protocol for oblivious transfer secure against semi-honest adversaries), there is a {\bf zero-one law} for the cryptographic complexity of 2-party deterministic functionalities. Namely, {\em every such functionality is either trivial or complete.} No other qualitative distinctions exist among functionalities, under this computational assumption.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;While nearly all previous work classifying multi-party computation functionalities has been restricted to the case of secure function evaluation, our results are the first to consider completeness of arbitrary {\em reactive} functionalities, which receive input and give output repeatedly throughout several rounds of interaction. One important technical contribution in this work is to initiate the comprehensive study of the cryptographic properties of reactive functionalities. We model these functionalities as finite automata and develop an automata-theoretic methodology for classifying and studying their cryptographic properties. Consequently, we completely characterize the reactive behaviors that lead to cryptographic non-triviality. Another contribution of independent interest is to optimize the hardness assumption used by Canetti et al. (STOC 2002) in showing that the common random string functionality is complete (a result independently obtained by Damg{\aa}rd et al. (TCC 2010)).  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt; &lt;a name="crypto33"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;div&gt; &lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;On Generalized Feistel Networks&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;/div&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Viet Tung Hoang and Phillip Rogaway&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;div class="fixed"&gt; We prove beyond-birthday-bound security for the well-known types of generalized Feistel networks, including: (1) unbalanced Feistel networks, where the $n$-bit to $m$-bit round functions may have $n\ne m$; (2) alternating Feistel networks, where the round functions alternate between contracting and expanding; (3) type-1, type-2, and type-3 Feistel networks, where $n$-bit to $n$-bit round functions are used to encipher $kn$-bit strings for some $k\ge2$; and (4) numeric variants of any of the above, where one enciphers numbers in some given range rather than strings of some given size. Using a unified analytic framework we show that, in any of these settings, for any $\varepsilon&gt;0$, with enough rounds, the subject scheme can tolerate CCA attacks of up to $q\sim N^{1-\varepsilon}$ adversarial queries, where $N$ is the size of the round functions' domain (the size of the larger domain for alternating Feistel). This is asymptotically optimal. Prior analyses for generalized Feistel networks established security to only $q\sim N^{0.5}$ adversarial queries. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt; &lt;a name="crypto34"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;div&gt; &lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;/div&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Hugo Krawczyk&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;div class="fixed"&gt; In spite of the central role of key derivation functions (KDF) in applied cryptography, there has been little formal work addressing the design and analysis of general multi-purpose KDFs. In practice, most KDFs (including those widely standardized) follow ad-hoc approaches that treat cryptographic hash functions as perfectly random functions. In this paper we close some gaps between theory and practice by contributing to the study and engineering of KDFs in several ways. We provide detailed rationale for the design of KDFs based on the extract-then-expand approach; we present the first general and rigorous definition of KDFs and their security that we base on the notion of computational extractors; we specify a concrete fully practical KDF based on the HMAC construction; and we provide an analysis of this construction based on the extraction and pseudorandom properties of HMAC. The resultant KDF design can support a large variety of KDF applications under suitable assumptions on the underlying hash function; particular attention and effort is devoted to minimizing these assumptions as much as possible for each usage scenario. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;Beyond the theoretical interest in modeling KDFs, this work is intended to address two important and timely needs of cryptographic applications: (i) providing a single hash-based KDF design that can be standardized for use in multiple and diverse applications, and (ii) providing a conservative, yet efficient, design that exercises much care in the way it utilizes a cryptographic hash function.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;(The HMAC-based scheme presented here, named HKDF, is being standardized by the IETF.)   &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt; &lt;a name="crypto35"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Time space tradeoffs for attacks against One-way functions and PRGs&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;/div&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Anindya De and Luca Trevisan and Madhur Tulsiani&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt;&lt;/div&gt; &lt;div class="fixed"&gt; We study time space tradeoffs in the complexity of attacks against one-way functions and pseudorandom generators.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;Fiat and Naor (SICOMP 99) show that for every function $f: [N]\to [N]$ there is an algorithm that inverts $f$ everywhere using (ignoring lower order factors) time, space and advice at most $N^{3/4}$.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;We show that an algorithm using time, space and advice at most \[ \max \{ \epsilon^{\frac 54} N^{\frac 34} \ , \ \sqrt{\epsilon N} \} \] exists that inverts $f$ on at least an $\epsilon$ fraction of inputs.  A lower bound of $\tilde \Omega(\sqrt { \epsilon N })$ also holds, making our result tight in the "low end" of $\epsilon \leq \sqrt[3]{\frac{1}{N}}$.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;(Both the results of Fiat and Naor and ours are formulated as more general trade-offs between the time and the space and advice length of the algorithm. The results quoted above correspond to the interesting special case in which time equals space and advice length.)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;We also show that for every length-increasing generator $G:[N] \to [2N]$ there is a algorithm that achieves distinguishing probability $\epsilon$ between the output of $G$ and the uniform distribution and that can be implemented in polynomial (in $\log N$) time and with advice and space $O(\epsilon^2 \cdot N\log N)$.  We prove a lower bound of $S\cdot T\geq \Omega(\epsilon^2 N)$ where $T$ is the time used by the algorithm and $S$ is the amount of advice. This lower bound applies even when the distinguisher has oracle access to $G$.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;We prove stronger lower bounds in the {\em common random string} model, for families of one-way permutations and of pseudorandom generators. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt; &lt;a name="crypto36"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt; Pseudorandom Functions and Permutations Provably Secure Against Related-Key Attacks&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Mihir Bellare and David Cash&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;div class="fixed"&gt; This paper fills an important foundational gap with the first proofs, under standard assumptions and in the standard model, of the existence of PRFs and PRPs resisting rich and relevant forms of related-key attack (RKA). An RKA allows the adversary to query the function not only under the target key but under other keys derived from it in adversary-specified ways. Based on the Naor-Reingold PRF we obtain an RKA-PRF whose keyspace is a group and that is proven, under DDH, to resist attacks in which the key may be operated on by arbibrary adversary-specified group elements. Previous work was able only to provide schemes in idealized models (ideal cipher, random oracle), under new, non-standard assumptions, or for limited classes of attacks. The reason was technical difficulties that we resolve via a new approach and framework that, in addition to the above, yields other RKA-PRFs including a DLIN-based one derived from the Lewko-Waters PRF. Over the last 15 years cryptanalysts and blockcipher designers have routinely and consistenly targetted RKA-security; it is visibly important for abuse-resistant cryptography; and it helps protect against fault-injection sidechannel attacks. Yet ours are the first significant proofs of existence of secure constructs. We warn that our constructs are proofs-of-concept in the foundational style and not practical.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt; &lt;a name="crypto37"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Secure Two-Party Quantum Evaluation of Unitaries Against Specious Adversariess&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Frédéric Dupuis and Jesper Buus Nielsen and Louis Salvail&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;div class="fixed"&gt; We show that any two-party quantum computation, specified by a unitary which simultaneously acts on the registers of both parties, can be securely implemented against a quantum version of classical semi-honest adversaries that we call specious.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;We first show that no statistically private protocol exists for swapping qubits against specious adversaries. The swap functionality is modeled by a unitary transform that is not sufficient for universal quantum computation. It means that universality is not required in order to obtain impossibility proofs in our model. However, the swap transform can easily be implemented privately provided a classical bit commitment scheme.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;We provide a simple protocol for the evaluation of any unitary transform represented by a circuit made out of gates in some standard universal set of quantum gates. All gates except one can be implemented securely provided one call to swap made available as an ideal functionality. For each appearance of the remaining gate in the circuit, one call to a classical NL-box is required for privacy. The NL-box can easily be constructed from oblivious transfer. It follows that oblivious transfer is universal for private evaluations of unitaries as well as for classical circuits.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt;&lt;div class="fixed"&gt;Unlike the ideal swap, NL-boxes are classical primitives and cannot be represented by unitary transforms. It follows that, to some extent, this remaining gate is the hard one, like the AND gate for classical two-party computation. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt; &lt;a name="crypto38"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt; On the Efficiency of Classical and Quantum Oblivous Transfer Reductions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Severin Winkler and Juerg Wullschleger&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;div class="fixed"&gt; Due to its universality oblivious transfer (OT) is a primitive of great importance in secure multi-party computation. OT is impossible to implement from scratch in an unconditionally secure way, but there are many reductions of OT to other variants of OT, as well as other primitives such as noisy channels. It is important to know how efficient such unconditionally secure reductions can be in principle, i.e., how many instances of a given primitive are at least needed to implement OT. For perfect (error-free) implementations good lower bounds are known, e.g. the bounds by Beaver (STOC '96) or by Dodis and Micali (EUROCRYPT '99). But since in practice one is usually willing to tolerate a small probability of error and since these statistical reductions can be much more efficient, the known bounds have only limited application. In the first part of this work we provide lower bounds on the efficiency of 1-out-of-n OT and Rabin-OT reductions to distributed randomness in the statistical case. From these results we derive bounds on reductions to different variants of OT that generalize known bounds to the statistical case. Our bounds hold in particular for transformations between a finite number of primitives and for any error. In the second part we look at the efficiency of quantum reductions. Recently, Salvail, Schaffner and Sotakova (ASIACRYPT '09) showed that most classical lower bounds for perfectly secure reductions of OT to distributed randomness still hold in a quantum setting. We present a statistically secure protocol that violates these bounds by an arbitrarily large factor. We then present a weaker lower bound for the statistical setting. We use this bound to show that even quantum protocols cannot extend OT. Finally, we present two lower bounds for reductions of OT to commitments and a protocol based on string commitments that is optimal with respect to both of these bounds. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt; &lt;a name="crypto39"&gt; &lt;/a&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sampling in a Quantum Population, and Applications &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;big&gt;&lt;i&gt;Niek Bouman and Serge Fehr&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/big&gt; &lt;/div&gt; &lt;div class="fixed"&gt; We propose a framework for analyzing classical sampling strategies for estimating the Hamming weight of a large string from a few sample positions, when applied to a multi-qubit quantum system instead. The framework shows how to interpret the result of such a strategy and how to define its accuracy when applied to a quantum system. Furthermore, we show how the accuracy of any strategy relates to its accuracy in its classical usage, which is well understood for the important examples. We show the usefulness of our framework by using it to obtain new and simple security proofs for the following quantum-cryptographic schemes: BB84 quantum-key-distribution, and quantum oblivious-transfer from bit-commitment.     &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;n corrupted="" above="" protocols="" guarantee="" output="" delivery="" and="" our="" second="" main="" result="" shows="" that="" under="" relaxed="" notion="" of="" allowing="" the="" adversary="" to="" selectively="" decide="" after="" learning="" its="" own="" honest="" parties="" will="" receive="" their="" there="" is="" a="" general="" round="" mpc="" protocol="" which="" tolerates="" t=""&gt;&lt;n&gt; &lt;/n&gt;&lt;/n&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-4222391143537230594?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/4222391143537230594/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=4222391143537230594' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/4222391143537230594'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/4222391143537230594'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2010/09/crypto-2010.html' title='Crypto 2010'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-6192915007974123713</id><published>2010-02-26T00:44:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2010-02-26T00:48:37.327-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Eurocrypt 2010</title><content type='html'>Accepted papers&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul class="ap"&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Secure obfuscation for encrypted signatures, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Satoshi Hada.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext selective opening attacks, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Serge Fehr,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Dennis Hofheinz,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Eike Kiltz,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt; Hoeteck Wee.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Universally composable quantum multi-party computation, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Dominique Unruh.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the impossibility of three-move blind signature schemes, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Marc Fischlin,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Dominique Schröder.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Multi-property-preserving domain extension using polynomial-based modes of operation,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Jooyoung Lee,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;John Steinberger.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A new generic algorithm for hard knapsacks, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Nick Howgrave-Graham,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Antoine Joux.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Constant-round non-malleable commitments from sub-exponential one-way functions, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Rafael Pass,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Hoeteck Wee.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Adaptive trapdoor functions and chosen-ciphertext security, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Eike Kiltz,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Payman Mohassel,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Adam O'Neill.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Plaintext-dependent decryption: A formal security treatment of SSH-CTR, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Kenneth G. Paterson,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Gaven J. Watson.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Adaptively secure broadcast, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Martin Hirt,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Vassilis Zikas.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Key recovery attacks of practical complexity on AES-256 variants with up to 10 rounds,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Alex Biryukov,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Orr Dunkelman,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Nathan Keller,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Dmitry Khovratovich,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Adi Shamir.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Stam's collision resistance conjecture, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;John Steinberger.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Constructing verifiable random functions with large input spaces, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Susan Hohenberger,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Brent Waters.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Automatic search for related-key differentials in byte-oriented block ciphers: Application to AES, Camellia, Khazad and others, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Alex Biryukov,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Ivica Nikolić.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Partial fairness in secure two-party computation, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Dov Gordon,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Jonathan Katz.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cryptographic agility and its relation to circular encryption, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Tolga Acar,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Mira Belenkiy,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Mihir Bellare,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;David Cash.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Secure message transmission with small public discussion, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Juan Garay,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Clint Givens,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Rafail Ostrovsky.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Public-key encryption in the bounded-retrieval model, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Joel Alwen,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Yevgeniy Dodis,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Moni Naor,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Gil Segev,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Shabsi Walfish,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Daniel Wichs.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Converting pairing-based cryptosystems from composite-order groups to prime-order groups, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;David Mandell Freeman.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient device-independent quantum key distribution, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Esther Haenggi,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Renato Renner,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Stefan Wolf.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Bounded key-dependent message security, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Boaz Barak,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt; Iftach Haitner,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Dennis Hofheinz,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Yuval Ishai.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Computational soundness, co-induction, and encryption cycles, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Daniele Micciancio.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Marten van Dijk,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Craig Gentry,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Shai Halevi,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Vinod Vaikuntanathan.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Lattice enumeration using extreme pruning, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Nicolas Gama,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Phong Q. Nguyen,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Oded Regev.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Perfectly secure multiparty computation and the computational overhead of cryptography&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Ivan Damgård,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Yuval Ishai,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Mikkel Krøigaard.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A simple BGN-type cryptosystem from LWE, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Craig Gentry,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Shai Halevi,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Vinod Vaikuntanathan.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Universal one-way hash functions via inaccessible entropy, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Iftach Haitner,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Thomas Holenstein,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Omer Reingold,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Salil Vadhan,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Hoeteck Wee.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient lattice (H)IBE in the standard model, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Shweta Agrawal,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Dan Boneh,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Xavier Boyen.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Protecting circuits from leakage: The computationally-bounded and noisy cases, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Sebastian Faust,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Tal Rabin,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Leonid Reyzin,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Eran Tromer,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Vinod Vaikuntanathan.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Vadim Lyubashevsky,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Chris Peikert,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Oded Regev.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Algebraic cryptanalysis of McEliece variants with compact keys, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Jean-Charles Faugère,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Ayoub Otmani,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Ludovic Perret,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Jean-Pierre Tillich.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" id="0"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Bonsai trees, or how to delegate a lattice basis, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;David Cash,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Dennis Hofheinz,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Eike Kiltz,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Chris Peikert.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li id="0"&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Fully secure functional encryption: Attribute-based encryption and (hierarchical) inner product encryption, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;" class="au"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Allison Lewko,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Tatsuaki Okamoto,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Amit Sahai,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Katsuyuki Takashima,&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Brent Waters.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;a href="http://crypto.rd.francetelecom.com/events/eurocrypt2010/papers"&gt;http://crypto.rd.francetelecom.com/events/eurocrypt2010/papers&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-6192915007974123713?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/6192915007974123713/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=6192915007974123713' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/6192915007974123713'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/6192915007974123713'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2010/02/eurocrypt-2010.html' title='Eurocrypt 2010'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-2894895062679367701</id><published>2010-02-26T00:25:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2010-02-26T00:35:48.395-08:00</updated><title type='text'>STOC 2010</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Accepted papers&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Budget Constrained Auctions with Heterogeneous Items                      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sayan Bhattacharya (Duke), Gagan Goel (Georgia Tech), Sreenivas Gollapudi (Microsoft Research) and Kamesh Munagala (Duke)                 &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On thje Structure of Cubic and Quartic Polynomials                      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Elad Haramaty and Amir Shpilka (Technion) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;BQP and the Polynomial Hierarchy  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Scott Aaronson (MIT) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Sorting under Partial Information (without the Ellipsoid Algorithm) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Jean Cardinal (ULB), Samuel Fiorini (ULB), Gwenaël Joret (ULB), Raphaël Jungers (MIT) and J. Ian Munro (University of Waterloo) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Approximation Schemes for Steiner Forest on Planar Graphs and Graphs of Bounded Treewidth &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;MohammadHossein Bateni (Princeton University), MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi (AT&amp;amp;T Labs -- Research) and Dániel Marx (Tel Aviv University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Extensions and Limits to Vertex Sparsification &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Tom Leighton (MIT and Akamai Technologies, Inc) and Ankur Moitra (MIT) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficiently Learning Mixtures of Two Gaussians &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Adam Tauman Kalai (Microsoft), Ankur Moitra (MIT), and Gregory Valiant (UC Berkeley)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Oblivious RAMs without Cryptographic Assumptions &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Miklos Ajtai (IBM Almaden Research Center) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The HOM problem is decidable &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Guillem Godoy, Omer Giménez, Lander Ramos and Carme Àlvarez (Universitat Polit`ecnica de Catalunya) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Deterministic identity testing of depth-4 multilinear circuits with bounded top fan-in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Zohar S. Karnin and Partha Mukhopadhyay and Amir Shpilka and Ilya Volkovich (Technion) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Improved Algorithms for Computing Fisher's Market Clearing Prices &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; James B. Orlin (MIT) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Optimal Bounds for Sign-Representing the Intersection of Two Halfspaces by Polynomials &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Alexander A. Sherstov (Microsoft Research) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;QIP = PSPACE &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Rahul Jain (National University of Singapore), Zhengfeng Ji (Perimeter Institute), Sarvagya Upadhyay (University of Waterloo) and John Watrous (University of Waterloo) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Augmenting undirected node-connectivity by one &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Laszlo A. Vegh (MTA-ELTE Egervary Research Group and Department of Operations Research, Eotvos University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Solving Polynomial Equations in Smoothed Polynomial Time and a Near Solution to Smale's 17th Problem &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Peter Buergisser (University of Paderborn) and Felipe Cucker (City University of Hong Kong) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Matroid Matching: the Power of Local Search &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jon Lee (IBM TJ Watson Research Center), Maxim Sviridenko (IBM TJ Watson Research Center) and Jan Vondrak (IBM Almaden Research Center)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Tensor-Rank and Lower Bounds for Arithmetic Formulas &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Ran Raz (Weizmann Institute) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Towards Polynomial Lower Bounds for Dynamic Problems &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Mihai Patrascu (AT&amp;amp;T Labs) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Improving Exhaustive Search Implies Superpolynomial Lower Bounds &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Ryan Williams (IBM Almaden Research Center) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;An Optimal Ancestry Scheme and Small Universal Posets &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Pierre Fraigniaud and Amos Korman (CNRS and Univ. Paris Diderot) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Tractable hypergraph properties for constraint satisfaction and conjunctive queries &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Dániel Marx (Tel Aviv University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the searchability of small-world networks with arbitrary underlying structure &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Pierre Fraigniaud (CNRS and Univ. Paris Diderot) and George Giakkoupis (Univ. Paris Diderot) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Satisfiability Allows No Nontrivial Sparsification Unless The Polynomial-Time Hierarchy Collapses &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Holger Dell (Humboldt University of Berlin) and Dieter van Melkebeek (University of Wisconsin-Madison) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A shorter proof of the Graph Minor Algorithm - The Unique Linkage Theorem - &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Ken-ichi Kawarabayashi (National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo) and Paul Wollan (University of Rome, La Sapienza) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Pseudorandom Generators for Polynomial Threshold Functions &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Raghu Meka and David Zuckerman (University of Texas at Austin) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;How to Compress Interactive Communication &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Boaz Barak (Princeton University), Mark Braverman (Microsoft Research New England), Xi Chen (University of Southern California) and Anup Rao (University of Washington) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Zero-One Frequency Laws &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Vladimir Braverman and Rafail Ostrovsky (UCLA) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The maximum multiflow problems with bounded fractionality &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Hiroshi Hirai (Reseach Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Kyoto University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Measuring Independence of Datasets &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Vladimir Braverman and Rafail Ostrovsky (UCLA) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Geometry of Differential Privacy &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Moritz Hardt (Princeton University) and Kunal Talwar (Microsoft Research) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;An Invariance Principle For Polytopes &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Prahladh Harsha (Tata Institute of Fundamental Research), Adam Klivans (UT-Austin) and Raghu Meka (UT-Austin) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Perfect Matchings in O(n log n) Time in Regular Bipartite Graphs &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ashish Goel (Stanford University and Twitter), Michael Kapralov (Stanford University) and Sanjeev Khanna (University of Pennsylvania) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Quantum Lovasz Local Lemma &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Andris Ambainis (University of Latvia), Julia Kempe (Tel Aviv University) and Or Sattath (Hebrew University and Tel Aviv University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Jason D. Hartline (Northwestern University) and Brendan Lucier (University of Toronto) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Strong Direct Product Theorem for Disjointness &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Hartmut Klauck (Centre for Quantum Technologies, Singapore) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Recognizing well-parenthesized expressions in the streaming model &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Frederic Magniez (LRI, Univ. Paris-Sud, CNRS), Claire Mathieu (Brown University) and Ashwin Nayak (U. Waterloo and Perimeter Institute) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Conditional Hardness of Precedence Constrained Scheduling on Identical Machines &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Ola Svensson (KTH - Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;An Improved LP-based Approximation for Steiner Tree &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jaroslaw Byrka (EPFL, Lausanne), Fabrizio Grandoni (Universita di Roma Tor Vergata), Thomas Rothvoss (EPFL, Lausanne) and Laura Sanita (EPFL, Lausanne) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Complexity of #CSP &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Martin Dyer and David Richerby (University of Leeds) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Approximate Sparse Recovery: Optimizing Time and Measurements &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Anna Gilbert (University of Michigan) Yi Li (University of Michigan), Ely Porat (Bar Ilan University) and Martin Strauss (University of Michigan) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Hardness of the Noncommutative Determinant &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Vikraman Arvind and Srikanth Srinivasan (Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Deterministic Single Exponential Time Algorithm for Most Lattice Problems based on Voronoi Cell Computations &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Daniele Micciancio and Panagiotis Voulgaris (UCSD) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Combinatorial approach to the interpolation method and scaling limits in sparse random graphs &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Mohsen Bayati (Stanford), David Gamarnik (MIT) and Prasad Tetali (Georgia Institute of Technology) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Weighted Geometric Set Cover via Quasi-Uniform Sampling &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Kasturi Varadarajan (University of Iowa) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Complexity Theory for Operators in Analysis &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Akitoshi Kawamura and Stephen Cook (University of Toronto) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Odd Cycle Packing &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Ken-ichi Kawarabayashi (National Institute of Informatics, Japan) and Bruce Reed (McGill University and Projet MASCOTTE) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Median Mechanism: Interactive and Efficient Privacy with Multiple Queries &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Aaron Roth (CMU) and Tim Roughgarden (Stanford) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Round Complexity of Covert Computation &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Vipul Goyal (MSR India) and Abhishek Jain (UCLA) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Public-Key Cryptography from Different Assumptions &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Benny Applebaum (Weizmann Institute of Science), Boaz Barak (Princeton University) and Avi Wigderson (Institute for Advanced Study) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the List-Decodability of Random Linear Codes &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Venkatesan Guruswami (Carnegie Mellon University), Johan Håstad (KTH - Royal Institute of Technology) and Swastik Kopparty (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Hardness Amplification in Proof Complexity &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Paul Beame (University of Washington), Trinh Huynh (University of Washington) and Toniann Pitassi (University of Toronto) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Non-commutative circuits and the sum-of-squares problem &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Pavel Hrubes (Princeton University), Avi Wigderson (Institute for Advanced Study) and Amir Yehudayoff (Institute for Advanced Study) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Faster approximation schemes for fractional multicommodity flow problems via dynamic graph algorithms &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Aleksander Madry (MIT) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficiency Improvements in Constructing Pseudorandom Generators from One-Way Functions &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Iftach Haitner (Microsoft Research New England), Omer Reingold (Microsoft Research Silicon Valley and Weizmann Institute of Science) and Salil Vadhan (Harvard University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Load balancing and orientability thresholds for random hypergraphs &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Pu Gao and Nicholas Wormald (University of Waterloo) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Bounding the average sensitivity and noise sensitivity of polynomial threshold functions &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ilias Diakonikolas (Columbia University), Prahladh Harsha (Tata Institute of Fundamental Research), Adam R. Klivans (University of Texas), Raghu Meka (University of Texas), Prasad Raghavendra (Microsoft Research New England), Rocco A. Servedio (Columbia University) and Li-Yang Tan (Columbia University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Graph Expansion and the Unique Games Conjecture &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Prasad Raghavendra (Microsoft Research New England) and David Steurer (Princeton University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Approximations for the Isoperimetric and Spectral Profile of Graphs and Related Parameters &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Prasad Raghavendra (Microsoft Research New England), David Steurer (Princeton University) and Prasad Tetali (Georgia Tech) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Detecting High Log-Densities -- an $O(n^{1/4})$ Approximation for Densest $k$-Subgraph &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Aditya Bhaskara (Princeton University), Moses Charikar (Princeton University), Eden Chlamtac (Weizmann Institute of Science), Uriel Feige (Weizmann Institute of Science) and Aravindan Vijayaraghavan (Princeton University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Near-optimal extractors against quantum storage &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Anindya De and Thomas Vidick (UC Berkeley) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Complexity of Circuit Satisfiability &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ramamohan Paturi (University of California, San Diego) and Pavel Pudl\'ak (Mathematical Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Connectivity Oracles for Failure Prone Graphs &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Seth Pettie and Ran Duan (University of Michigan) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Shuchi Chawla (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Jason Hartline (Northwestern University), David Malec (University of Wisconsin-Madison) and Balasubramanian Sivan (University of Wisconsin-Madison) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Subgraph Sparsification and Nearly Optimal Ultrasparsifiers &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alexandra Kolla (Institute for Advanced Study), Yury Makarychev (Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago), Amin Saberi (Stanford University) and Shang-Hua Teng (University of Southern California) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;  Bilipschitz snowflakes, metrics of negative type, and PSD flows &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; James R. Lee and Mohammad Moharrami (University of Washington) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Limits of Buffering: A Tight Lower Bound for Dynamic Membership in the External Memory Model &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Elad Verbin (ITCS, Tsinghua University) and Qin Zhang (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Optimal Homologous Cycles, Total Unimodularity, and Linear Programming &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tamal K. Dey (Ohio State University), Anil N. Hirani (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) and Bala Krishnamoorthy (Washington State University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Distributed Computation in Dynamic Networks &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Fabian Kuhn (University of Lugano), Nancy Lynch (MIT) and Rotem Oshman (MIT) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Full Characterization of Quantum Advice &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Scott Aaronson and Andrew Drucker (MIT) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Maintaining a Large Matching or a Small Vertex Cover &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Krzysztof Onak (MIT) and Ronitt Rubinfeld (MIT and Tel Aviv University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Almost Tight Bounds for Rumour Spreading with Conductance &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Flavio Chierichetti, Silvio Lattanzi and Alessandro Panconesi (Sapienza University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Changing Base without Losing Space &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Yevgeniy Dodis (New York University) and Mihai Pastrascu (AT&amp;amp;T Labs) and Mikkel Thorup (AT&amp;amp;T Labs) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Price of Privately Releasing Contingency Tables and the Spectra of Random Matrices with Correlated Rows &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Shiva Kasiviswanathan (Los Alamos National Laboratory), Mark Rudelson (University of Missouri), Adam Smith (Pennsylvania State University) and Jonathan Ullman (Harvard University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Saving Space by Algebraization &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Daniel Lokshtanov and Jesper Nederlof (University of Bergen) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Privacy Amplification with Asymptotically Optimal Entropy Loss &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Nishanth Chandran (UCLA), Bhavana Kanukurthi (Boston University), Rafail Ostrovsky (UCLA) and Leonid Reyzin (Boston University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Sparse Johnson-Lindenstrauss Transform &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Anirban Dasgupta and Ravi Kumar and Tamas Sarlos (Yahoo! Research) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Local List-Decoding and Testing of Random Linear Codes from High-Error &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Swastik Kopparty and Shubhangi Saraf (MIT) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Differential Privacy Under Continual Observation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Cynthia Dwork (Microsoft Research), Moni Naor (Weizmann Institute), Toniann Pitassi (University of Toronto) and Guy Rothblum (Princeton University) &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/newengland/events/stoc2010/accepted.htm&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-2894895062679367701?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/2894895062679367701/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=2894895062679367701' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2894895062679367701'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2894895062679367701'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2010/02/stoc-2010.html' title='STOC 2010'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-6925253526646366464</id><published>2010-02-11T13:36:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2010-02-11T13:38:07.981-08:00</updated><title type='text'>COSADE 2010</title><content type='html'>&lt;div id="col3_content" class="clearfix"&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                           &lt;/div&gt;&lt;h1 style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Accepted Papers &lt;/h1&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;ol style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;About Probability Density Function Estimation for Side Channel Analysis&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;p&gt; Florent Flament, Houssem Maghrebi, Moulay Aziz Elabid, Jean-Luc Danger, Sylvain Guilley and Laurent Sauvage, Telecom ParisTech, France&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Biasing power traces to improve correlation in power analysis attacks&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;p&gt; Yongdae Kim, Akeshi Sugawara, Naofumi Homma and Takafumi Aoki, Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University, Japan Akashi Satoh, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Japan&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Correlation power analysis in frequency domain&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;p&gt;    Oliver Schimmel, Technical University Darmstadt,  Germany&lt;br /&gt;  Paul Duplys, Eberhard Boehl and Jan Hayek, Robert Bosch GmbH, Germany&lt;br /&gt;  Wolfgang Rosenstiel, University of Tübingen, Germany&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;DPA Characteristic Evaluation of SASEBO for Board Level Simulation&lt;/b&gt;&lt;p&gt; Toshihiro Katashita, Akashi Satoh, Katsuya Kikuchi, Hiroshi Nakagawa, Masahiro Aoyagi, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Japan&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Improved Point of Interest Search for Template Attacks &lt;/b&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Martin Baer, Fraunhofer SIT, Germany&lt;br /&gt; Hermann Drexler and Jürgen Pulkus. Giesecke &amp;amp; Devrient, Germany&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Performance and Security Aspects of Client-Side SSL/TLS Processing on Mobile Devices&lt;/b&gt;   &lt;p&gt;Johann Groszschaedl. University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Randomizing the Montgomery Multiplication to Repel Template Attacks on Multiplicative Masking&lt;/b&gt;   &lt;p&gt;Christoph Herbst and Marcel Medwed, IAIK ,TU Graz, Austria&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Right-to-Left or Left-to-Right Exponentiation?&lt;/b&gt;   &lt;p&gt;Colin Walter, Royal Holloway, United Kingdom&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Side Channel Leakage Profiling in Software&lt;/b&gt;   &lt;p&gt;Daniel Shumow and Peter Montgomery, Microsoft Research, USA&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Side-Channel Analysis based on Rainbow Tables&lt;/b&gt;&lt;p&gt;Sylvain Guilley, Olivier Meynard,    Laurent Sauvage and  Jean-Luc Danger. Telecom ParisTech, France&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Side channels attacks in code-based cryptography&lt;/b&gt;&lt;p&gt;   Pierre-Louis Cayrel, Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt (CASED), Germany&lt;br /&gt;  Falko Strenzke., FlexSecure GmbH&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Side-Channel based Watermarks for IP Protection&lt;/b&gt;&lt;p&gt;   Georg T. Becker, Markus Kasper and Christof Paar, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;The Variance Power Attack&lt;/b&gt;&lt;p&gt;   Philippe Hoogvorst, CNRS, France&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Towards a Third Order Side Channel Analysis Resistant Table Recomputation Method&lt;/b&gt;&lt;p&gt;   Guillaume Fumaroli, Sylvain Lachartre and Ange Martinelli, Thales, France&lt;br /&gt;  Louis Goubin, Université Versailles Saint-Quentin, France&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;a href="http://cosade2010.cased.de/accepted_papers.html"&gt;http://cosade2010.cased.de/accepted_papers.html&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;           &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-6925253526646366464?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/6925253526646366464/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=6925253526646366464' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/6925253526646366464'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/6925253526646366464'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2010/02/cosade-2010.html' title='COSADE 2010'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-7024614222082318423</id><published>2010-02-11T12:51:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2010-02-11T12:55:34.779-08:00</updated><title type='text'>CT-RSA 2010</title><content type='html'>&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Accepted Papers&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;    &lt;/div&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Breaking RSA-based PIN Encryption with thirty ciphertext validity queries &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Nigel P. Smart&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: University of Bristol  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient CRT-RSA Decryption for Small Encryption Exponents&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Subhamoy Maitra and Santanu Sarkar&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Indian Statistical Institute  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round PRESENT&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Joo Yeon Cho&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Helsinki University of Technology, Finland  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Resettable Public-Key Encryption: How to Encrypt on a Virtual Machine&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Scott Yilek&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: UC San Diego  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Usable Optimistic Fair Exchange&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Alptekin Kupcu and Anna Lysyanskaya&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Brown University  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On Extended Sanitizable Signature Schemes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Sebastien Canard and Amandine Jambert&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Orange Labs and Orange Labs  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Dependent Linear Approximations - The Algorithm of Biryukov and Others Revisited&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Miia Hermelin and Kaisa Nyberg&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Helsinki University of Technology (TKK)  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Making the Diffie-Hellman Protocol Identity-Based&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Dario Fiore and Rosario Gennaro&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: University of Catania, IBM Research - USA  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Hash Function Combiners in TLS and SSL&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Marc Fischlin, Anja Lehmann, Daniel Wagner&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Unrolling Cryptographic Circuits: A Simple Countermeasure Against Side-Channel Attacks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Shivam Bhasin, Sylvain Guilley, Laurent Sauvage, Jean-Luc Danger&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Institut TELECOM / TELECOM ParisTech, CNRS LTCI (UMR 5141), Departement COMELEC, 46 rue Barrault, 75634 PARIS Cedex 13, FRANCE. &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Practical Key Recovery Attack against Secret-IV Edon-R&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Gaetan Leurent&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Plaintex-Awareness of Hybrid Encryption&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Shaoquan Jiang and Huaxiong Wang&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: University of Electronic Science and Technology of China &amp;amp; Nanyang Technological University  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;High-speed parallel software implementation of the nT pairing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Diego F. Aranha, Julio Lopez, Darrel Hankerson&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: University of Campinas, Auburn University  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Refinement of Miller's Algorithm over Edwards Curves&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: XU Lei, LIN Dongdai&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: tate Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Sum of CBC MACs Is a Secure PRF&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Kan Yasuda&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: NTT Corporation  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Fault Attacks against EMV Signatures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Jean-Sebastien Coron and David Naccache and Mehdi Tibouchi&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: University of Luxembourg, ENS  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Improving Efficiency of An 'On the Fly' Identification Scheme by Perfecting Zero-Knowledgeness&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Bagus Santoso, Kazuo Ohta, Kazuo Sakiyama, Goichiro Hanaoka&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Research Center for Information Security (RCIS) National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), The University of Electro-Communications &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Probabilistic Public Key Encryption with Equality Test&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Guomin Yang and Chik How Tan and Qiong Huang and Duncan S. Wong&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: National University of Singapore and City University of Hong Kong  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient CCA-Secure Public Key Encryption from Identity-based Techniques&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Junzuo Lai, Robert H. Deng, Shengli Liu, Weidong Kou&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Singapore Management University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Xi Dian University  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Speed records for NTRU&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Jens Hermans, Frederik Vercauteren, Bart Preneel&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: K.U. Leuven, ESAT/SCD-COSIC and IBBT, Belgium  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Revisiting Higher-Order DPA Attacks: Multivariate Mutual Information Analysis&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Benedikt Gierlichs and Lejla Batina and Bart Preneel and Ingrid Verbauwhede&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: K.U. Leuven, ESAT/SCD-COSIC and IBBT, Belgium; and Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On Fast Verification of Hash Chains&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Dae Hyun Yum, Jin Seok Kim, Pil Joong Lee, Sung Je Hong&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: POSTECH  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Anonymity from Asymmetry : New Constructions for Anonymous HIBE&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Dan Boneh, Leo Ducas&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Stanford University, Ecole Normale Superieure  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Differential Cache-Collision Timing Attacks on AES with Applications to Embedded CPUs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Andrey Bogdanov and Thomas Eisenbarth and Christof Paar and Malte Wienecke&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Horst Gortz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany; COSIC - Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Title: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Rebound Attacks on the Gr{\o}stl Hash Function&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Florian Mendel and Christian Rechberger and Martin Schlaffer and Soren S. Thomsen&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: Graz University of Technology and Technical University of Denmark  &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-7024614222082318423?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/7024614222082318423/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=7024614222082318423' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/7024614222082318423'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/7024614222082318423'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2010/02/ct-rsa-2010.html' title='CT-RSA 2010'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-6285404914494580911</id><published>2010-02-11T12:44:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2010-02-11T12:49:38.189-08:00</updated><title type='text'>WiSec'10</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;LIST OF SUBMISSIONS ACCEPTED AS FULL PAPERS:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;pBMDS: A Behavior-based Malware Detection System for Cellphone Devices&lt;/i&gt;, Liang Xie, Xinwen Zhang, Jean-Pierre Seifert and Sencun Zhu.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;P&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;reventing Multi-query Attack in Location-based Services&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;, Nilothpal Talukder and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Attacks on Physical-layer Identification&lt;/i&gt;, Boris Danev, Heinrich Luecken, Srdjan Capkun and Karim El Defrawy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Effectiveness of Distance-decreasing Attacks Against Impulse Radio Ranging&lt;/i&gt;, Manuel Flury, Marcin Poturalski, Panagiotis (Panos) Papadimitratos, Jean-Pierre Hubaux and Jean-Yves Le Boudec.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Low-Cost Untraceable Authentication Protocols for RFID&lt;/i&gt;, Yong Ki Lee, Lejla Batina, Dave Singeléand Ingrid Verbauwhede.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Mobile User Location-specific Encryption (MULE): Using Your Office as Your Password&lt;/i&gt;, Ahren Studer and Adrian Perrig.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Secure and Scalable Identification for Hash-based RFID Systems Using Updatable Pre-computation&lt;/i&gt;, Yasunobu Nohara and Sozo Inoue.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;honeyM: A Framework for Implementing Virtual Honeyclients for Mobile Devices&lt;/i&gt;, TJ OConnor and Ben Sangster.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Timing-based Localization of In-Band Wormhole Tunnels in MANETs&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; Jinsub Kim, Dan Sterne, Rommie Hardy, Roshan K. Thomas and Lang Tong.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;     &lt;strong&gt;LIST OF SUBMISSIONS ACCEPTED AS SHORT PAPERS:    &lt;/strong&gt;     &lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;RFID Survivability Quantification and Attack Modeling&lt;/i&gt;, Yanjun Zuo.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Subverting MIMO Wireless Systems by Jamming the Channel Estimation Procedure&lt;/i&gt;, Robert Miller and Wade Trappe.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient Compromising Resilient Authentication Schemes for Large Scale Wireless Sensor Networks&lt;/i&gt;, Hao Chen.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Tradeoff between Trust and Privacy in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;Maxim Raya, Reza Shokri and Jean-Pierre Hubaux.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Automating the Injection of Believable Decoys to Detect Snooping&lt;/i&gt;, Brian Bowen, Vasileios P. Kemerlis, Pratap Prabhu, Angelos Keromytis and Sal Stolfo. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Zeroing-In on Network Metric Minima for Sink Location Determination&lt;/i&gt;, Zhenhua Liu and Wenyuan Xu.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Privacy-Preserving Computation of Benchmarks on Item-Level Data Using RFID&lt;/i&gt;, Florian Kerschbaum, Nina Oertel and Leonardo Weiss Ferreira Chaves.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Efficiency of Secure Beaconing in VANETs&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; Frank Kargl and Elmar Schoch.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Secret Keys from Entangled Sensor Motes: Implementation and Analysis&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; Matthias Wilhelm, Ivan Martinovic and Jens Schmitt.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient Code Diversification for Network Reprogramming in Sensor Networks&lt;/i&gt;, Qijun Gu.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Secure Walking GPS: A Secure Localization and Key Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Network&lt;/span&gt;s&lt;/i&gt;, Qi Mi, John Stankovic and Radu Stoleru.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Reliability of Wireless Fingerprinting using Clock Skews&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; Chrisil Arackaparambil, Sergey Bratus, Anna Shubina and David Kotz.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;     &lt;strong&gt;LIST OF ACCEPTED POSTERS/DEMOS:    &lt;/strong&gt;     &lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Testbed Design For Facilitating Simultaneous WiMAX Experiments&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;, Gautam Bhanage.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Regulating Pervasive Computing Applications in Ad hoc networks using Law Governed Interaction&lt;/i&gt;, Rishabh Dudheria, Naftaly Minsky and Wade Trappe.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Detecting Wormholes in Wireless Sensor Networks&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; Thanassis Giannetsos, Tassos Dimitriou and Neeli Prasad.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Enhancing unlinkability on IPv6 receiver address with distributed relay service&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; Takashi Minohara and Ryota Sato.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Secret Handshakes or Oh, It's You Again!&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; Kristin Buckley, Michael Engling and Susanne Wetzel.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Stealthy Compromise of Wireless Sensor Nodes with Power Analysis Attacks&lt;/i&gt;, Giacomo de Meulenaer and Françs-Xavier Standaert.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Indiana Jones Attack: An Initial Evaluation of RSS Authentication&lt;/i&gt;, Bernhard Firner, Wade Trappe, Rich Howard and Yanyong Zhang.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;An Effcient Security Framework for Mobile WiMAX&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; Mete Rodoper, Arati Baliga, Wade Trappe and Edward Jung.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;appoint - A Distributed Privacy-Preserving iPhone Application&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; Daniel A., Mayer, Dominik Teubert, Susanne Wetzel, Ulrike Meyer and Georg Neugebauer.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Strongly Secure Pairing of Wireless Devices within Physical Proximity&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; Suhas Mathur, Wade Trappe and Alexander Varshavsky.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Mobile Ad-hoc Routing Security&lt;/i&gt;, Jared Cordasco, Werner Backes and Susanne Wetzel.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Rapid prototyping of a "Denial of Service Radio" using OCRP Kit&lt;/i&gt;, Prasanthi Maddala, Khanh Le, Peter Wolniansky and Ivan Seskar.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Discovering Wormhole Attacks in Delay Tolerant Networks via Forbidden Topology Structure Identification&lt;/i&gt;, Yanzhi Ren, Mooi Choo Chuah, Jie Yang and Yingying Chen.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Coping with Frequency-based Attacks to Secure Distributed Data Storage in Wireless Networks&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; Hongbo Liu, Hui Wang and Yingying Chen.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-6285404914494580911?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/6285404914494580911/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=6285404914494580911' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/6285404914494580911'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/6285404914494580911'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2010/02/wisec10.html' title='WiSec&apos;10'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-953767805758220681</id><published>2010-02-11T12:40:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2010-02-11T12:43:11.701-08:00</updated><title type='text'>PQCrypto 2010</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="padding-bottom: 13px; padding-top: 7px; text-align: justify;" class="hd1"&gt;Accepted Papers&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;span class="para1"&gt; &lt;p&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Proposal of a Signature Scheme based on STS Trapdoor&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Shigeo Tsujii, Masahito Gotaishi, Kohtaro Tadaki, Ryo Fujita  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cryptanalysis of Two Quartic Encryption Schemes&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Weiwei Cao, Jintai Ding,Lei Hu,Xuyun Nie  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Strongly Unforgeable Signatures and Hierarchical Identity-based Signatures from Lattices Without Random Oracles&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Markus Rückert  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Designing a rank metric based McEliece cryptosystem&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Pierre Loidreau  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cryptanalysis of the Niederreiter Public Key Scheme Based on GRS Subcodes&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Christian Wieschebrink  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Properties of the Discrete Differential with Cryptographic Application&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Daniel Smith-Tone  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Selecting Parameters for the Rainbow Signature Scheme&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Albrecht Petzoldt, Stanislav Bulygin, and Johannes Buchmann  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Timing Attack against the secret Permutation in the McEliece PKC&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Falko Strenzke  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Growth of the ideal generated by a quadratic Boolean function&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Jintai Ding, Timothy Hodges, Victoria Kruglov  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Practical Power Analysis Attacks on Software Implementations of McEliece&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Stefan Heyse and Amir Moradi and Christof Paar  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Cryptanalysis of Improved MFE Public Key Cryptosystem&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Xuyun Nie, Jintai Ding, Weiwei Cao, Xiling Tang4  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Information-set decoding for linear codes over Fq&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Christiane Peters  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Mutant Zhuang-Zi Algorithm&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Jintai Ding, Dieter Schmidt  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Secure Variants of the Square Encryption Scheme&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Crystal Clough, Jintai Ding  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Low-Reiter: Niederreiter Encryption Scheme for Embedded Microcontrollers&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Stefan Heyse  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Grover vs. McEliece&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Daniel J. Bernstein  &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Key exchange and encryption schemes based on non-commutative skew polynomials&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Boucher,Gaborit,Geiselmann,Ruatta,Ulmer     &lt;span class="para1"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-953767805758220681?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/953767805758220681/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=953767805758220681' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/953767805758220681'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/953767805758220681'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2010/02/pqcrypto-2010.html' title='PQCrypto 2010'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-1160067832854004337</id><published>2010-02-02T01:18:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2010-02-02T01:22:31.140-08:00</updated><title type='text'>TCC 2010</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="text-align: left;"&gt;&lt;h1 style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:100%;"&gt;Accepted Papers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h1&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul class="acceptedlist"&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;A Domain Extender for the Ideal Cipher&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Jean-Sebastien Coron and Yevgeniy Dodis and Avradip Mandal and Yannick Seurin&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;A Hardcore Lemma for Computational Indistinguishability: Security Amplification for Arbitrarily Weak PRGs with Optimal Stretch&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Ueli Maurer and Stefano Tessaro&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;A Twist on the Naor-Yung Paradigm and Its Application to Efficient CCA-Secure Encryption from Hard Search Problems&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Ronald Cramer and Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Almost Optimal Bounds for Direct Product Threshold Theorem&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Charanjit S Jutla&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;An Efficient Parallel Repetition Theorem&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Johan Hastad and Rafael Pass and Douglas Wikstrom and Krzysztof Pietrzak&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Bounds on the Sample Complexity for Private Learning and Private Data Release&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Amos Beimel and Shiva Kasiviswanathan and Kobbi Nissim&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Composition of Zero-Knowledge Proofs with Efficient Provers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Eleanor Birrell and Salil Vadhan&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Concise Mercurial Vector Commitments and Independent Zero-Knowledge Sets with Short Proofs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Benoit Libert and Moti Yung&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Delayed-Key Message Authentication for Streams&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Marc Fischlin and Anja Lehmann&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Efficiency Limitations for $\Sigma$-Protocols for Group Homomorphisms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Endre Bangerter and Jan Camenisch and Stephan Krenn&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Efficiency Preserving Transformations for Concurrent Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Rafail Ostrovsky and Omkant Pandey and Ivan Visconti&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Georg Fuchsbauer and Jonathan Katz and David Naccache&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Efficient, Robust and Constant-Round Distributed RSA Key Generation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Ivan Damgård and Gert Læssøe Mikkelsen&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Eye for an Eye: Efficient Concurrent Zero-Knowledge in the Timing Model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Rafael Pass and Wei-Lung Dustin Tseng and Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Founding Cryptography on Tamper-Proof Hardware Tokens&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Vipul Goyal and Yuval Ishai and Amit Sahai and Ramarathnam Venkatesan and Akshay Wadia&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;From Passive to Covert Security at Low Cost&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Ivan Damgård and Martin Geisler and Jesper Buus Nielsen&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Fully Secure HIBE with Short Ciphertext&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Allison B. Lewko and Brent Waters&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Ideal Hierarchical Secret Sharing Schemes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Oriol Farràs and Carles Padró&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Leakage-Resilient Signatures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Sebastian Faust and Eike Kiltz and Krzysztof Pietrzak and Guy Rothblum&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Obfuscation of Hyperplanes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Ran Canetti and Guy Rothblum and Mayank Varia&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;On Building Fairness Bit by Bit&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;S. Dov Gordon and Yuval Ishai and Tal Moran and Rafail Ostrovsky and Amit Sahai&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;On Related-Secret Pseudorandomness&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;David Goldenberg and Moses Liskov&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;On Symmetric Encryption and Point Obfuscation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Ran Canetti and Yael Tauman Kalai and Mayank Varia and Daniel Wichs&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;On the Necessary and Sufficient Assumptions for UC Computation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Ivan Damgård and Jesper Buus Nielsen and Claudio Orlandi&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Private Coins versus Public Coins in Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Rafael Pass and Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Public-Key Cryptographic Primitives Provably as Secure as Subset Sum&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Vadim Lyubashevsky and Adriana Palacio and Gil Segev&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Public-key Encryption Schemes with Auxiliary Inputs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Yevgeniy Dodis and Shafi Goldwasser and Yael Kalai and Chris Peikert and Vinod Vaikuntanathan&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Rationality in the Full-Information Model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Ronen Gradwohl&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Robust Encryption&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Michel Abdalla and Mihir Bellare and Gregory Neven&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Threshold Decryption and Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Lattice-Based Cryptosystems&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Rikke Bendlin and Ivan Damgård&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="odd"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Tight Parallel Repetition Theorems for Public-coin Arguments&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Kai-Min Chung and Feng-Hao Liu&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li style="text-align: justify;" class="even"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Truly Efficient String Oblivious Transfer and SFE in Malicious and Covert Adversaries Models Using Resettable Tamper-Proof Tokens&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Vladimir Kolesnikov&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li class="odd"&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;   &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="title"&gt;Two Is A Crowd? A Black-Box Separation Of One-Wayness and Security Under Correlated Inputs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;span class="author"&gt;Yevgeniy Vahlis&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-1160067832854004337?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/1160067832854004337/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=1160067832854004337' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/1160067832854004337'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/1160067832854004337'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2010/02/tcc-2010.html' title='TCC 2010'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-7297142794481800803</id><published>2010-02-02T01:15:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2010-02-02T01:17:37.634-08:00</updated><title type='text'>FSE 2010</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: arial;" class="sub_title"&gt;FSE 2010 List of Accepted Papers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;103. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cryptanalysis of ESSENCE&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Maria Naya-Plasencia, Andrea Röck, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Yann Laigle-Chapuy, Gaëtan Leurent, Willi Meier, Thomas Peyrin &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;104. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Constructing Rate-1 MACs from Unpredictable Block Ciphers: PGV Model Revisited                         &lt;/span&gt;Liting Zhang, Wenling Wu, Peng Wang, Lei Zhang, Shuang Wu, Bo Liang                         &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;106. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;How to Thwart Birthday Attacks against MACs via Small Randomness&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Kazuhiko Minematsu                         &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;110. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Super-Sbox Cryptanalysis: Improved Attacks for AES-like Permutations&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Henri Gilbert, Thomas Peyrin                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;113. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Differential and Invertibility Properties of BLAKE (Short Presentation)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Jian Guo, Simon Knellwolf, Krystian Matusiewicz, Willi Meier                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;119. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Rebound Attack on Reduced-Round Versions of the JH&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Vincent Rijmen, Deniz Toz, Kerem Varici                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;122. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Domain Extension for Enhanced Target Collision-Resistant Hash Functions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Ilya Mironov                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;123. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Higher Order Differential Attack on Step-Reduced Variants of Luffa v1&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Dai Watanabe, Yasuo Hatano, Tsuyoshi Yamada, Toshinobu Kaneko                         &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;124. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Unified Method for Improving PRF Bounds for a Class of Blockcipher based MACs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Mridul Nandi                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;129. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Enhanced Security Notions for Dedicated-Key Hash Functions: Definitions and Relationships&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Mohammad Reza Reyhanitabar, Willy Susilo, Yi Mu                         &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;133. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Pseudo-cryptanalysis of the Original Blue Midnight Wish (Short Presentation)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Søren Steffen Thomsen                         &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;138. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Rotational Cryptanalysis of ARX&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Dmitry Khovratovich, Ivica Nikolic                         &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;139. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Improving the Generalized Feistel&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Tomoyasu Suzaki, Kazuhiko Minematsu                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;146. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Security Analysis of the Mode of JH Hash Function&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Rishiraj Bhattacharyya, Avradip Mandal, Mridul Nandi                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;151. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Fast Software AES Encryption&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Dag Arne Osvik, Joppe W. Bos, Deian Stefan, David Canright                         &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;152. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Lightweight Privacy Preserving Authentication for RFID Based on a Stream Cipher&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Olivier Billet, Jonathan Etrog, Henri Gilbert                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;153. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Finding Preimages of Tiger Up to 23 Steps&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Lei Wang, Yu Sasaki                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;155. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Nonlinear Equivalence of Stream Ciphers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Sondre Rønjom, Carlos Cid                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                          &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;156. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Attacking the Knudsen-Preneel Compression Functions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Onur Özen, Thomas Shrimpton, Martijn Stam                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                         &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;163. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Another Look at Complementation Properties&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Charles Bouillaguet, Orr Dunkelman, Gaëtan Leurent, Pierre-Alain Fouque                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;                          &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="font-family: arial; text-align: justify;" class="contents"&gt;166. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cryptanalysis of the DECT Standard Cipher&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;                        Karsten Nohl, Erik Tews, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann                          &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-7297142794481800803?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/7297142794481800803/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=7297142794481800803' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/7297142794481800803'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/7297142794481800803'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2010/02/fse-2010.html' title='FSE 2010'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-231467996066971816</id><published>2009-11-24T00:25:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2009-11-24T00:42:38.076-08:00</updated><title type='text'>C&amp;ESAR 2009</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Hello,&lt;br /&gt;The conference starts today; you can get the program here : http://www.cesar-conference.fr/&lt;br /&gt;or just below.&lt;br /&gt;Regards,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Etat de l'art de la sécurité des réseaux radioélectriques 802.11&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Laurent Butti&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Étude de l'interception et du positionnement de trafic Wi-Fi dans un environnement hétérogène&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Matteo Cypriani, François Spies et al&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Attaques Wifi WPA&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Cédric Blancher&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sécurité UMTS&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Henri Gilbert&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Les dangers du WiFi - démonstration&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Christophe Rault&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Vérification de protocoles dans les réseaux    ad hoc&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Ana Cavalli&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Survivability of mobile ad   hoc networks in military applications&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Thierry Plesse&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt; A secure approach for tactical MANETs&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Christophe   Bidan&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Quand la technologie se mêle de droit et vice versa&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Daniel Lemétayer&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sécurité dans les systèmes RFID&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Gldas Avoine&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Protocoles de sécurité pour RFID&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;François Vacherand&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction NFC , paysage, attaques, applications&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt; &lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Christian Damour, Guillaume Achten et al&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;NFC, Java Card, and   Certification&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Eric Vétillard, Guillaume Dufay&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sensor networks security&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;Konrad Wrona&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;A Distributed Intrusion   Detection System for Wireless Sensor Networks&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Philippe Leleu, Lionel Besso&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Analyse de la menace sur les applications   sans fil à courte et moyenne portée&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: large;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;p style="font-weight: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;Eric Bornette, Didier Eymery&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Anonymat et géolocalisation&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;Sébastien Gambs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Compromising electromagnetic emanations  of  wireless communications&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;Martin Vuagnoux&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;RFID : protection des données à caractère personnel dans l'internet des objets&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;Marie Barel&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: verdana,geneva; color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128);"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;table style="width: 754px;" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" rules="none"&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr align="left"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: x-small;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10px; line-height: normal;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;td width="73"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td width="350"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-231467996066971816?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/231467996066971816/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=231467996066971816' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/231467996066971816'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/231467996066971816'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/11/c-2009.html' title='C&amp;ESAR 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-6412286516645935976</id><published>2009-11-06T07:29:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2009-11-06T07:37:22.100-08:00</updated><title type='text'>INSCRYPT 2009</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Ping Li, Bing Sun and Chao Li. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Integral Cryptanalysis of ARIA&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Xianmeng Meng. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Weak Keys in RSA With Primes Sharing Least Significant Bits&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Wei Zhao and Dingfeng Ye. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Pairing-based Nominative Signatures with Selective and Universal Convertibility&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Kang Le and Xiang Ji. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;CAPTCHA Phishing: A Practical Attack on Human Interaction Proofing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Zhiqiang Liu, Dawu Gu, Jing Zhang and Wei Li. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Differential-Multiple Linear Cryptanalysis&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Ruming Yin, Jian Yuan, Qiuhua Yang, Xiuming Shan and Xiqin Wang. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Gemstone: A new stream cipher using coupled map lattice&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Mathieu Renauld and Francoix-Xavier Standaert. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Lei Zhang, Wenling Wu and Liting Zhang. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Proposition of Two New Cipher Structures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Liqun Chen. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A DAA Scheme Requiring Less TPM Resources&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Sean Policarpio and Yan Zhang. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Formal Language for Specifying Complex XML Authorisations with Temporal Constraints&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Deian Stefan. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Hardware Framework for the Rabbit Stream Cipher&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Yanjiang Yang, Jian Weng, Jianying Zhou and Ying Qiu. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Optionally Identifiable Private Handshakes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Arpita Patra, Ashish Choudhary and Chandrasekaran Pandurangan. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Communication Efficient Statistical Asynchronous Multiparty Computation with Optimal Resilience&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Elie Bursztein and John Mitchell. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Using Strategy Objectives for Network Security Analysis&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Nicky Mouha, Gautham Sekar, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Thomas Peyrin, Søren S. Thomsen, Meltem Sonmez Turan and Bart Preneel. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cryptanalysis of the ESSENCE Family of Hash Functions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Muhammad Reza Z'aba, Leonie Simpson, Ed Dawson and Kenneth Wong. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Linearity within the SMS4 Block Cipher&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Saba&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; Jalal and Brian King.&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; An Attack and Repair of Secure Web Transaction Protocol&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Sharmila Deva Selvi S, Sree Vivek S and Chandrasekaran Pandu Rangan. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cryptanalysis of Certificateless Signcryption Schemes and an Efficient Construction Without Pairing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Takeo Mizuno and Hiroshi Doi. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption scheme for Attribute-Based Encryption&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify; font-weight: bold;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Shivank Agrawal, Swarun Kumar, Amjed Shareef and Pandu Rangan C. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Sanitizable signatures with strong transparency in the standard model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Sharmila Deva Selvi S, Sree Vivek S, Shilpi Nayak and Chandrasekaran Pandurangan. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Breaking and Building of Threshold Signcryption Schemes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Johann Groszschaedl and Stefan Tillich.&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Full-Custom VLSI Design of a Unified Multiplier for ECC on Smart Cards and RFID Tags&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Short Paper&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Lijun Dong and Xiaojun Kang. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Dynamic Role-Based Access Control Model on Environment Security  &lt;/span&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;JIQIANG LU. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Differential Attack on Five Rounds of the SC2000 Block Cipher   &lt;/span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Sourav Das and Dipanwita RoyChowdhury. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Prevention of Attacks on Grain Using Cellular Automata &lt;/span&gt;   &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Rui Zhang and Hideki Imai. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Constructing Better KEMs with Partial Message Recovery &lt;/span&gt;   &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;a name="89"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);" class="authors3"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Zhigang Gao and Dengguo Feng&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;An improved password authenticated key agreement protocol for wireless mobile network   &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;a style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);" name="96"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="authors3"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Xiaofeng Nie, Jiwu Jing and Yuewu Wang&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Novel Contagion-Like Patch Dissemination Mechanism against Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Worms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;a style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);" name="103"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="authors3"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Fengjiao Wang and Yuqing Zhang&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Provably Secure Password-authenticated Group Key Exchange with Different Passwords under Standard Assumption&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;a style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);" name="133"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="authors3"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Xuexian Hu and Wenfen Liu&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in the UC Framework  &lt;/span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;a name="149"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="authors3"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Feng Cheng, Sebastian Roschke, Robert Schuppenies and Christoph Meinel&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Remodeling the Vulnerability Information   &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;a name="73"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="authors3"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="FR"&gt;Jean-Charles Faugere and Perret ludovic&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="FR"&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Curry and Flurry using Correlated Messages&lt;/span&gt;   &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;a name="75"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="authors3"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Helger Lipmaa and Bingsheng Zhang&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient Generalized Selective Private Function Evaluation with Applications in Biometric Authentication  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); text-align: justify;" class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 18pt; text-indent: -18pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;a name="147"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="authors3"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Pedro Peris Lopez, Julio C. Hernandez-Castro, Juan M. E. Tapiador, Tieyan Li and Jan C. A. van der Lubbe&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt;. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Weaknesses in Two Recent Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocols  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-6412286516645935976?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/6412286516645935976/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=6412286516645935976' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/6412286516645935976'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/6412286516645935976'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/11/inscrypt-2009.html' title='INSCRYPT 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-5228609822374075976</id><published>2009-11-06T07:16:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2009-11-06T07:22:39.255-08:00</updated><title type='text'>4th International Conference on Information Theoretic Security (ICITS 2009)</title><content type='html'>&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Leakage-Resilience and The Bounded Retrieval Model&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Yevgeny Dodis (New York University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Lower Bound on the Key Length of Information-Theoretic Forward-Secure Storage Schemes&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Stefan Dziembowski (University of Rome "La Sapienza")&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Security of Key Distribution and Complementarity in Quantum Mechanics&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Masato Koashi (Osaka University, Japan)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Free-Start Distinguishing: Combining Two Types of Indistinguishability Amplification&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Peter Gazi and Ueli Maurer (ETH Zurich, Switzerland and Comenius University Bratislava, Slovakia)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Code-Based Public-Key Cryptosystems And Their Applications&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Kazukuni Kobara (AIST, Japan)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Security of Pseudorandomized Information-Theoretically Secure Schemes&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Koji Nuida and Goichiro Hanaoka (AIST, Japan)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient Statistical Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing with Optimal Resilience&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Arpita Patra, Ashish Choudhary and C. Pandu Rangan (IIT, Madras, India)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Optimization of Bipartite Secret Sharing Schemes&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Oriol Farras, Jessica Ruth Metcalf-Burton, Carles Padro, and Leonor Vazquez&lt;br /&gt;(Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain and University of Michigan, U.S.A.)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Linear Threshold Multisecret Sharing Schemes&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Oriol Farras, Ignacio Gracia, Sebastia Martin, and Carles Padro&lt;br /&gt;(Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Multiterminal Secrecy Generation and Tree Packing&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="pName"&gt;Prakash Narayan (University of Maryland)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Information Theoretic Security Based on Bounded Observability&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Jun Muramatsu, Kazuyuki Yoshimura, and Peter Davis (NTT, Japan)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Random Graphs in Security and Privacy&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Adi Shamir (The Weizmann Institute of Science)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Group Testing and Batch Verification&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;Greg Zaverucha and Doug Stinson (University of Waterloo, Canada)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;What Can Cryptography Do for Coding Theory? Using Computational Complexity to Model Uncertain Channels&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Adam Smith&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;(Pennsylvania State University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cryptanalysis of Secure Message Transmission Protocols with Feedback&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Qiushi Yang and Yvo Desmedt (University College London, UK)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Optimum Leakage Principle for Analyzing Multi-threaded Programs&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Han Chen and Pasquale Malacaria (Queen Mary University of London, UK)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A General Conversion Method of Fingerprint Codes to (More) Robust Fingerprint Codes against Bit Erasure&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Koji Nuida (AIST, Japan)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;An Improvement of Pseudorandomization against Unbounded Attack Algorithms - The Case of Fingerprint Codes&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="pName"&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Koji Nuida and Goichiro Hanaoka (AIST, Japan)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;em style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Statistical-mechanical Approach for Multiple Watermarks Using Spectrum Spreading&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;" class="pName"&gt;Kazuhiro Senda and Masaki Kawamura (Yamaguchi University, Japan)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-5228609822374075976?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/5228609822374075976/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=5228609822374075976' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5228609822374075976'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5228609822374075976'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/11/4th-international-conference-on.html' title='4th International Conference on Information Theoretic Security (ICITS 2009)'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-3716056703039000348</id><published>2009-11-06T07:04:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2009-11-06T07:09:51.371-08:00</updated><title type='text'>4th Benelux Workshop on Information and System Security</title><content type='html'>&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Yves Edel and Andreas Klein. &lt;i&gt;Computational aspects of fast correlation attacks&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Anthony Van Herrewege, Miroslav Knezevic, Lejla Batina, Ingrid Verbauwhede and Bart Preneel. &lt;i&gt;Compact Implementations of Pairings&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Boris Skoric. &lt;i&gt;Quantum readout of Physical Unclonable Functions&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Related and Open Key Attacks on AES and other Block Ciphers&lt;br /&gt;&lt;i&gt;In this talk we will describe recent research results on related-key attacks and open key attacks on AES.  We will discuss properties of AES key schedule that allow to construct good related-key differentials.  We will then explain how to use these differentials in various attacks. This methodology can be applied to the study of key schedules of other block ciphers. Our best attack on full AES-256 takes $2^{99}$ steps while our round-reduced attacks on up to 13 rounds out of 14 are marginally practical. We will discuss open key attacks on block ciphers and their relevance to the security of hashing modes of block ciphers.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Jorge Guajardo and Bart Mennink. &lt;i&gt;Towards Side-Channel Resistant Block Cipher Usage or Can We Encrypt Without Side-Channel Countermeasures?&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Jiqiang Lu, Jing Pan and Jerry den Hartog. &lt;i&gt;Regarding the Security of AES against First and Second-Order Differential Power Analysis&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Feng Hao, Peter Ryan and Piotr Zielinski. &lt;i&gt;Anonymous Voting by 2-Round Public Discussion&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Ben Smyth, Mark Ryan, Steve Kremer and Mounira Kourjieh. &lt;i&gt;Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Ben Adida, Olivier de Marneffe, Olivier Pereira and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. &lt;i&gt;Electing a University President using Open-Audit Voting: Analysis of real-world use of Helios&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Cryptology and Elliptic Curves : a 25-year love (?) story&lt;br /&gt;&lt;i&gt;End of 1984 : a new factoring method emerges from H.W. Lenstra's brain, "... derived from the Pollard p-1-method by replacing the multiplicative group by a random elliptic curve". The algorithm is published in 1985, followed some months later by the idea from Miller and Koblitz to fit Diffie-Hellman and El-Gamal schemes to this new paradigm : ECC is born. In this talk, we try to tell the 25-year love (?) story of cryptology and elliptic curves, by positioning it in the more global context of modern   cryptology.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Jorge Guajardo, Bart Mennink and Berry Schoenmakers. &lt;i&gt;Modulo Reduction for Paillier Encryptions and Application to Secure Statistical Analysis&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Gildas Avoine, Christian Floerkemeier and Benjamin Martin. &lt;i&gt;RFID Distance Bounding Multistate Enhancement (Short Version)&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Yasser Phoulady. &lt;i&gt;Sharing A Labeled Tree&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt; Damiano Bolzoni, Sandro Etalle and Pieter Hartel. &lt;i&gt;Panacea: Automating Attack Classification for Anomaly-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;ul style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Wojciech Mostowski and Jip Hogenboom. &lt;i&gt;Full Memory Attack on a Java Card&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-3716056703039000348?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/3716056703039000348/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=3716056703039000348' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/3716056703039000348'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/3716056703039000348'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/11/4th-benelux-workshop-on-information-and.html' title='4th Benelux Workshop on Information and System Security'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-683205258990090435</id><published>2009-11-06T06:56:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2009-11-06T07:00:53.687-08:00</updated><title type='text'>ICICS 2009</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;How to   Steal a &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Botnet&lt;/span&gt; and What Can Happen When You Do&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 3pt;"&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Richard A. Kemmerer&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;st1:placetype st="on"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;University&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/st1:placetype&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt; of &lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;California&lt;/st1:placename&gt;,   &lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;Santa Barbara&lt;/st1:city&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;USA&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Security   Evaluation of a DPA-resistant S-box Based on the Fourier&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Transform&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMR10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Yang Li,   Kazuo &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Sakiyama&lt;/span&gt;, Shinichi Kawamura, Yuichi &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Komano&lt;/span&gt;, and Kazuo &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Ohta&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;The &lt;st1:placetype st="on"&gt;university&lt;/st1:placetype&gt; of &lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;Electro-Communications&lt;/st1:placename&gt;,   &lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;Tokyo&lt;/st1:city&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;Japan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;;   Toshiba Corporation, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;Japan&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Security   Analysis of the GF-NLFSR Structure and Four-Cell Block Cipher&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMR10;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Wenling&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt; Wu, Lei Zhang, &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Liting&lt;/span&gt; Zhang,   and &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Wentao&lt;/span&gt; Zhang&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMR10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;The State Key   Lab of Information Security, &lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;Graduate&lt;/st1:placename&gt;   &lt;st1:placetype st="on"&gt;University&lt;/st1:placetype&gt; of &lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;Chinese&lt;/st1:placename&gt;   &lt;st1:placetype st="on"&gt;Academy&lt;/st1:placetype&gt; of Sciences, &lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;Beijing&lt;/st1:city&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;China&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 3pt;"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;The RAKAPOSHI Stream Cipher&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMR10;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Carlos Cid, &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Shinsaku&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Kiyomoto&lt;/span&gt;, and Jun &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Kurihara&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Royal Holloway, &lt;st1:placetype st="on"&gt;University&lt;/st1:placetype&gt; of &lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;London&lt;/st1:placename&gt;,   &lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;London&lt;/st1:city&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;UK&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Design   of Reliable and Secure Multipliers by &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Multilinear&lt;/span&gt;   Arithmetic Codes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMR10;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Zhen   Wang, Mark &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Karpovsky&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Berk&lt;/span&gt;   &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Sunar&lt;/span&gt;, and Ajay Joshi&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Reliable   Computing Laboratory, Boston University CRIS Laboratory, Worcester   Polytechnic Institute, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;USA&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMR10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Hardware/Software   Co-Design of Public-Key Cryptography for SSL Protocol Execution in Embedded   Systems&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMR10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Manuel &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Koschuch&lt;/span&gt;, Johann &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Groszschaedl&lt;/span&gt;,   and Dan Page, Matthias &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Hudler&lt;/span&gt; and Michael Kruger&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;FH Campus &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Wien&lt;/span&gt; University   of Applied Sciences, University of Luxembourg, University of Bristol, and FH   Campus &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Wien&lt;/span&gt; University of Applied Sciences&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Online/Offline   Ring Signature Scheme&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Joseph K. Liu, Man Ho Au, Willy &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Susilo&lt;/span&gt;, and &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Jianying&lt;/span&gt; Zhou&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;I2R, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;Singapore&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;; &lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;University of Wollongong&lt;/st1:city&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;Australia&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Policy-controlled   Signatures &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Pairat&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Thorncharoensri&lt;/span&gt;, Willy &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Susilo&lt;/span&gt;,   and Yi &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Mu&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;University of Wollongong&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/st1:city&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;Australia&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10; color: blue;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Public   Key Encryption without Random Oracle Made Truly Practical&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Puwen&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Wei&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Xiaoyun&lt;/span&gt; Wang,   and &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Yuliang&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Zheng&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Shandong University&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/st1:city&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;China&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;;   &lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Tsinghua&lt;/span&gt; University&lt;/st1:city&gt;,   &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;China&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;; &lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;University of North Carolina&lt;/st1:city&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;USA&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;A   Public-Key Traitor Tracing Scheme with an Optimal Transmission Rate&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 3pt;"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Yi-&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Ruei&lt;/span&gt; Chen and &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Wen-Guey&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Tzeng&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;National&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/st1:placename&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Chiao&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/st1:placename&gt;   &lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Tung&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/st1:placename&gt; &lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;University&lt;/st1:placename&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;Taiwan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: CMR10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Computationally Secure Hierarchical Self-Healing   Key Distribution for&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: CMR10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: CMMI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Yanjiang&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt; Yang, &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Jianying&lt;/span&gt; Zhou, Robert H. Deng, and &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Feng&lt;/span&gt;   &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Bao&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Institute   for &lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Infocomm&lt;/span&gt;     Research&lt;/st1:city&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;Singapore&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt; &lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: CMR10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Enabling Secure Secret Updating for   Unidirectional Key Distribution&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: CMR10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;in RFID-Enabled Supply Chains&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMR10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Shaoying&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10; color: black;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Cai&lt;/span&gt;, &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Tieyan&lt;/span&gt; Li, &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Changshe&lt;/span&gt; Ma, &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Yingjiu&lt;/span&gt; Li, and   Robert &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;H.Deng&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Singapore&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/st1:placename&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;management&lt;/st1:placename&gt;   &lt;st1:placetype st="on"&gt;University&lt;/st1:placetype&gt;, &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Singapor&lt;/span&gt;;   Institute for &lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Infocomm&lt;/span&gt;     Research&lt;/st1:city&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;Singapore&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: CMR10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Biometric-Based Non-Transferable Anonymous   Credentials&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMR10;" lang="EN-US"&gt; &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: CMTI10;" lang="EN-US"&gt;Marina Blanton and William M. P. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Hudelson&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;   &lt;st1:placetype st="on"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt;University&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/st1:placetype&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt;" lang="EN-US"&gt; of &lt;st1:placename st="on"&gt;Notre&lt;/st1:placename&gt;   Dame, &lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:city st="on"&gt;Penn State University&lt;/st1:city&gt;,    &lt;st1:country-region st="on"&gt;USA&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://www.icics2009.org/&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-683205258990090435?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/683205258990090435/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=683205258990090435' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/683205258990090435'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/683205258990090435'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/11/icics-2009.html' title='ICICS 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-8900960966797226653</id><published>2009-10-02T07:30:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-10-02T07:31:19.138-07:00</updated><title type='text'>SEMINAIRE DE CRYPTOGRAPHIE DE RENNES</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;SEMINAIRE DE CRYPTOGRAPHIE DE RENNES&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Le séminaire a lieu les vendredi à 14 h 00, Salle 016, IRMAR (rez de chaussée, bâtiment 22),&lt;br /&gt;Université de Rennes 1, Campus de Beaulieu.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Séance du 16 octobre 2009&lt;br /&gt;Peter Schwabe Eindhoven University of Technology&lt;br /&gt;Titre : AES-GCM plus rapide et résistant contredes attaques temporelles&lt;br /&gt;Résume : Cet exposé a pour but de présenter une nouvelle implantation&lt;br /&gt;d'AES et d'AES-GCM. C'est la première qui résiste aux attaques&lt;br /&gt;temporelles et qui est en même temps efficace pour chiffrer des&lt;br /&gt;paquets courts.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;J'expliquerai pourquoi les méthodes classiques pour implanter AES sont&lt;br /&gt;vulnérables aux attaques dites de "cache-timing".  Ensuite, je&lt;br /&gt;décrirai la technique de "bit-slicing" et détaillerai notre&lt;br /&gt;implantation d'AES.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Dans une seconde partie, je donnerai un bref aperçu du mode&lt;br /&gt;d'opération GCM et présenterai nos deux approches d'implantation : une&lt;br /&gt;optimistée en vitesse et l'autre résistante aux attaques temporelles.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Séance du 23 octobre 2009&lt;br /&gt;Andrea Roeck INRIA Rocquencourt&lt;br /&gt;Titre : (Yet Another) Analysis of the Linux Random Number Generator&lt;br /&gt;Résume : The Linux random number generator is part of the kernel since&lt;br /&gt;1994. It collects entropy from user input, interrupts and disk&lt;br /&gt;movements and claims to output high quality random numbers. There are&lt;br /&gt;two different versions: /dev/random which blocks if the internal&lt;br /&gt;entropy count goes to zero and /dev/urandom which is faster since it&lt;br /&gt;produces as many bits as the user wants to.  The only official&lt;br /&gt;definition of this RNG exists in the code itself which is subject to&lt;br /&gt;possible changes in new releases of the kernel. We want to give a&lt;br /&gt;detailed description of the current version. There exists previous&lt;br /&gt;attempts of describing this generator, especially the works of Barak&lt;br /&gt;and Halevi in 2005 and Gutterman et al. in 2006. However, the&lt;br /&gt;generator changed in the meantime and we want to describe it in more&lt;br /&gt;mathematical details.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Séance du 23 octobre 2009&lt;br /&gt;Maria   Naya INRIA Rocquencourt&lt;br /&gt;Titre : Titre à préciser.&lt;br /&gt;Résume :&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Séance du 30 octobre 2009&lt;br /&gt;Julien Bringer SAGEM&lt;br /&gt;Titre : Extended Private Information Retrieval Protocols: definitions,applications &amp;amp; new extensions&lt;br /&gt;Résume : Cet exposé est basé sur des travaux communs avec Hervé Chabanne, David Pointcheval, Qiang Tang menés dans le cadre du projet ANR RNRT BACH (Biometric Authentication with Cryptographic Handling).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Extended Private Information Retrieval (EPIR) is a generalization of&lt;br /&gt;the notion of Private Information Retrieval (PIR). The principle is to&lt;br /&gt;enable a user to privately evaluate a fixed and public function with&lt;br /&gt;two inputs, a chosen block from a database and an additional string.&lt;br /&gt;In this talk, we will present this notion and describe 2 constructions&lt;br /&gt;with applications to biometric authentication. We will then explain an&lt;br /&gt;extension of this notion in order to add more flexibility during the&lt;br /&gt;system life. As an example, we will introduce a general protocol&lt;br /&gt;enabling polynomial evaluations. As to practical concern, we will also&lt;br /&gt;discuss how amortizing database computations when dealing with several&lt;br /&gt;requests.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-8900960966797226653?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/8900960966797226653/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=8900960966797226653' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/8900960966797226653'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/8900960966797226653'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/10/seminaire-de-cryptographie-de-rennes.html' title='SEMINAIRE DE CRYPTOGRAPHIE DE RENNES'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-5060004164409124420</id><published>2009-09-11T01:58:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-09-11T02:02:34.148-07:00</updated><title type='text'>sciencewatch</title><content type='html'>Hello,&lt;br /&gt;I discovered an excellent website, which  can help you to track trends in Science :&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://sciencewatch.com&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I really like the section "Hot papers";&lt;br /&gt;For example, have a look here :&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://sciencewatch.com/dr/nhp/2009/09sepnhp/&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Regards,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;h2 class="rightTableRuleBelow" align="left"&gt;&lt;a href="http://sciencewatch.com/sciencewatch/dr/nhp/"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://sciencewatch.com/sciencewatch/dr/nhp/2009/"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-5060004164409124420?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/5060004164409124420/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=5060004164409124420' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5060004164409124420'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5060004164409124420'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/09/sciencewatch.html' title='sciencewatch'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-5861457745413278449</id><published>2009-09-10T00:59:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-09-10T01:02:27.499-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Workshop on Secure Execution of Untrusted Code</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Formal Model for Virtual Machine Introspection&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jonas Pfoh, Christian Schneider, and Claudia Eckert&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;       &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Emulating Emulation-Resistant Malware&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Min Gyung Kang, Heng Yin, Steve Hanna, Stephen McCamant, and Dawn Song &lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;       &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;TimeCapsule: Secure Recording of Accesses to a Protected Datastore&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Srinivas Krishnan and Fabian Monrose&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Browser protection against Cross-Site Request Forgery&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Wim Maes, Thomas Heyman, Lieven Desmet, and Wouter Joosen&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Hardware-enforced Fine-grained Isolation of Untrusted Code&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Eugen Leontie, Gedare Bloom, Bhagirath Narahari, Rahul Simha, and Joseph Zambreno&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Defending embedded systems against Control flow attacks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Aurélien Francillon, Claude Castellucciam and Daniele Perito&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Cake is a Lie: Privilege Rings as a Policy Resource&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sergey Bratus, Peter C. Johnson, Michael E. Locasto, Ashwin Ramaswamy, and Sean W. Smith&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Application Containers without Virtual Machines&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Shengzhi Zhang, Xi Xiong, Xiaoqi Jia, and Peng Liu&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Availability-sensitive Intrusion Recovery&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Micah Sherr and Matt Blaze&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-5861457745413278449?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/5861457745413278449/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=5861457745413278449' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5861457745413278449'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5861457745413278449'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/09/workshop-on-secure-execution-of.html' title='Workshop on Secure Execution of Untrusted Code'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-5666996483684650334</id><published>2009-09-10T00:52:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-09-10T00:54:46.032-07:00</updated><title type='text'>WISTP'2009</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="bodytext"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Session: MOBILITY&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;On the Unobservability of a Trust Relation in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Olivier Heen, Gilles Guette and Thomas Genet&lt;br /&gt;INRIA, Université Rennes 1&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;A Mechanism to Avoid Collusion Attacks Based on Code Passing in Mobile Agent Systems&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Marc Jaimez, Oscar Esparza and Jose L. Muñoz&lt;br /&gt;Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Privacy – Aware Location Database Service for Granular Queries&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Shinsaku Kiyomoto, Keith M. Martin, and Kazuhide Fukushima&lt;br /&gt;KDDI Laboratories and Royal Holloway University of London&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p class="bodytext"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Session: ATTACKS AND SECURE IMPLEMENTATIONS&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Algebraic Attacks on RFID Protocols&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ton van Deursen and Sasa Radomirovic&lt;br /&gt;University of Luxembourg&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Anti-Counterfeiting using Memory Spots&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Helen Balinsky, Edward McDonnell, Liqun Chen and Keith Harrison&lt;br /&gt;Hewlett Packard Laboratories&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;On Second – Order Fault Analysis Resistance for CRT – RSA Implementations&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Emmanuelle Dottax, Christophe Giraud, Matthieu Rivain and Yannick Sierra&lt;br /&gt;Oberthur Technologies and University of Luxembourg&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p class="bodytext"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Session: PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Measurement Analysis when Benchmarking Java Card Platforms&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Samia Bouzefrane, Julien Cordry and Pierre Paradinas&lt;br /&gt;CNAM/Cedric&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Performance issues of Selective Disclosure and Blinded Issuing Protocols on Java Card&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hendrik Tews and Bart Jacobs&lt;br /&gt;Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, The Netherlands&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Energy – Efficient Implementation of ECDH Key Exchange for Wireless Sensor Networks&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Christian Lederer, Roland Mader, Manuel Koschuch, Johann Groszschaedl,&lt;br /&gt;Stefan Tillich, and Alexander Szekely&lt;br /&gt;University of Klagenfurt, Graz University of Technology, FH Campus&lt;br /&gt;Wien, and University of Bristol&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p class="bodytext"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Session: CRYPTOGRAPHY&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Key Management Schemes for Peer – to – Peer Multimedia Streaming Overlay Networks&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;Juan Álvaro Muñoz Naranjo, Juan Antonio López Ramos and Leocadio González Casado&lt;br /&gt;Universidad de Almería&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;Ultra-lightweight Key Predistribution in Wireless Sensor Networks for Monitoring Linear Infrastructure&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Keith M. Martin and Maura B. Paterson&lt;br /&gt;Royal Holloway and University of London&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;PKIX Certificate Status in MANET&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;J. Muñoz, O. Esparza, C. Gañán and X. Arnau&lt;br /&gt;Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-5666996483684650334?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/5666996483684650334/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=5666996483684650334' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5666996483684650334'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/5666996483684650334'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/09/wistp2009.html' title='WISTP&apos;2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-2575683101541100265</id><published>2009-08-27T01:30:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-08-27T01:36:44.624-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Workshop on Formal and Computational Cryptography FCC 2009</title><content type='html'>&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Computational and Symbolic Anonymity in an Unbounded Network&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hubert Comon-Lundh, Masami Hagiya, Yusuke Kawamoto, and Hideki Sakurada&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Formal Indistinguishability extended to the Random Oracle Model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Cristian Ene, Yassine Lakhnech, and Van Chan Ngo&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Computationally Sound Analysis of Probabilistic Security Protocols with Digitial Signatures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mihhail Aizatulin, Henning Schnoor, and Thomas Wilke&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;CoSP: A general framework for computational soundness proofs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Michael Backes, Dennis Hofheinz, and Dominique Unruh&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Execution Correspondence Theorem for Polynomially Accurate Simulations&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Roberto Segala and Andrea Turrini&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;From CryptoVerif Specifications to Computationally Secure Implementations of Protocols (Work in Progress)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;David Cadé&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Computationally Sound Proofs of Security for a Key Management API&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Graham Steel&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Refining Computationally Sound Mechanized Proofs for Kerberos&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Bruno Blanchet, Aaron D. Jaggard, Jesse Rao, Andre Scedrov, and Joe-Kai Tsay&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Computational Indistinguishability Logic&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Gilles Barthe, Marion Daubignard, Bruce Kapron, and Yassine Lakhnech&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Automated Proofs for Encryption Modes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Martin Gagné, Pascal Lafourcade, Yassine Lakhnech, and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Computational Soundness of Cryptographic Verification by Typing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Cédric Fournet&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Computational Soundness of RCF Implementations&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Michael Backes, Matteo Maffei, and Dominique Unruh&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-2575683101541100265?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/2575683101541100265/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=2575683101541100265' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2575683101541100265'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2575683101541100265'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/08/workshop-on-formal-and-computational.html' title='Workshop on Formal and Computational Cryptography FCC 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-4849281509297729014</id><published>2009-08-27T00:36:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-08-27T00:48:52.887-07:00</updated><title type='text'>5th LCN Workshop on Security in Communications Networks</title><content type='html'>&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dt style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;span class="papertitle"&gt;Mobility, Routing, and Computation in Ad-Hoc and Disruption-Tolerant Networks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Stephen D. Wolthusen&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt&gt;(Royal Holloway, University of London, UK and Gjøvik University College, Norway)&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dt style="text-align: justify; font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;span class="papertitle"&gt;Measuring Similarity of Malware Behavior&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt style="text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Martin Apel&lt;/span&gt; (University of Dortmund, Germany); Christian Bockermann (University of Dortmund, Germany); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Michael Meier&lt;/span&gt; (University of Dortmund, Germany)&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Malicious software (malware) represents a major threat for computer systems of almost all types. In the past few years the number of prevalent malware samples has increased dramatically due to the fact that malware authors started to deploy morphing (aka obfuscation) techniques in order to hinder detection of such polymorphic malware by anti-malware products. Using these techniques numerous variants of a malware can be generated. All these variants have a different syntactic representation while providing almost the same functionality and showing similar behavior. In order to effectively detect polymorphic malware it is advantageous (if not required) to know which malware samples are variants of a particular malware. Respective approaches for determining this relation between malware samples automatically are currently investigated by a number of researchers. A prerequisite for assessing this relation based on particular features of malware samples is an appropriate similarity or distance measure. In particular a number of approaches for clustering malware samples have been recently published. Thereby different similarity measures are used but without thoroughly discussing the choice. So it is an unanswered question which similarity measures are appropriate for determining respective relations between malware samples. To answer this question we study different distance measures in detail and discuss desirable properties of a distance measure for this particular purpose. We focus on behavioral features of malware and compare and experimentally evaluate different distance measures for malware behavior. Based on our results we identify a most appropriate distance measure for grouping malware samples based on similar behavior.&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dt style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;span class="papertitle"&gt;npf—A Simple, Traffic-Adaptive Packet Classifier Using On-line Reorganization of Rule Trees&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt&gt;&lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Shariful Shaikot&lt;/span&gt; (Washington State University, USA); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Min Kim&lt;/span&gt; (Washington State University, USA)&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Packet classification is one of the crucial components of application such as firewalls, intrusion detection, and differentiated services. For example, an intrusion detection system (IDS) classifies packets either as benign or malicious and alerts the network administrator. Since existing IDS’s spend the majority of CPU time in packet classification, an IDS fails to detect malicious packets under high load. Many ideas have been proposed to make the packet inspection faster so that an IDS spends less time in packet classification. However, because of the increasing number of security threats and vulnerabilities, the number of rules often exceeds thousands, requiring more than hundreds of megabytes of memory. As a result, an IDS spends longer time to classify packets since each packet incurs many memory accesses, and thus the throughput of an IDS is limited by memory bandwidth. The problem can be mitigated by exploiting locality in traffic patterns. In this paper, we propose npf, a fast and traffic-adaptive packet classifier which intelligently reorganizes the internal structure based on the traffic pattern. Unlike existing approaches requireing a separate, off-line reorganization phase, npf performs reorganization on-line with little overhead, resulting in higher throughput without compromising accuracy. Experimental results on our test bed show that npf outperforms a traditional packet classifier by spending an order of magnitude less time per packet in order to classify the packet.&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dt style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;span class="papertitle"&gt;An Anti-Spam Scheme Using Capability-Based Access Control&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt&gt;&lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Yasushi Shinjo&lt;/span&gt; (University of Tsukuba, Japan)&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt style="text-align: justify;"&gt;This paper proposes an anti-spam scheme that uses capability-based access control.  In this scheme, rights to bypass spam filters are represented as capabilities, and an email message containing a valid capability bypasses the spam filer and goes straight to the receiver's inbox.  As a result, the false positive problem inherent in existing spam filters is eliminated.  This scheme allows a user to delegate rights to another person and is compatible with existing email systems and applications.  It was implemented in Mozilla Thunderbird, along with a tool, Capability Basket, that provides an API for email clients and a GUI for users.&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dt style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;span class="papertitle"&gt;Design Considerations for a Honeypot for SQL Injection Attacks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt&gt;&lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Thomas Chen &lt;/span&gt;(Swansea University, United Kingdom); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;John Buford&lt;/span&gt; (Avaya Labs Research, USA)&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt style="text-align: justify;"&gt;SQL injection attacks continue to be a major problem for web applications. We investigate design considerations for an application layer honeypot to attract and learn about SQL injection attacks. The honeypot responds with indications of vulnerability leading attackers ultimately to disinformation that could be useful to track them. The honeypot restricts attackers from escalating the attack to the operating system or launching attacks on other systems. The honeypot could emulate the appearance of common defenses against SQL injection in order to seem more genuine. Finally, we describe considerations to implement an experimental honeypot with honeyd.&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dd&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/dd&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dt style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;span class="papertitle"&gt;On Limited-Range Strategic/Random Jamming Attacks in Wireless Ad hoc Networks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt&gt;&lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Korporn Panyim&lt;/span&gt; (University of Pittsburgh, USA); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Thaier Hayajneh&lt;/span&gt; (University of Pittsburgh, USA); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Prashant Krishnamurthy&lt;/span&gt; (University of Pittsburgh, USA); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;David Tipper&lt;/span&gt; (University of Pittsburgh, USA)&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Jamming attacks are considered one of the most devastating as they are difficult to prevent and sometimes hard to detect. In this paper we consider the impact of the placement and range of limited-range jammers on ad hoc networks. Limited range jammers are more difficult to detect as they use transmission powers similar to that of regular nodes (or perhaps even smaller transmit powers).The attacker can locate his jammer(s) randomly in the network. Alternatively, jammers can be placed at strategic locations. For instance, intuitively, this can be nodes with high traffic inputs/outputs (discovered by sensing the traffic flow in the network). Using OPNET, we perform extensive simulations to show how significant such strategically placed attacks can be compared to random placement of limited-range jammers on both TCP and UDP traffic.&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dt style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;span class="papertitle"&gt;A Frame Handler Module for a Side-Channel in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt&gt;&lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Marvin Odor&lt;/span&gt; (University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Babak Nasri&lt;/span&gt; (Beyond measures Inc., Canada); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Mazda Salmanian &lt;/span&gt;(Defence R&amp;amp;D Canada, Canada); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Peter Mason&lt;/span&gt; (Defence Research &amp;amp; Development Canada, Canada); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Miguel Vargas Martin &lt;/span&gt;(University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Ramiro Liscano&lt;/span&gt; (University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada)&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt style="text-align: justify;"&gt;In this paper, we establish a hidden 802.11 wireless channel, with the masking of the channel achieved by inserting intentional errors in the Frame Check Sequence (FCS). We design a frame handler module to provide a proof-of-concept model of the side-channel using MATLAB and Simulink with Communication Toolbox. We justify using MATLAB over the other simulation tools because of its existing functions: physical layer IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networking (WLAN) standard, existing modular channel fading models, the MAC layer cyclic redundancy checksum (CRC) generator, the CRC Syndrome detector, and the capability of modifying fields in a frame. These existing functions allow for the creation of a frame handler which generates frames, according to our design, to be inserted as erroneous frames and recovers frames from normal 802.11 traffic. Herein we provide the design and details of the implementation of the channel. Our design offers the ability to introduce error detection and correction capabilities, and protection against passive monitoring defences. This simulation framework is a step towards the development of more sophisticated environments including multi-node simulations that maintain robust and reliable side-channel communication.&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dt style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;span class="papertitle"&gt;Energy-Efficient Multi-key Security Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt&gt;&lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Sandeep Chowdary Kolli&lt;/span&gt; (Missouri University of Science and Technology, USA); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Maciej Zawodniok &lt;/span&gt;(Missouri S&amp;amp;T, USA)&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt style="text-align: justify;"&gt;This paper proposes a multi-key encryption scheme and engine architecture (MKE) that increases security and optimizes energy efficiency of sensor networks, while minimizing modifications to existing implementations. The scheme improves security of AES against correlation power analysis (CPA) attack by employing MKE engine, breaking the correlation between power consumption and the used key. Other schemes utilize complex hardware designs, for example by using the inhomogeneous s-boxes that reduce energy efficiency of the engine. In contrast, the proposed hardware engine uses a randomly sequence of few keys to encode subsequent blocks of a messages. Additionally, the scheme improves security of AES against brute-force attacks for a given key size by utilizing multiple keys to encrypt subsequent blocks of a message. In contrast, a typical security upgrade would require a larger key size and encryption engine, which would increase cost and energy consumption of the devices. Both analytical and simulation results are presented in this paper.&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dd&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/dd&gt;&lt;dt&gt;&lt;span class="papertitle"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dt style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;span class="papertitle"&gt;Group Key Agreement for Wireless Mesh Networks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt&gt;&lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Andreas Noack&lt;/span&gt; (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany); &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;Joerg Schwenk&lt;/span&gt; (Ruhr-University Germany, Germany)&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dt style="text-align: justify;"&gt;Wireless mesh networks consist of stationary nodes that communicate over wireless connections. Since WLAN security standards are only applicable in the standard scenario where the access points are connected by a cable-bound backbone, nearly all mesh networks broacast messages in the clear. To secure these networks, and to reduce the amount of reencryption of messages, we propose to use group key agreement (GKA) protocols to agree on a common key for all nodes. In a mesh network, a message sent by one node can only be received directly by nodes within the broadcast reach of the first node. Thus we have neither direct point-to-point connections between nodes, nor do we have a perfect broadcast channel. We therefore compare the suitability of different GKA protocols proposed in the literature for mesh networks.&lt;/dt&gt;&lt;dd&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/dd&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dd&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/dd&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dd&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/dd&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;dl class="papers"&gt;&lt;dd&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/dd&gt;&lt;/dl&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-4849281509297729014?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/4849281509297729014/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=4849281509297729014' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/4849281509297729014'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/4849281509297729014'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/08/5th-lcn-workshop-on-security-in.html' title='5th LCN Workshop on Security in Communications Networks'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-8587396002507208742</id><published>2009-08-25T14:51:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-08-25T14:53:52.322-07:00</updated><title type='text'>WEWoRC 2009</title><content type='html'>&lt;a name="accepted"&gt;&lt;h4&gt;Accepted talks at WEWoRC 2009&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;/a&gt;    &lt;table border="1" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;      &lt;td width="100%"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;       &lt;td&gt;         &lt;div align="center"&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/div&gt;    &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;   &lt;tr&gt;     &lt;td width="100%"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;       &lt;td&gt;              &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;      &lt;tr&gt;     &lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Authenticating with Attributes&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Dalia Khader (University of Bath, UK)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;From MQ to MQQ Cryptography:Weaknesses and New Solutions&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Rohit Ahlawat, Kanika Gupta, Saibal K. Pal (University of Delhi, India)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Bivium as a Mixed-0-1  Programming Problem&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Julia Borghoff, Lars R. Knudsen, Mathias Stolpe (DTU Mathematics, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt; &lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Cryptanalysis of C2&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Julia Borghoff, Lars R. Knudsen, Gregor Leander, Krystian Matusiewicz (DTU Mathematics, Technical University of Denmark,Denmark) &lt;a href="http://events.iaik.tugraz.at/weworc09/9aa510c7c7aab1/abstracts/04.pdf"&gt;abstract.pdf&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Application of the cube attack to stream and block ciphers&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Piotr Mroczkowski and Janusz Szmidt (Military Communication Institute and Military University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Fault injection's sensitivity of the McEliece PKC&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Pierre-Louis Cayrel and Pierre Dusart (Universite de Paris 8, and Universite de Limoges, France)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Round-Reduced Near-Collisions of BLAKE-32&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Jian Guo and Krystian Matusiewicz (Nanyang Technological University and Technical University of Denmark)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Cryptanalysis of the MCSSHA Hash Functions&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Jean-Philippe Aumasson and Maria Naya-Plasencia (FHNW Windisch, Switzerland, and INRIA project-team SECRET, France&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;An Improvement of Privacy-Preserving Scheme Based on Random Substitutions&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Ju-Sung Kang (Department of Mathematics, Kookmin University, Korea) &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Fast implementation of MASH hash function family&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Marek Gradzki (Military University of Technology, Institute of Mathematics and Cryptology, Warsaw, Poland)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Probabilistic Analysis of LLL Reduced Bases&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Michael Schneider, Johannes Buchmann and Richard Lindner (Technische Universität Darmstadt, Department of Computer Science, Germany)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Exploring Subliminal Channels in Pairing-Based Signatures&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Laila El Aimani and Yona Raekow (B-IT, Universität Bonn, Germany)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Collisions and Preimages for Sarmal&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Florian Mendel and Martin Schläffer (IAIK, Graz University of Technology, Austria) &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;On Free-Start Collisions and Collisions for TIB3&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Florian Mendel and Martin Schläffer (IAIK, Graz University of Technology, Austria)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Structural Attacks on Two SHA-3 Candidates: Blender-n and DCH-n&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Mario Lamberger and Florian Mendel (IAIK, Graz University of Technology, Austria)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;A Simple Derivation for the Frobenius Pseudoprime Test&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Daniel Loebenberger (B-IT, Universität Bonn, Germany)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Efficient root finding of polynomials over fields of characteristic 2&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Vincent Herbert (INRIA Paris - Rocquencourt, France)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Improved Distinguishing Attacks on HC-256&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Gautham Sekar and Bart Preneel (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Dept. ESAT/COSIC, Belgium, and IBBT, Belgium&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Key Recovery Attack on full GOST Block Cipher with Zero Time and Memory&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by  Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Jan-Hendrik Huehne, and Stefan Lucks (Bauhaus-University Weimar, Germany) &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Attacking Reduced Rounds of the ARIA Block Cipher&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, and Stefan Lucks (Bauhaus-University Weimar, Germany) &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Security of Generalized Tandem-DM&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, and Stefan Lucks (Bauhaus-University Weimar, Germany)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Density of Ideal Lattices&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Johannes Buchmann and Richard Lindner (Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany) &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Cryptanalysis of Reduced Word Variants of Salsa&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Sylvain Pelissier (EPFL, Switzerland) &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Efficient Arithmetic on Binary Genus-2 Curves&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Peter Birkner and Tanja Lange (Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, Netherlands) &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Cryptanalysis of a Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocol - LRMAP&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Imran Erguler, Mete Akgun, and Emin Anarim (National Research Institute of Electronics and Cryptology, TUBITAK-UEKAE, and  Electrical-Electronics Engineering Department, Bogazici University,Turkey) &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Short Signature Scheme From Bilinear Pairings&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by by Sedat Akleylek, Baris Bulent Kirlar, Omer Sever, and Zaliha Yuce (Institute of Applied Mathematics, Middle East Technical University, Turkey)  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Hierarchical Ring Signatures&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Lukasz Krzywiecki, Miroslaw Kutylowski, Anna Lauks-Dutka (Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wroclaw University of Technology, Poland) &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Efficient Chosen-Ciphertext Security from Selective-ID Secure Identity-Based Key Encapsulation&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Jonas Schrieb (University of Paderborn, Germany)&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Analysis of Reduced MD6&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Thomas Hodanek (Graz University of Technology, Austria) &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;     &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Algebraic-Differential Cryptanalysis of DES&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Jean-Charles Faugere, Ludovic Perret, and Pierre--Jean Spaenlehauer (UPMC, Univ Paris 06, LIP6 INRIA, Centre Paris-Rocquencourt, SALSA Project CNRS, France) &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;         &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; &lt;div&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Multi-Linear cryptanalysis in Power Analysis : MLPA&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; by Thomas Roche and Cedric Taverniere (Laboratoire Informatique de Grenoble, and CS, Communication and Systems, France)  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-8587396002507208742?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/8587396002507208742/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=8587396002507208742' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/8587396002507208742'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/8587396002507208742'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/08/weworc-2009.html' title='WEWoRC 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-9201669042772390601</id><published>2009-08-25T14:48:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2009-08-25T14:48:28.147-07:00</updated><title type='text'>ASIACRYPT 2009</title><content type='html'>&lt;h3&gt;110. Improved Cryptanalysis of Skein&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Cagdas Calik, Willi Meier, Onur Özen, Raphael C.-W. Phan and Kerem Varici&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;116. Secure Two-Party Computation is Practical&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Benny Pinkas, Thomas Schneider, Nigel P. Smart and Stephen C. Williams&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;128. Security Notions and Generic Constructions for Client Puzzles&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Liqun Chen, Paul Morrissey, Nigel P. Smart and Bogdan Warinschi&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;130. On the Analysis of Cryptographic Assumptions in the Generic Ring Model&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Tibor Jager and Jörg Schwenk&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;134 .Fiat-Shamir With Aborts: Applications to Lattice and Factoring-Based Signatures&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Vadim Lyubashevsky&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;145. Rebound Distinguishers: Results on the Full Whirlpool Compression Function&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Mario Lamberger, Florian Mendel, Christian Rechberger, Vincent Rijmen and Martin Schläffer&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;152. PSS is Secure against Random Fault Attacks&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Jean-Sebastien Coron and Avradip Mandal&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;157. Zero Knowledge in the Random Oracle Model, Revisited&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Hoeteck Wee&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;168. Linearization Framework for Collision Attacks: Application to CubeHash and MD6&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Eric Brier, Shahram Khazaei, Willi Meier and Thomas Peyrin&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;173. Improved generic algorithms for 3-collisions&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Antoine Joux and Stefan Lucks&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;189. Non-Malleable Statistically Hiding Commitment from Any One-Way Function&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Zongyang Zhang, Zhenfu Cao, Ning Ding and Rong Ma&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;202+302. Preimages for Step-Reduced SHA-2&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Kazumaro Aoki, Jian Guo, Krystian Matusiewicz, Yu Sasaki and Lei Wang&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;207. Cache-Timing Template Attacks&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Billy Brumley and Risto Hakala&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;221. Related-key Cryptanalysis of the Full AES-192 and AES-256&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Alex Biryukov and Dmitry Khovratovich&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;225. A Modular Design for Hash Functions: Towards Making the Mix-Compress-Mix Approach Practical&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Anja Lehmann and Stefano Tessaro&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;228. Security Bounds for the Design of Code-based Cryptosystems&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Matthieu Finiasz and Nicolas Sendrier&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;231. On Black-Box Constructions of Predicate Encryption from Trapdoor Permutations&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Jonathan Katz and Arkady Yerukhimovich&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;235. Memory Leakage-Resilient Encryption based on Physically Unclonable Functions&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Frederik Armknecht, Roel Maes, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Berk Sunar and Pim Tuyls&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;246. Quantum-Secure Coin-Flipping and Applications&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Ivan Damgård and Carolin Lunemann&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;250. Signature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Jonathan Katz and Vinod Vaikuntanathan&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;255. Simple Adaptive Oblivious Transfer Without Random Oracle&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Kaoru Kurosawa and Ryo Nojima&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;256. Improved Non-Committing Encryption with Applications to Adaptively Secure Protocols&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Seung Geol Choi, Dana Dachman-Soled, Tal Malkin and Hoeteck Wee&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;262. Secure Multi-party Computation Minimizing Online Rounds&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Seung Geol Choi, Ariel Elbaz, Tal Malkin and Moti Yung&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;268. Group Encryption: Non-Interactive Realization in the Standard Model&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Julien Cathalo, Benoit Libert and Moti Yung&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;272. Foundations of Non-Malleable Hash and One-Way Functions&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Alexandra Boldyreva, David Cash, Marc Fischlin and Bogdan Warinschi&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;274. Proofs of Storage from Homomorphic Identification Protocols&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Giuseppe Ateniese, Seny Kamara and Jonathan Katz&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;276. Hierarchical Predicate Encryption for Inner-Products&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Tatsuaki Okamoto and Katsuyuki Takashima&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;289. A Framework for Universally Composable Non-Committing Blind Signatures&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Masayuki Abe and Miyako Ohkubo&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;296. How to Confirm Cryptosystems Security: The Original Merkle-Damgård is Still Alive!&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Yusuke Naito, Kazuki Yoneyama, Lei Wang and Kazuo Ohta&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;303. Efficient Public Key Encryption Based on Ideal Lattices&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Damien Stehlé, Ron Steinfeld, Keisuke Tanaka and Keita Xagawa&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;322. Cryptanalysis of the Square Cryptosystems&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Olivier Billet and Gilles Macario-Rat&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;325. Cascade Encryption Revisited&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Peter Gaži and Ueli Maurer&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;326. Factoring $pq^2$ with Quadratic Forms: Nice Cryptanalyses&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Guilhem Castagnos, Antoine Joux, Fabien Laguillaumie and Phong Q. Nguyen&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;331. The Key-Dependent Attack on Block Ciphers&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Xiaorui Sun and Xuejia Lai&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;332. On the Power of Two-Party Quantum Cryptography&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Louis Salvail, Christian Schaffner and Miroslava Sotakova&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;343. The Intel AES Instructions Set and the SHA-3 Candidates&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Ryad Benadjila, Olivier Billet, Shay Gueron and Matt Robshaw&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;358. MD5 is Weaker than Weak: Attacks on Concatenated Combiners&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Florian Mendel, Christian Rechberger and Martin Schläffer&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;368. Rebound Attack on the Full LANE Compression Function&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Krystian Matusiewicz, María Naya-Plasencia, Ivica Nikolić, Yu Sasaki and Martin Schläffer&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;370. Hedged Public-Key Encryption: How to Protect Against Bad Randomness&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Mihir Bellare, Zvika Brakerski, Moni Naor, Thomas Ristenpart, Gil Segev, Hovav Shacham and Scott Yilek&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;385. Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Based on Lattices&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Jonathan Katz and Vinod Vaikuntanathan&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;h3&gt;404. Attacking Power Generators Using Unravelled Linearization: When Do We Output Too Much?&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;p&gt;Mathias Herrmann and Alexander May&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-9201669042772390601?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/9201669042772390601/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=9201669042772390601' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/9201669042772390601'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/9201669042772390601'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/08/asiacrypt-2009.html' title='ASIACRYPT 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-4483028713913015496</id><published>2009-07-22T03:36:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-07-22T03:38:31.368-07:00</updated><title type='text'>SHARCS'09</title><content type='html'>&lt;b&gt;List of accepted papers for SHARCS'09&lt;/b&gt; &lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt; Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Itai Dinur, Luca Henzen, Willi Meier, and Adi Shamir&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; "Efficient FPGA Implementations of High-Dimensional Cube Testers on the Stream Cipher Grain-128"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt; Daniel J. Bernstein&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;  "Cost analysis of hash collisions: will quantum computers make SHARCS obsolete?"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt; Daniel J. Bernstein, Hsueh-Chung Chen, Ming-Shing Chen, Chen-Mou Cheng, Chun-Hung Hsiao, Tanja Lange, Zong-Cing Lin, and Bo-Yin Yang&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;  "ECM Today"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt; Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange, Ruben Niederhagen, Christiane Peters, and Peter Schwabe&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; "FSBday: Implementing Wagner's Generalized Birthday Attack against the SHA-3 candidate FSB"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt; Joppe W. Bos, Marcelo E. Kaihara, and Peter L. Montgomery&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; "Pollard Rho on the PlayStation 3"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt; Tim Güneysu, Gerd Pfeiffer, Christof Paar,  and Manfred Schimmler&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;  "3 Years of Evolution: Cryptanalysis with COPACOBANA"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt; Martin Novotný and Timo Kasper&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; "Cryptanalysis of KeeLoq with COPACOBANA"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt; Igor Semaev&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; "Sparse Boolean equations and circuit lattices"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;3 more papers have been accepted conditionally. &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://www.sharcs.org/&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-4483028713913015496?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/4483028713913015496/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=4483028713913015496' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/4483028713913015496'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/4483028713913015496'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/07/sharcs09.html' title='SHARCS&apos;09'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-1339116698814018962</id><published>2009-07-21T02:28:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-07-21T02:31:05.228-07:00</updated><title type='text'>FDTC 09</title><content type='html'>&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 18pt;"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;INVITED PAPERS&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;ol style="margin-top: 0cm;" start="1" type="1"&gt;&lt;li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 6pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Blinded fault resistant exponentiation      revisited”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt; text-align: justify;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;Arnaud &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Boscher&lt;/span&gt;, Helena &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Handshuh&lt;/span&gt; (speaker), Elena Trichina&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;2.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="SpellE"&gt;KeeLoq&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; and Side-Channel Analysis – Evolution of an Attack&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 18pt 36pt;"&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;Christof&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt; &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Paar&lt;/span&gt; (speaker)&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 18pt;"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;REGULAR PAPERS&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;1.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;WDDL is protected against fault attacks&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;N. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Selmane&lt;/span&gt;, S. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Bhasin&lt;/span&gt;, S. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Guilley&lt;/span&gt;, T. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Graba&lt;/span&gt; and J.L. Danger&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;2.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Protecting RSA against fault attacks: the embedding method&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;M. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Joye&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;3.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Fault analysis of the stream cipher Snow 3G&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="FR"&gt;B. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Debraize&lt;/span&gt; and I. Marquez &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Corbella&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;4.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Securing the elliptic curve &lt;/span&gt;&lt;st1:city style="font-weight: bold;" st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place st="on"&gt;Montgomery&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:city&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; ladder against fault attacks&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;N. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Ebeid&lt;/span&gt; and R. Lambert&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;5.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Practical fault attack on a cryptographic LSI with ISO/IEC 18033-3 block ciphers&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;T. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Fukunaga&lt;/span&gt; and J. Takahashi&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;6.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A fault attack on ECDSA&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;J.M. Schmidt and M. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Medwed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;7.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt; &lt;/span&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Fault attack on &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;" class="SpellE"&gt;Schnorr&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; based identification and signature schemes&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;P.A. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Fouque&lt;/span&gt;, D. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Masgana&lt;/span&gt; and F. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Valette&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;8.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Optical fault attacks on AES: a threat in violet&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="DE"&gt;J.M. Schmidt; M. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Hutter&lt;/span&gt; and T. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Plos&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;9.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Differential fault analysis on SHACAL-&lt;/span&gt;&lt;st1:metricconverter productid="1”" st="on"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;1&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;/st1:metricconverter&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;"&gt;R. Li&lt;span class="GramE"&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;C. Li and C. Gong&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;10.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Low voltage fault attacks on the RSA cryptosystem&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt; text-indent: 0cm;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;A.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt;     &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;"&gt;Barenghi&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;"&gt;, G. Bertoni, &lt;span class="GramE"&gt;E.&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Parrinello&lt;/span&gt; and G. Pelosi&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;11.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Securing AES implementation against fault attacks&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 12pt 35.45pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;L. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Genelle&lt;/span&gt;, C. Giraud and E. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Prouff&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt 35.7pt; text-indent: -17.85pt;"&gt;&lt;!--[if !supportLists]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;12.&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Times New Roman&amp;quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;!--[endif]--&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;“&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Using optical emission analysis for estimating contribution to power analysis&lt;/span&gt;”&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;span style="font-family: Arial;" lang="EN-GB"&gt;            S. &lt;span class="SpellE"&gt;Skorobogatov&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://conferenze.dei.polimi.it/FDTC09/&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-1339116698814018962?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/1339116698814018962/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=1339116698814018962' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/1339116698814018962'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/1339116698814018962'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/07/fdtc-09.html' title='FDTC 09'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-7988053957389086789</id><published>2009-07-20T02:12:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-07-20T02:14:15.363-07:00</updated><title type='text'>SAC 2009 Accepted Submissions</title><content type='html'>&lt;h1 class="title"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/h1&gt;   &lt;!-- Main Content--&gt;                                  &lt;!-- EDITABLE NODE CONTENT START --&gt;          &lt;p&gt; &lt;strong&gt;A More Compact AES&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;David Canright and Dag Arne Osvik&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; We explored ways to reduce the number of bit operations required to implement AES. One way involved optimizing the composite field approach for entire rounds of AES. Another way was integrating the Galois multiplications of MixColumns with the linear transformations of the S box. Combined with careful optimizations, these reduced the number of bit operations to encrypt one block by 9.0%, compared to earlier work that used the composite field only in the S-box. For decryption, the improvement was 13.5%. This work may be useful both as a starting point for a bit-sliced software implementation, where reducing operations increases speed, and also for hardware with limited resources. &lt;/div&gt; &lt;p&gt; &lt;strong&gt;A new approach for FCSRs&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;François Arnault and Thierry Berger and Cédric Lauradoux and Marine Minier and Benjamin Pou&lt;/em&gt;sse&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; The Feedback with Carry Shift Registers (FCSRs) have been proposed as an alternative to Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) for the design of stream ciphers. FCSRs have good statistical properties and they provide a built-in non-linearity. However, two attacks have shown that the current representations of FCSRs can introduce weaknesses in the cipher. We propose a new “ring'” representation of FCSRs based upon matrix definition which generalizes the Galois and Fibonacci representations. Our approach preserves the statistical properties and circumvents the weaknesses of the Fibonacci and Galois representations. Moreover, the ring representation leads to automata with a quicker diffusion characteristic and better implementation results. As an application, we describe a new version of F-FCSR stream ciphers. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;An Efficient Residue Group Multiplication for The $\eta_T$ Pairing Over ${\mathbb F}_{3^m}$&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Yuta Sasaki and Satsuki Nishina and Masaaki Shirase and Tsuyoshi Takagi&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;When we implement the $\eta_T$ pairing, which is one of the fastest pairings, e need multiplications in a base field ${\mathbb F}_{3^m}$ and in a group $G$. We have regarded elements in $G$ as those in ${\mathbb F}_{3^{6m}}$ to implement the $\eta_T$ pairing in the past. Gorla et al. proposed a multiplication algorithm in ${\mathbb F}_{3^{6m}}$ that takes 5 multiplications in ${\mathbb F}_{3^{2m}}$, namely 15 multiplications in ${\mathbb F}_{3^{m}}$. This algorithm then reaches the theoretical lower bound of the number of multiplications. On the other hand, we may also regard elements in $G$ as those in the residue group ${\mathbb F}_{3^{6m}}^{\,*}\,/\,{\mathbb F}_{3^{m}}^{\,*}$ in which $\beta a$ is equivalent to $a$ for $a \in {\mathbb F}_{3^{6m}}^{\,*}$ and $\beta \in {\mathbb F}_{3^{m}}^{\,*}$. This paper propose an algorithm for computing a multiplication in the residue group. Its cost is asymptotically 12 multiplications in ${\mathbb F}_{3^{m}}$ as $m \rightarrow \infty$, which reaches beyond the lower bound the algorithm of Gorla et al. reaches. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;An Improved Recovery Algorithm for Decayed AES Key Schedule Images&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Alex Tsow&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A practical algorithm that recovers AES key schedules from decayed memory images is presented. Halderman et al. [9] established this recovery capability, dubbed the cold-boot attack, as a serious vulnerability for several widespread software-based encryption packages. Our algorithm recovers AES-128 key schedules tens of millions of times faster than the original proof-of-concept release. In practice, it enables reliable recovery of key schedules at 70% decay, well over twice the decay capacity of previous methods. The algorithm is generalized to AES 256 and is empirically shown to recover 256-bit key schedules that have suffered 65% decay. When solutions are unique, the algorithm effciently validates this property and outputs the solution for memory images decayed up to 60%. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;BTM: A Single-Key, Inverse-Cipher-Free Mode for Deterministic Authenticated Encryption&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Tetsu Iwata and Kan Yasuda&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We present a new blockcipher mode of operation named BTM, which stands for Bivariate Tag Mixing. BTM falls into the category of Deterministic Authenticated Encryption, which we call DAE for short. BTM makes all-around improvements over the previous two DAE constructions, SIV (Eurocrypt 2006) and HBS (FSE 2009). Specifically, our BTM requires just one blockcipher key, whereas SIV requires two. Our BTM does not require the decryption algorithm of the underlying blockcipher, whereas HBS does. The BTM mode utilizes bivariate polynomial hashing for authentication, which enables us to handle vectorial inputs of dynamic dimensions. BTM then generates an initial value for its counter mode of encryption by mixing the resulting tag with one of the two variables (hash keys), which avoids the need for an implementation of the inverse cipher. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Compact McEliece Keys from Goppa Codes&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Rafael Misoczki and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;The classical McEliece cryptosystem is built upon the class of Goppa codes, which remains secure to this date in contrast to many other families of codes but leads to very large public keys. Previous proposals to obtain short McEliece keys have primarily centered around replacing that class by other families of codes, most of which were shown to contain weaknesses, and at the cost of reducing in half the capability of error correction. In this paper we describe a simple way to reduce significantly the key size in McEliece and related cryptosystems using a subclass of Goppa codes, keeping the capability of correcting the full designed number of errors while also improving the efficiency of cryptographic operations to subquadratic time. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Cryptanalysis of Dynamic SHA(2)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Jean-Philippe Aumasson and Orr Dunkelman and Sebastiaan Indesteege and Bart Preneel&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this paper, we analyze the hash functions Dynamic SHA and Dynamic SHA2, which have been selected as first round candidates in the NIST Hash Competition. These hash functions rely heavily on data-dependent rotations, similar to certain block ciphers, e.g., RC5. Our analysis suggests that in the case of hash functions, where the attacker has more control over the rotations, this approach is less favorable. We present practical, or close to practical, collision attacks on both Dynamic SHA and Dynamic SHA2. Moreover, we present a preimage attack on Dynamic SHA that is faster than exhaustive search. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Cryptanalysis of hash functions with structures&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Dmitry Khovratovich&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Affiliations: University of Luxembourg&lt;br /&gt;Hash function cryptanalysis has acquired many methods, tools and tricks from other areas, mostly block ciphers. In this paper another trick from block cipher cryptanalysis, the structures, is used for speeding up the collision search. We investigate the memory and the time complexities of this approach under different assumptions on round functions. The power of the new attack is illustrated with the cryptanalysis of the hash functions Grindahl and the analysis of the SHA-3 candidate Fugue (both functions as 256 and 512 bit versions). The collision attack on Grindahl-512 is the first collision attack on this function. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Cryptanalyses of Narrow-Pipe Mode of Operation in AURORA-512 Hash Functi&lt;/strong&gt;on&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Yu Sasaki&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We present cryptanalyses of the AURORA-512 hash function, which is a SHA-3 candidate. We first describe a collision attack on AURORA-512. We then show a second-preimage attack on AURORA-512/-384 and explain that the randomized hashing can also be attacked. We finally show a full key-recovery attack on HMAC-AURORA-512 and universal forgery on HMAC AURORA-384. Our attack exploits weaknesses in a narrow-pipe mode of operation of AURORA-512 named ``Double-Mix Merkle-Damg\aa{}rd (DMMD)," which produces 512-bit output by updating two 256-bit chaining variables in parallel. We do not look inside of the compression function. Hence, our attack can work even if the compression function is regarded as a random oracle. The time complexity of our collision attack is approximately $2^{236}$ AURORA-512 operations, and $2^{236}\times 512$ bits of memory is required. Our second preimage attack works on any given message. The time complexity is approximately $2^{290}$ AURORA-512 operations, and $2^{288}\times 512$ bits of memory is required. Our key recovery attack on HMAC-AURORA-512, which uses 512-bit secret keys, requires $2^{257}$ queries, $2^{259}$ off-line AURORA-512 operations, and a negligible amount of memory. The universal forgery on HMAC-AURORA-384 is also possible by combining the second-preimage and key-recovery attacks. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Cryptanalysis of the full MMB Block Cipher&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Meiqin Wang and Jorge Nakahara Jr and Yue Sun&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;The block cipher MMB was designed by Daemen, Govaerts and Vandewalle, in 1993, as an alternative to the IDEA block cipher. We exploit and describe unusual properties of the modular multiplication in $\Z_{2^{32}-1}$, but the {\bf main contributions} of this paper are detailed differential, square and linear cryptanalysis of MMB. Concerning differential cryptanalysis, we can break the full 6-round MMB with $2^{118}$ chosen plaintexts, $2^{95.91}$ full 6-round MMB encryptions and $2^{64}$ counters, effectively bypassing the ciphers countermeasures against DC. For the square attack, we can recover the 128-bit user key for 4-round variant of MMB with $2^{34}$ chosen plaintexts, $2^{126.32}$ 4-round encryptions and $2^{64}$ memory requirements. Concerning linear cryptanalysis, we present a key-recovery attack on 3-round variant of MMB requiring $2^{114.56}$ known-plaintexts and $2^{126}$ encryptions. Moreover, we detail a ciphertext-only attack on 2-round MMB using $2^{93.6}$ ciphertexts and $2^{93.6}$ parity computations. These attacks do not depend on weak-key or weak-subkey assumptions, and are thus, independent of the (redesigned) key schedule algorithm. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Cryptanalysis of the LANE Hash Function&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Shuang Wu and Dengguo Feng and Wenling Wu&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The LANE hash function is designed by Sebastiaan Indesteege and Bart Preneel. It is now a first round candidate of NIST's SHA-3 competition. The LANE hash function contains four concrete designs with different digest length of 224, 256, 384 and 512. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; The LANE hash function uses two permutations P and Q, which consist of different number of AES-like rounds. LANE-224/256 uses 6-round P and 3-round Q. LANE-384/512 uses 8-round P and 4-round Q. We will use LANE-n-(a,b) to denote a variant of LANE with a-round P, b-round Q and a digest length n. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; We have found a semi-free start collision attack on reduced-round LANE-256-(3,3) with complexity of 2^62 compression function evaluations and 2^69 memory. This technique can be applied to LANE-512-(3,4) to get a semi-free start collision attack with the same complexity of 2^62 and 2^69 memory. We also propose a collision attack on LANE-512-(3,4) with complexity of 2^94 and 2^133 memory. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Differential Fault Analysis of Rabbit&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Aleksander Kircanski and Amr Youssef&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;Rabbit is a high speed scalable stream cipher with 128-bit key and a 64-bit initialization vector. It has passed all three stages of the ECRYPT stream cipher project and is a member of eSTREAM software portfolio. In this paper, we present a practical fault analysis attack on Rabbit. The fault model in which we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random bit of the internal state of the cipher but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. Our attack requires around $128-256$ faults, precomputed table of size $2^{41.6}$ bytes and recovers the complete internal state of Rabbit in about $2^{38}$ steps. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Format-Preserving Encryption&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Mihir Bellare and Thomas Ristenpart&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the encryption of credit-card data as well as other applications, we may want to encipher in such a way that a certain property of the plaintext is preserved in the ciphertext.  This paper initiates a treatment of this type of format-preserving encryption. We introduce a primitive that we call a general cipher that allows us to capture encryption preserving arbitrary formats. We specify an as-strong-as-possible notion of security for it that says that none but the desired property is leaked. We then provide an efficient construction of a general cipher that we call FPF. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Herding, Second Preimage and Trojan Message Attacks Beyond Merkle-Damgaard&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Elena Andreeva and Charles Bouillaguet and Orr Dunkelman and John Kelsey&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;In this paper we present new techniques to analyze the structure of hash functions other than the Merkle-Damgaard construction. We extend the herding attack to concatenated hashes, zipper&lt;br /&gt;hashes, and hash functions which iterate the message blocks several times. We follow with introducing the herding attack on tree hashes, showing how this attack can be applied in a completely different way. Furthermore, we show some new second preimage attacks (herding-based on the hash-twice, time-memory-data tradeoff based on tree hashes). Finally, we present a new type of attack - the trojan message attack, which allows for producing second preimages of unknown messages (from a small space) when they are appended with a fixed suffix. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Highly Regular m-ary Powering Ladders&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Marc Joye&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;This paper describes new exponentiation algorithms with applications to cryptography. The proposed algorithms can be seen as m-ary generalizations of the so-called Montgomery ladder. Both left-to-right and right-to-left versions are presented. Similarly to Montgomery ladder, the proposed algorithms always repeat the same instructions in the same order and so offer a natural protection against certain implementation attacks. Moreover, as they are available in any radix m and in any scan direction, the proposed algorithms offer improved performance and greater flexibility. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Improved Cryptanalysis of the Reduced Grøstl Compression Function, ECHO Permutation and AES&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Florian Mendel and Thomas Peyrin and Christian Rechberger and Martin Schläffer&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this paper, we propose two new ways to mount attacks on the SHA-3 candidates Grøstl, and ECHO, and apply these attacks also to the AES. Our results improve upon the original rebound attack. Using two new techniques, we are able to extend of the number of rounds in which available degrees of freedom can be used. As a result, we present the first attack on 7 rounds for the Grøstl-256 compression function, as well as an improved known-key distinguisher for 7 rounds of the AES and the internal permutation used in ECHO. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Improved Integral Attacks on MISTY1&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Xiaorui Sun and Xuejia Lai&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;We present several integral attacks on MISTY1 using the $FO$ Relation. The $FO$ Relation is a more precise form of the Sakurai-Zheng Property such that the functions in the $FO$ Relation depend on 16-bit inputs instead of 32-bit inputs used in previous attacks, and that the functions do not change for different keys while previous works used different functions. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; We use the $FO$ Relation to improve the 5-round integral attack. The data complexity of our attack, $2^{34}$ chosen plaintexts, is the same as previous attack, but the running time is reduced from $2^{48}$ encryptions to $2^{29.58}$ encryptions. %This improvement can greatly reduce the running time of the attack. The attack is then extended by one more round with data complexity of $2^{34}$ chosen plaintexts and time complexity of $2^{107.26}$ encryptions. By exploring the key schedule weakness of the cipher, we also present a chosen ciphertext attack on 6-round MISTY1 with all the $FL$ layers with data complexity of $2^{32}$ chosen ciphertexts and time complexity of $2^{126.09}$ encryptions. Compared with other attacks on 6-round MISTY1 with all the $FL$ layers, our attack has the least data complexity. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Information Theoretically Secure Multi Party Set Intersection Re-Visited&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Arpita Patra and Ashish Choudhary and C. Pandu Rangan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;We re-visit the problem of secure multiparty set intersection in information theoretic settings. In \cite{LiSetMPCACNS07}, Li et.al have proposed a protocol for multiparty set intersection problem with $n$ parties, that provides information theoretic security, when $t &lt; \frac{n}{3}$ parties are corrupted by an active adversary having {\it unbounded computing power}. In \cite{LiSetMPCACNS07}, the authors claimed that their protocol takes six rounds of communication and communicates ${\cal O}(n^4m^2)$ field elements, where each party has a set containing $m$ field elements. However, we show that the round and communication complexity of the protocol in \cite{LiSetMPCACNS07} is much more than what is claimed in \cite{LiSetMPCACNS07}. We then propose a {\it novel} information theoretically secure protocol for multiparty set intersection with $n &gt; 3t$, which significantly improves the "actual" round and communication complexity (as shown in this paper) of the protocol given in \cite{LiSetMPCACNS07}. To design our protocol, we use several tools which are of independent interest. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;More On Key Wrapping&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Rosario Gennaro and Shai Halevi&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;We address the practice of key-wrapping, where one symmetric cryptographic key is used to encrypt another. This practice is used extensively in key-management architectures, often to create an "adapter layer" between incompatible legacy systems. Although in principle any secure encryption scheme can be used for key wrapping, practical constraints (which are commonplace when dealing with legacy systems) may severely limit the possible implementations, sometimes to the point of ruling out any "secure general-purpose encryption." It is therefore desirable to identify the security requirements that are "really needed" for the key-wrapping application, and have a large variety of implementations that satisfy these requirements. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; This approach was developed in a work by Rogaway and Shrimpton at EUROCRYPT 2006. They focused on allowing deterministic encryption, and defined a notion of \emph{deterministic authenticated encryption} (DAE), which roughly formalizes "the strongest security that one can get without randomness." Although DAE is weaker than full blown authenticated encryption, it seems to suffice for the case of key wrapping (since keys are random and therefore the encryption itself can be deterministic). Rogaway and Shrimpton also described a mode of operation for block ciphers (called SIV) that realizes this notion. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; We continue in the direction initiated by Rogaway and Shirmpton. We first observe that the notion of DAE still rules out many practical and ``seemingly secure'' implementations. We thus look for even weaker notions of security that may still suffice. Specifically we consider notions that mirror the usual security requirements for symmetric encryption, except that the inputs to be encrypted are random rather than adversarially chosen. These notions are all strictly weaker than DAE, yet we argue that they suffice for most applications of key wrapping. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; As for implementations, we consider the key-wrapping notion that mirrors authenticated encryption, and investigate a template of Hash-then-Encrypt (HtE), which seems practically appealing: In this method the key is first "hashed" into a short nonce, and then the nonce and key are encrypted using some standard encryption mode. We consider a wide array of "hash functions", ranging from a simple XOR to collision-resistant hashing, and examine what "hash function" can be used with what encryption mode. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;More on the Security of Linear RFID Authentication Protocols&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Matthias Krause and Dirk Stegemann&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;The limited computational resources available in RFID tags implied an intensive search for light weight authentication protocols in the last years. The most promising suggestions were those of the $\textsf{HB}$-familiy ($\textsf{HB}^+$, $\textsf{HB}^{\#}$,  Trusted$\textsf{HB}$, ...) initially introduced by Juels and Weis, which are provably secure (via reduction to the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem) against passive and some kinds of active attacks. Their main drawbacks are large amounts of communicated bits and the fact that all known $\textsf{HB}$-type protocols have been proven to be insecure with respect to certain types of active attacks. As a possible alternative, authentication protocols based on choosing random elements from $L$ secret linear $n$-dimensional subspaces of $GF(2)^{n+k}$ (so called CKK-protocols) were introduced by Cicho\'{n}, Klonowski, and Kuty\l owski. These protocols are special cases of (linear) $(n,k,L)$-protocols which we investigate in this paper. We present several active and passive attacks against $(n,k,L)$-protocols, thereby giving some evidence that the security of $(n,k,L)$-protocols can be reduced to the hardness of the {\it learning unions of linear subspaces} (LULS) problem. We then present a learning algorithm for LULS based on solving overdefined systems of degree $L$ in $Ln$ variables. Under the hardness assumption that LULS-problems cannot be solved significantly faster, linear $(n,k,L)$-protocols (with properly chosen $n,k,L$) could be interesting for practical applications. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;New Cryptanalysis of Irregularly Decimated Stream Ciphers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Bin Zhang&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;In this paper we investigate the security of irregularly decimated stream ciphers. We present an improved correlation analysis of various irregular decimation mechanisms, which allows us to get much larger correlation probabilities than previously known methods. Then new correlation attacks are launched against the shrinking generator with Krawczyk's parameters, LILI-$\amalg$, DECIM$^{\textit{v2}}$ and DECIM-{$128$} to access the security margin of these ciphers. We show that the shrinking generator with Krawczyk's parameters is practically insecure; the initial internal state of LILI-$\amalg$ can be recovered reliably in $2^{72.5}$ operations, if $2^{24.1}$-bit keystream and $2^{74.1}$-bit memory are available. This disproves the designers' conjecture that the complexity of any divide-and-conquer attack on LILI-$\amalg$ is in excess of $2^{128}$ operations and requires a large amount of keystream. We also examine the main design idea behind DECIM, i.e., to filter and then decimate the output using the ABSG algorithm, by showing a class of correlations in the ABSG mechanism and mounting attacks faster than exhaustive search on a $160$-bit (out of $192$-bit) reduced version of DECIM$^{\textit{v2}}$ and on a $256$-bit (out of $288$-bit) reduced version of DECIM-{$128$}. Our result on DECIM is the first nontrivial cryptanalytic result besides the time/memory/data tradeoffs. While our result confirms the underlying design idea, it shows an interesting fact that the security of DECIM rely more on the length of the involved LFSR than on the ABSG algorithm. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;New Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Camellia-128&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Hamid Mala and Mohsen Shakiba and Mohammad Dakhil-alian&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Camellia, a 128-bit block cipher which has been accepted by ISO/IEC as an international standard, is increasingly being used in many cryptographic applications. In this paper, using the redundancy in the key schedule and accelerating the filtration of wrong pairs, we present a new impossible differential attack to reduced-round Camellia. By this attack 12-round Camellia-128 without FL/FL-1 functions and whitening is breakable with a total complexity of about 2^116.6 encryptions and 2^116.3 chosen plaintexts. In terms of the numbers of the attacked rounds, our attack is better than any previously known attack on Camellia-128. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;On Repeated Squarings in Binary Fields&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Kimmo U. Järvinen&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this paper, we discuss the problem of computing repeated squarings (exponentiations to a power of 2) in finite fields with polynomial basis. Repeated squarings have importance, especially, in elliptic curve cryptography where they are used in computing inversions in the field and scalar multiplications on Koblitz curves. We explore the problem specifically from the perspective of efficient implementation using field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) where the look-up table structure helps to reduce both area and delay overheads. We propose several repeated squarer architectures and demonstrate their practicability for FPGA-based implementations. Finally, we show that the proposed repeated squarers can offer significant speedups and even improve resistivity against side-channel attacks. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Optimization strategies for hardware-based cofactorization&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Daniel Loebenberger and Jens Putzka&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We use the specific structure of the inputs to the cofactorization step in the general number field sieve (GNFS) in order to optimize the runtime for the cofactorization step on a hardware cluster. An optimal distribution of bitlength-specific ECM modules is proposed and compared to existing ones. With our optimizations we obtain a speedup between 17% and 33% of the cofactorization step of the GNFS when compared to the runtime of an unoptimized cluster. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Practical Collisions for SHAMATA&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sebastiaan Indesteege and Florian Mendel and Bart Preneel and Martin Schlaeffer&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this paper we present a practical collision attack on the SHA-3 submission SHAMATA. SHAMATA is a stream cipher-like hash function design with components of the AES, and it is one of the fastest submitted hash functions. In our attack we show weaknesses in the message injection and state update of SHAMATA. It is possible to find certain message differences that do not get changed by the message expansion and non-linear part of the state update function. This allows us to find a differential path with a complexity of about $2^{96}$ for SHAMATA-256 and about $2^{110}$ for SHAMATA-512, using a linear low-weight codeword search. Using an efficient guess-and-determine technique we can significantly improve the complexity of this differential path for SHAMATA-256. With a complexity of about $2^{40}$ we are even able to construct practical collisions for the full hash function SHAMATA-256. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Practical pseudo-collisions for hash functions ARIRANG-224/384&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Jian Guo and Krystian Matusiewicz and Lars R. Knudsen and San Ling and Huaxiong Wang&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;In this paper we analyse the security of the SHA-3 candidate ARIRANG. We show that bitwise complementation of whole registers turns out to be very useful for constructing high-probability differential characteristics in the function. We use this approach to find near-collisions with Hamming weight 32 for the full compression function as well as collisions for the compression function of ARIRANG reduced to 26 rounds, both with complexity close to $2^0$ and memory requirements of only a few words. We use near collisions for the compression function to construct pseudo-collisions for the complete hash functions ARIRANG-224 and ARIRANG-384 with complexity $2^{23}$ and close to $2^0$, respectively. We implemented the attacks and provide examples of appropriate pairs of $H,M$ values. We also provide possible configurations which may give collisions for step-reduced and full ARIRANG. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Real Traceable Signatures&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sherman S.M. Chow&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Traceable signature scheme extends a group signature scheme with an enhanced anonymity management mechanism. The group manager can compute a tracing trapdoor which enables anyone to test if a signature is signed by a given misbehaving user, where the only way to do so for group signatures requires revealing the signer of all signatures. Nevertheless, it is not tracing in a strict sense. For all existing schemes, $T$ tracing agents need to recollect all $N'$ signatures ever produced and perform $RN'$ ``checks'' for $R$ revoked users. This involves a high volume of transfer and computations. Increasing $T$ maximizes the degree of parallelism for tracing but also the probability of ``missing'' some signatures. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; We propose a new and efficient way of tracing -- the tracing trapdoor allows the reconstruction of tags such that each of them can uniquely identify a signature of a misbehaving user. Identifying $N$ signatures out of the total of $N'$ signatures ($N &lt;&lt;&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;/div&gt;&lt;p style="text-align: justify;"&gt; &lt;strong&gt;Weak Keys of the Block Cipher PRESENT for Linear Cryptanalysis&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Kenji Ohkuma&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The block cipher PRESENT designed as an ultra-light weight cipher has the 31-round SPN structure with S-box layers with 16-parallel 4-bit S-boxes and diffusion layers with a bit permutation. The designers evaluated the maximum linear characteristic deviation is not more than $2^{-43}$ for 28 rounds and concluded that the linear cryptanalysis is not vulnerable to PRESENT. But we have found that 32% of PRESENT keys are weak for linear cryptanalysis, and the linear deviation can be much larger than the linear characteristic value by multi-path effect. And we evaluated that a 28-round path with a linear deviation $2^{-39.3}$ for the weak keys. Furthermore, we found that the linear cryptanalysis is applicable up to 24-round reduced version of PRESENT for the weak keys.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;http://sac.ucalgary.ca/agenda/accepted_papers&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-7988053957389086789?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/7988053957389086789/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=7988053957389086789' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/7988053957389086789'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/7988053957389086789'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/07/sac-2009-accepted-submissions.html' title='SAC 2009 Accepted Submissions'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-4804783006711506305</id><published>2009-07-20T02:08:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-07-20T02:09:22.774-07:00</updated><title type='text'>ProvSec 2009</title><content type='html'>&lt;p align="left"&gt;&lt;span class="style9"&gt;Accepted Papers &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. Title: How to Prove Security of A Signature with A Tighter Security Reduction &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: GUO Fuchun and Mu Yi       &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2. Title: An eCK-secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Without Random Oracles &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: Moriyama Daisuke and Okamoto Ttatsuaki       &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3. Title: Oracle Separation in the Non-Uniform Model &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: Buldas Ahto, Niitsoo Margus and Laur Sven       &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;4. Title: Anonymous Conditional Proxy Re-encryption Without Random Oracle &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: Fang Liming, Wang Jiandong and Susilo Willy       &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;5. Title: Identity-Based Verifiably Encrypted Signatures Without Random Oracles &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Zhang Lei , Qin Bo and Wu Qianhong      &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;6. Title: Zero-Knowledge Protocols for NTRU: Application to Identification and Plaintext Proof &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: Xagawa Keita and Tanaka Keisuke       &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;7. Title: GUC-Secure Set-Intersection Computation &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Yuan TIAN      &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;8. Title: Chosen-Ciphertext Secure RSA-type Cryptosystems &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: Joye Marc and Chevallier-Mames Benoît       &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;9. Title: Twin Signature Schemes, Revisited &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Schäge Sven      &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;10. Title: On the Insecurity of the Fiat-Shamir Signatures with Iterated Hash Functions &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;      Authors: Fujisaki Eiichiro, Nishimaki Ryo and Tanaka Keisuke           &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;11. Title: Spatial Encryption under Simpler Assumption &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: Zhou Muxin and Cao Zhenfu        &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;12. Title: Self-Enforcing Private Inference Control &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: Yang Yanjiang, Bao Feng, Zhou Jianying, Weng Jian and Li Yingjiu       &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;13. Title: Comparing SessionStateReveal and EphemeralKeyReveal for Diffie-Hellman protocols &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Authors: Ustaoglu Berkant      &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;14. Title: Anonymous Signatures Revisited &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: Saraswat Vishal and Yun Aaram       &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;15. Title: Is the Notion of Divisible On-line/Off-line Signatures Stronger than On-line/Off-line Signatures? (An affirmative answer to an open problem in CT-RSA 2009) &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: Au Man Ho, Mu Yi and Susilo Willy       &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;16. Title: Breaking and Fixing of an Identity Based Multi-Signcryption Scheme &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: S Sharmila , Rangan C Pandu and Vivek Sree     &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;17. Title: Password Authenticated Key Exchange Based on RSA in the Three-Party Settings&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;    Authors: Dongna E, Chuangui Ma and Qingfeng Cheng       &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;18. Title: Efficient Non-Interactive Universally Composable String-Commitment Schemes &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    Authors: Nishimaki Ryo, Tanaka Keisuke and Fujisaki Eiichiro     &lt;/p&gt;      &lt;strong&gt;19. Title: Server-Controlled Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;      Authors: Guo Hua, Mu Yi, Zhang Xiyong and Li Zhoujun&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://ist.sysu.edu.cn/ProvSec2009/&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-4804783006711506305?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/4804783006711506305/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=4804783006711506305' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/4804783006711506305'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/4804783006711506305'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/07/provsec-2009.html' title='ProvSec 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-2707138995363237815</id><published>2009-07-07T08:38:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-07-07T08:40:55.475-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Workshop on RFID Security 2009</title><content type='html'>http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/rfidsec09/index.html&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Ff-Family of Protocols for RFID-Privacy and Authentication &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Erik-Oliver Blass&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Coupon Recalculation for the Schnorr and GPS Identification Scheme: A Performance Evaluation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Christoph Nagl&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;When Compromised Readers Meet RFID &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tania Martin&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Modeling Privacy for Off-line RFID Systems &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Flavio D. Garcia&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of Trusted-HB &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Adi Shamir&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Dark Side of Security by Obscurity and Cloning MiFare Classic Rail and Building Passes, Anywhere, Anytime    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nicolas T. Courtois&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Weaknesses in Two Recent Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocols&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Pedro Peris-Lopez&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;New Methods for Cost-Effective Side-Channel Attacks on Cryptographic RFIDs &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;David Oswald&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Practical Experiences with NFC Security on mobile Phones&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Gauthier Van Damme&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Pathchecker: an RFID Application for Tracing Products in Suply-Chains&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Khaled Ouafi&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Hyperelliptic curve processor for RFID tags&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Junfeng Fan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;We Can Remember It for You Wholesale: Implications of Data Remanence on the Use of RAM for True Random Number Generation on RFID Tags&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Jonathan Voris&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient RFID Security and Privacy with Anonymizers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Christian Wachsmann&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Using HB Family of Protocols for Privacy-Preserving Authentication of RFID Tags in a Population&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jonathan Voris&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Flyweight RFID Authentication Protocol &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jorge Munilla&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Semi-Destructive Privacy in RFID Systems&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Paolo D'Arco&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-2707138995363237815?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/2707138995363237815/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=2707138995363237815' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2707138995363237815'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2707138995363237815'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/07/workshop-on-rfid-security-2009.html' title='Workshop on RFID Security 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-727580001606955746</id><published>2009-07-07T08:29:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-07-07T08:32:36.049-07:00</updated><title type='text'>ALGOSENSORS 2009</title><content type='html'>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; International Workshop on  Algorithmic Aspects of Wireless Sensor Networks&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://www.algosensors.org/algosensors09/index.php&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Bernadette Charron-Bost, Jennifer Welch and Josef Widder. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Link Reversal: How to play better to work less&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Marek Klonowski, Miroslaw Kutylowski and Jan Zatopianski. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Energy Efficient Alert in Single-Hop Networks of Extremely Weak Devices&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;David Kirkpatrick and Sergey Bereg. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Approximating barrier resilience in wireless sensor networks&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Milan Bradonjic, Eddie Kohler and Rafail Ostrovsky. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Near-Optimal Radio Use For Wireless Network Synchronization&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Olaf Bonorden, Bastian Degener, Barbara Kempkes and Peter Pietrzyk. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Complexity and approximation of a geometric local robot assignment problem&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Chen Avin, Zvi Lotker, Francesco Pasquale and Yvonne Anne Pignolet. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Note on Uniform Power Connectivity in the SINR Model&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Sorelle Friedler and David Mount. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Compressing Kinetic Data From Sensor Networks&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Zeev Nutov and Michael Segal. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Improved Approximation Algorithms for Maximum Lifetime Problems in Wireless Networks&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Jacek Cichon, Jaroslaw Grzaslewicz and Miroslaw Kutylowski. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Securing Random Key Predistribution Against Node Captures&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Onur Tekdas, Yokesh Kumar, Volkan Isler and Ravi Janardan. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Building a Communication Bridge with Mobile Hubs&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Saira Viqar and Jennifer Welch. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Deterministic Collision Free Communication Despite Continuous Motion&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Pierre Leone, Marina Papatriantafilou and Elad M. Schiller. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Relocation Analysis of Stabilizing MAC Algorithms for Large-Scale Mobile Ad Hoc Networks&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Michael Keane, Evangelos Kranakis, Danny Krizanc and Lata Narayanan. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Routing on Delay Tolerant Sensor Networks&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Florian Huc, Aubin Jarry, Pierre Leone, Jose Rolim, Luminita Moraru and Sotiris Nikoletseas. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Early Obstacle Detection and Avoidance for All to All Traffic Pattern in Wireless Sensor Networks&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Paolo D'Arco, Alessandra Scafuro and Ivan Visconti. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Revisiting DoS Attacks and Privacy in RFID-Enabled Networks&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Carme Alvarez, Amalia Duch, Joaquim Gabarro and Maria Serna. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Sensor Field: A computational model&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Peter Glaus. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Locating a Black Hole without the Knowledge of Incoming Link&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Xiaoyang Guan. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Better Face Routing Protocols&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Avery Miller. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Gossiping in Jail&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Stefan Dziembowski, Alessandro Mei and Alessandro Panconesi. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On Active Attacks on Sensor Network Key Distribution Schemes&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Yoann Dieudonne and Franck Petit. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Self-stabilizing Deterministic Gathering&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-727580001606955746?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/727580001606955746/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=727580001606955746' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/727580001606955746'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/727580001606955746'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/07/algosensors-2009.html' title='ALGOSENSORS 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-3585086076495434833</id><published>2009-07-06T01:02:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-07-06T01:11:00.311-07:00</updated><title type='text'>2nd IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust  HOST-2009</title><content type='html'>http://www.engr.uconn.edu/HOST/&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Local Heating Attacks on Flash Memory Devices&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sergei Skorobogatov,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Fault Analysis of Grain-128&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Guilhem Castagnos, Alexandre Berzati, Cécile Canovas, Blandine&lt;br /&gt;Debraize, Louis Goubin, Aline Gouget, Pascal Paillier and Stephanie&lt;br /&gt;Salgado,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Security Evaluation of Different AES Implementations Against Practical &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Setup Time Violation Attacks in FPGAs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Shivam Bhasin, Nidhal Selmane, Sylvain Guilley and Jean-Luc Danger,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ReconfigurablePhysicalUnclonableFunctions--EnablingTechnologyfor &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Tamper-Resistant Storage&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Klaus Kursawe, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Dries Schellekens, Boris Skoric and&lt;br /&gt;Pim Tuyls,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Circuit Level Techniques for Reliable Physically Uncloneable Functions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vignesh Vivekraja and Leyla Nazhandali. ,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Temperature-Aware Cooperative Ring Oscillator PUF&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Chi-En Yin and Gang Qu.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Robust Stable Radiometric Fingerprinting for Frequency Reconfigurable &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Devices&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Andrea Candore, Ovunc Kocabas and Farinaz Koushanfar,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Experiences in Hardware Trojan Design and Implementation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yier Jin, Nathan Kupp and Yiorgos Makris,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Performance of Delay-Based Trojan Detection Techniques under &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Parameter Variations&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Devendra Rai and John Lach,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;New Design Strategy for Improving Hardware Trojan Detection and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Reducing Trojan Activation Time&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hassan Salmani, Mohammad Tehranipoor and Jim Plusquellic,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Analysis and Design of Active IC Metering Schemes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Roel Maes, Dries Schellekens, Pim Tuyls and Ingrid Verbauwhede,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Secure IP-Block Distribution for Hardware Devices&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jorge Guajardo, Tim Gueneysu, Sandeep S. Kumar and Christof Paar,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Extended Abstract: Early Feedback on Side-Channel Risks with &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Accelerated Toggle-Counting&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Zhimin Chen and Patrick Schaumont. ,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Security Through Obscurity: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; An Approach for Protecting Register Transfer Level Hardware IP&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Rajat Subhra Chakrabortyand Swarup Bhunia,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;OS Support for Detecting Trojan Circuit Attacks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Gedare Bloom, Bhagirath Narahari and Rahul Simha,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;VITAMIN: Voltage Inversion Technique &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; to Ascertain Malicious Insertions in ICs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mainak Banga and Michael S. Hsiao,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Dynamic Evaluation of Hardware Trust&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;David McIntyre, Francis Wolff, Chris Papachristou and Swarup Bhunia,&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-3585086076495434833?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/3585086076495434833/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=3585086076495434833' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/3585086076495434833'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/3585086076495434833'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/07/2nd-ieee-international-workshop-on.html' title='2nd IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust  HOST-2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-8844056906277261562</id><published>2009-07-06T00:51:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-07-06T00:59:55.560-07:00</updated><title type='text'>14th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2009)</title><content type='html'>Esorics 2009: List of accepted papers&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Dynamic Enforcement of Abstract Separation of Duty Constraints  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;David A. Basin (Information Security, Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich),&lt;br /&gt;Samuel J. Burri (Security Group, Zurich Research Laboratory, IBM Research), Günter&lt;br /&gt;Karjoth (Security Group, Zurich Research Laboratory, IBM Research)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Enabling Public Verifiability and Data Dynamics for Storage Security in Cloud &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Computing  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Qian Wang (Illinois Institute of Technology), Cong Wang (Illinois Institute of Technology),&lt;br /&gt;Jin Li (Illinois Institute of Technology), Kui Ren (Illinois Institute of Technology), Wenjing&lt;br /&gt;Lou (Worcester Polytechnic Institute)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Requirements and protocols for inference-proof interactions in information &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;systems  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Joachim Biskup (Technische Universitaet Dortmund), Christian Gogolin (Technische&lt;br /&gt;Universitaet Dortmund), Jens Seiler (Technische Universitaet Dortmund), Torben Weibert&lt;br /&gt;(Technische Universitaet Dortmund)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Automatically Generating Models for Botnet Detection  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Peter Wurzinger (Technical University Vienna), Leyla Bilge (Institute Eurecom), Thorsten&lt;br /&gt;Holz (University of Mannheim), Jan Göbel (University of Mannheim), Christopher Kruegel&lt;br /&gt;(University of California, Santa Barbara), Engin Kirda (Institute Eurecom)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Privacy Preservation Model for Facebook-Style Social Network Systems  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Philip W. L. Fong (University of Calgary), Mohd Anwar (University of Calgary), Zhen Zhao&lt;br /&gt;(University of Regina)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Tracking Information Flow in Dynamic Tree Structures  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alejandro Russo (Chalmers), Andrei Sabelfeld (Chalmers), Andrey Chudnov (Stevens)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Exploiting a Content Delivery Network for an Attack Against Its Customers  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sipat Triukose (Case Western Reserve University), Zakaria Al-Qudah (Case Western&lt;br /&gt;Reserve University), Michael Rabinovich (Case Western Reserve University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ID-based Secure Distance Bounding and Localization &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nils Ole Tippenhauer (ETH Zurich), Srdjan Capkun (ETH Zurich)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Synthesising Secure APIs  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Veronique Cortier (LORIA, Projet Cassis, CNRS &amp;amp; INRIA), Graham Steel (LSV, INRIA &amp;amp;&lt;br /&gt;CNRS &amp;amp; ENS-Cachan)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ReFormat: Automatic Reverse Engineering of Encrypted Messages  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Zhi Wang (North Carolina State University), Xuxian Jiang (North Carolina State&lt;br /&gt;University), Weidong Cui (Microsoft Research), Xinyuan Wang (George Mason&lt;br /&gt;University), Mike Grace (North Carolina State University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Towards a theory of accountability and audit &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Radha Jagadeesan (School of CDM, DePaul University, Chicago.), Alan Jeffrey (Bell Labs,&lt;br /&gt;Alcatel-Lucent), Corin Pitcher (School of CDM, DePaul University, Chicago), James Riely&lt;br /&gt;(School of CDM, DePaul University, Chicago)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cumulative Attestation Kernels for Embedded Systems  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Michael LeMay (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Carl A. Gunter (University of&lt;br /&gt;Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)&lt;br /&gt;Hide and Seek in Time - Robust Covert Timing Channels &lt;br /&gt;Yali Liu (University of California, Davis), Frederik Armknecht (Ruhr-University), Dipak&lt;br /&gt;Ghosal (University of California, Davis), Stefan Katzenbeisser (Technische Universität&lt;br /&gt;Darmstadt), Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (Ruhr-University), Steffen Schulz (Ruhr-University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Formal Indistinguishability extended to the Random Oracle Model  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Cristian Ene (Université Grenoble 1, CNRS, Verimag), Yassine Lakhnech (Université&lt;br /&gt;Grenoble 1, CNRS, Verimag), Van Chan Ngo (ETH Zürich)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Secure ownership and ownership transfer in RFID systems&lt;/span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Ton van Deursen (University of Luxembourg), Sjouke Mauw (University of Luxembourg),&lt;br /&gt;Sasa Radomirovic (University of Luxembourg), Pim Vullers (Eindhoven University of&lt;br /&gt;Technology and University of Luxembourg)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Secure Pseudonymous Channels  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sebastian Moedersheim (IBM Zurich Research Laboratory), Luca Vigano (University of&lt;br /&gt;Verona)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Learning More About the Underground Economy: A Case-Study of Keyloggers &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;and Dropzones  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thorsten Holz (University of Mannheim), Markus Engelberth (University of Mannheim),&lt;br /&gt;Felix Freiling (University of Mannheim)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Reliable Evidence: Auditability by Typing  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nataliya Guts (MSR-INRIA Joint Centre), Cédric Fournet (Microsoft Research), Francesco&lt;br /&gt;Zappa Nardelli (INRIA)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Usable Access Control in Collaborative Environments: Authorization based on &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;People-Tagging  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Qihua Wang (Purdue University), Hongxia Jin (IBM Almaden Research Center), Ninghui Li&lt;br /&gt;(Purdue University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Data Structures with Unpredictable Timing  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Darrell Bethea (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Mike Reiter (University of&lt;br /&gt;North Carolina at Chapel Hill)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;New Privacy Results on Synchronized RFID Authentication Protocols Against &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Tag Tracing  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ching Yu Ng (University of Wollongong), Willy Susilo (University of Wollongong), Yi Mu&lt;br /&gt;(University of Wollongong), Rei Safavi-Naini (University of Calgary)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Set Covering Problems in Role-Based Access Control  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Liang Chen (Royal Holloway, University of London), Jason Crampton (Royal Holloway,&lt;br /&gt;University of London)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The wisdom of Crowds: attacks and optimal constructions &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;George Danezis (Microsoft Research), Claudia Diaz, Emilia Kasper, and Carmela Troncoso&lt;br /&gt;(K.U. Leuven/IBBT, ESAT/SCD-COSIC)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Lightweight Opportunistic Tunneling (LOT) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Amir Herzberg, Yossi Gilad (Bar Ilan University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Authentic Time-Stamps for Archival Storage  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alina Oprea (RSA Laboratories), Kevin Bowers (RSA Laboratories)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;WORM-SEAL: Trustworthy Data Retention and Verification for Regulatory &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Compliance  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tiancheng Li (Purdue University), Xiaonan Ma (IBM Almaden Research Center), Ninghui Li&lt;br /&gt;(Purdue University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Type-based Analysis of PIN Processing APIs  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Matteo Centenaro (University of Venice, Italy), Riccardo Focardi (University of Venice,&lt;br /&gt;Italy), Flaminia Luccio (University of Venice, Italy), Graham Steel (LSV, ENS Cachan \&amp;amp;&lt;br /&gt;CNRS \&amp;amp; INRIA, France)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Computationally Sound Analysis of a Probabilistic Contract Signing Protocol  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mihhail Aizatulin (University of Kiel), Henning Schnoor (University of Kiel), Thomas Wilke&lt;br /&gt;(University of Kiel)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Secure Evaluation of Private Linear Branching Programs with Medical &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Applications  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mauro Barni (University of Siena), Pierluigi Failla (University of Siena), Vladimir&lt;br /&gt;Kolesnikov (Bell Laboratories), Riccardo Lazzeretti (University of Siena), Ahmad-Reza&lt;br /&gt;Sadeghi (Ruhr-University Bochum), Thomas Schneider (Ruhr-University Bochum)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Declassification with Explicit Reference Points  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alexander Lux (TU Darmstadt), Heiko Mantel (TU Darmstadt)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Keep a Few: Outsourcing Data while Maintaining Confidentiality  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Valentina Ciriani (DTI - Universita' degli Studi di Milano), Sabrina De Capitani di&lt;br /&gt;Vimercati (DTI - Universita' degli Studi di Milano), Sara Foresti (DTI - Universita' degli&lt;br /&gt;Studi di Milano), Sushil Jajodia (CSIS - George Mason University), Stefano Paraboschi&lt;br /&gt;(DIIMM - University of Bergamo), Pierangela Samarati (DTI - Universita' degli Studi di&lt;br /&gt;Milano)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;User-Centric Handling of Identity Agent Compromise  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Daisuke Mashima, Mustaque Ahamad, Swagath Kannan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Set Based Encryption  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Rakesh Bobba (University of Illinois), Himanshu Khurana (University of Illinois), Manoj&lt;br /&gt;Prabhakaran (University of Illinois)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Model-Checking DoS Amplification for VoIP Session Initiation  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ravinder Shankesi (University of Illinois), Musab AlTurki (University of Illinois), Ralf&lt;br /&gt;Sasse (University of Illinois), Carl Gunter (University of Illinois), Jose Meseguer&lt;br /&gt;(University of Illinois)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Protocol Normalization using Attribute Grammars &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Drew Davidson (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Randy Smith (University of Wisconsin-&lt;br /&gt;Madison), Nic Doyle (CISCO Systems), Somesh Jha (University of Wisconsin-Madison)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Coremelt Attack&lt;/span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Ahren Studer (Carnegie Mellon University), Adrian Perrig (Carnegie Mellon University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Isolating JavaScript with Filters, Rewriting, and Wrappers  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sergio Maffeis (Imperial College, London), John C. Mitchell (Stanford University), Ankur&lt;br /&gt;Taly (Stanford University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;PCAL: Language Support for Proof-Carrying Authorization Systems  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Avik Chaudhuri (University of Maryland, College Park), Deepak Garg (Carnegie Mellon&lt;br /&gt;University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Super-efficient Aggregating History-independent Persistent Authenticated &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Dictionaries  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Scott A. Crosby (Rice University), Dan S. Wallach (Rice University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Client-Side Detection of XSS Worms by Monitoring Payload Propagation  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Fangqi Sun (UC Davis), Liang Xu (UC Davis), Zhendong Su (UC Davis)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Corruption-Localizing Hashing  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Shaoquan Jiang, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;An Effective Method for Combating Malicious Scripts Clickbots  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yanlin Peng (Iowa State University), Linfeng Zhang (Iowa State University), J. Morris&lt;br /&gt;Chang (Iowa State University), Yong Guan (Iowa State University)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://conferences.telecom-bretagne.eu/esorics2009/EN/home.php&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-8844056906277261562?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/8844056906277261562/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=8844056906277261562' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/8844056906277261562'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/8844056906277261562'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/07/14th-european-symposium-on-research-in.html' title='14th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2009)'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-9181879716237576982</id><published>2009-06-29T01:22:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-06-29T01:27:28.780-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Accepted Papers GeoCrypt2009</title><content type='html'>You can even download the slides of some presentations here :&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://iml.univ-mrs.fr/ati/GeoCrypt2009/slides_of_talks.htm&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Number of points of Jacobian and Pryme varieties&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yves Aubry (Université du Sud Toulon-Var)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Asymptotically exact sequences of function fields and applications&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Stéphane Ballet (IML, Marseille)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;About Hironaka's invariants&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vincent Cossart (Université de Versailles-Saint Quentin)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Genus 2 curves with many rational points&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Noam D. Elkies (Harvard University, Cambridge)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cryptography and arithmetic geometry: a 25-year love (?) story&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Marc Girault (Expert, Caen)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Abelian varieties without algebraic geometry&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Everett Howe (CCR, San Diego)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On post-quantum PKCs: on our public key cryptosystem based on subfield subcodes of AG-codes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Heeralal Janwa (UPR Rio Piedras Campus, Porto Rico)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Unified, strongly unified and complete formulae for point addition on elliptic curves&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Marc Joye (Thomson R&amp;amp;D, Security Labs)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Inequalities for the number of points of curves over finite fields deduced from explicit formulas&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Gilles Lachaud (IML, Marseille)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Gluings of abelian varieties and applications&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kristin Lauter (Microsoft Research, Redmond)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A CM construction of genus 2 curves with p-rank 1&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Gary McGuire (University College Dublin)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Explicit computations of Serre's obstruction for genus 3 curves&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Christophe Ritzenthaler (IML, Marseille)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Polynomials on F2m with good resistance to cryptanalysis&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;François Rodier (IML, Marseille)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Divisors of dimension zero&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Robert Rolland (Expert, ACRYPTA, Marseille)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Twists of elliptic curves and Hilbert's tenth problem&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Karl Rubin (University of California, Irvine)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Curves over F2 with many points&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;René Schoof (Università di Roma 2)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Point counting on reductions of CM abelian varieties&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alice Silverberg (University of California, Irvine)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient CM-constructions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Peter Stevenhagen (Universiteit Leiden)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Moduli of nondegenerate curves&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;John Voight (University of Vermont, Burlington)&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-9181879716237576982?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/9181879716237576982/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=9181879716237576982' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/9181879716237576982'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/9181879716237576982'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/06/accepted-papers-geocrypt2009.html' title='Accepted Papers GeoCrypt2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-2900535470330081665</id><published>2009-06-29T01:18:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-06-29T01:22:07.447-07:00</updated><title type='text'>RAID 2009</title><content type='html'>Accepted papers&lt;br /&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;RAID (Recent Advances in Intrusion   Detection) 2009&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://www.rennes.supelec.fr/RAID2009/index.html&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;   Guanhua Yan, Stephan Eidenbenz and Emanuele Galli. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;SMS-Watchdog: Profiling Social Behaviors of SMS Users for Anomaly Detection&lt;/span&gt;   &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Peng Li, Debin Gao and Mike Reiter. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Automatically Adapting a Trained Anomaly Detector to Software Patches&lt;/span&gt;   &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Grégoire Jacob, Hervé Debar and Eric Filiol. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Malware Behavioral Detection by Attribute-Automata using Abstraction from Platform and Language&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Saira Zahid, Muhammad Shahzad, Syed Ali Khayam and Muddassar Farooq. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Keystroke-based User Identification on Smart Phones&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Damiano Bolzoni, Sandro Etalle and Pieter Hartel. Panacea: &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Automating Attack Classification for Anomaly-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Jérome François, Humberto Abdelnur, Radu State and Olivier Festor. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Automated Behavioral Fingerprinting&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Martin Rehak, Eugen Staab, Volker Fusenig, Michal Pechoucek, Martin Grill, Jan Stiborek and Karel Bartos. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Runtime Monitoring and Dynamic Reconfiguration for Intrusion Detection Systems&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Juan Caballero, Zhenkai Liang, Pongsin Poosankam and Dawn Song. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Towards Generating High Coverage Vulnerability-based Signatures with Protocol-level Constraint-guided Exploration&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Lei Liu, Guanhua Yan, Xinwen Zhang and Songqing Chen. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;VirusMeter: Preventing Your Cellphone from Spies&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Giorgos Vasiliadis, Michalis Polychronakis, Spiros Antonatos, Evangelos Markatos and Sotiris Ioannidis. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Regular Expression Matching on Graphics Hardware for Intrusion Detection&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Scott Schneider, Kent Griffin, Tzi-cker Chiueh and Xin Hu. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Automatic Generation of String Signatures for Malware Detection&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Chaoting Xuan, John Copeland and Raheem Beyah. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Toward Revealing Kernel Malware Behavior in Virtual Execution Environments&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Federico Maggi, William Robertson, Christopher Kruegel and Giovanni Vigna. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Protecting a Moving Target: Addressing Web Application Concept Drift&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;   &lt;p&gt; Jaideep Chandrashekar, Frederic Giroire, Nina Taft, Eve Schooler and Dina Papagiannaki. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Exploiting Temporal Persistence to Detect Covert Botnet Channels&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt; Daniel Luchaup, Randy Smith, Cristian Estan and Somesh Jha. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Multi-Byte Regular Expression Matching with Speculation&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt; M. Zubair Shafiq, S. Momina Tabish and Muddassar Farooq. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Realtime Mining of Structural Information to Detect Zero-Day Malicious Portable Executables&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt; Gabriela Cretu-Ciocarlie, Angelos Stavrou, Michael Locasto and Salvatore Stolfo. &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Adaptive Anomaly Detection via Self-Calibration and Dynamic Updating &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-2900535470330081665?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/2900535470330081665/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=2900535470330081665' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2900535470330081665'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/2900535470330081665'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/06/raid-2009.html' title='RAID 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-9126926839133300326</id><published>2009-06-24T00:10:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-06-24T00:12:11.222-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Cryptography Research Announces Integration of SASEBO-G into DPA WorkstationTM</title><content type='html'>an interesting news&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/cryptography-research-announces-integration-of-sasebo-g-into-dpa-workstationtm,869964.shtml"&gt;http://www.earthtimes.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt; SAN FRANCISCO - (Business Wire) Cryptography Research, Inc. (CRI) today announced integration of the SASEBO-G board with its DPA Workstation&lt;sup&gt;TM&lt;/sup&gt; to enable testing of FPGA images against side channel attacks such as Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt; DPA Workstation software release v 6.16 includes the capability to test FPGAs using the SASEBO-G board developed by the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST). The release also adds improved visualization tools for interpretation and manipulation of power analysis waveforms. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt; The SASEBO-G board offers a platform optimized for performing power analysis on Xilinx FPGA images. CRI’s advanced data collection and analysis software integrates direct I/O and data collection capability with the SASEBO-G platform. Akashi Satoh, head of the SASEBO project at AIST, said, “We are delighted to work with Cryptography Research to bring the capability to evaluate sophisticated hardware cryptographic modules against side channel attacks.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt; The DPA Workstation is recognized as the leading side channel analysis platform, enabling the testing of a wide variety of devices with support for all major cryptographic algorithms including DES, Triple-DES, AES, RSA, Elliptic Curve, SHA and proprietary algorithms. “The integration of the advanced SASEBO-G platform with the advanced DPA Workstation&lt;sup&gt;TM&lt;/sup&gt; confirms CRI’s commitment to delivering state of the art evaluation tools to protect fielded devices against power analysis and other side channel attacks,” said Benjamin Jun, CRI’s vice president of technology. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;      &lt;b&gt;About SASEBO&lt;/b&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt; The SASEBO (Side channel Attack Standard Evaluation Boards) were developed by the Research Center for Information Security (RCIS) of the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) and Tohoku University as a research project sponsored by METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan) to provide a standard evaluation reference for cryptographic modules. The SASEBO website can be found at: &lt;a href="http://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&amp;amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rcis.aist.go.jp%2Fspecial%2FSASEBO%2Findex-en.html&amp;amp;esheet=5992492&amp;amp;lan=en_US&amp;amp;anchor=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rcis.aist.go.jp%2Fspecial%2FSASEBO%2Findex-en.html&amp;amp;index=1"&gt;http://www.rcis.aist.go.jp/special/SASEBO/index-en.html&lt;/a&gt;.    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;      &lt;b&gt;About the DPA Workstation&lt;/b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;&lt;b&gt;TM&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/sup&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;      The Cryptography Research DPA Workstation&lt;sup&gt;TM&lt;/sup&gt; is the most powerful and flexible side channel analysis testing platform available, and is used by leading companies and governments throughout the world. The DPA Workstation&lt;sup&gt;TM&lt;/sup&gt; includes the hardware, software and training needed to perform sophisticated power analysis testing and evaluation, and includes full source code allowing extensive customization for use with a variety of environments and device types. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;      &lt;b&gt;About Cryptography Research, Inc.&lt;/b&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt; Cryptography Research, Inc. provides technology to solve complex security problems. In addition to security evaluation and applied engineering work, the company is actively involved in long-term research and technology licensing in areas including content protection, tamper resistance, network security and financial services. Security systems designed by Cryptography Research engineers protect more than $100 billion of commerce annually for wireless, telecommunications, financial, entertainment, digital television and Internet industries. For additional information, please visit &lt;a href="http://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&amp;amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fcryptography.com%2Findex.html&amp;amp;esheet=5992492&amp;amp;lan=en_US&amp;amp;anchor=www.cryptography.com&amp;amp;index=2"&gt;www.cryptography.com&lt;/a&gt;.    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span class="bwct31415"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="color:#000000;"&gt;      &lt;b&gt;Andrew Lloyd &amp;amp; Associates&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Carol Leslie, +44 1273 675100       (Europe)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="mailto:carol@ala.com"&gt;carol@ala.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;or&lt;br /&gt;&lt;b&gt;Schwartz       Communications&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Dan Borgasano, +1-415-512-0770 (United States)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="mailto:CRI@schwartz-pr.com"&gt;CRI@schwartz-pr.com&lt;/a&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-9126926839133300326?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/9126926839133300326/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=9126926839133300326' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/9126926839133300326'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/9126926839133300326'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/06/cryptography-research-announces.html' title='Cryptography Research Announces Integration of SASEBO-G into DPA WorkstationTM'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-1057587101076478289</id><published>2009-06-23T05:31:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-06-23T05:33:21.928-07:00</updated><title type='text'>ISC 09</title><content type='html'>&lt;h3&gt;List of Accepted Papers&lt;/h3&gt;  &lt;h4&gt;Full papers&lt;/h4&gt; &lt;div style="margin-top: 1.1em;"&gt; &lt;table&gt; &lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;10&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Detection of Database Intrusion using a Two-Stage Fuzzy System&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Suvasini Panigrahi and Shamik Sural&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;17&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;F3ildCrypt: End-to-End Protection of Sensitive Information in Web Services&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Matthew Burnside and Angelos Keromytis&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;21&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;On the security of Identity Based Ring Signcryption Schemes&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sharmila Deva Selvi S., Sree Vivek S., and Pandu Rangan C.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;22&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Privacy-aware Attribute-based Encryption with User Accountability&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Jin Li, Kui Ren, Bo Zhu, and Zhiguo Wan&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;24&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;An efficient distance bounding RFID authentication protocol: balancing false-acceptance rate and memory requirement&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Gildas Avoine and Aslan Tchamkerten&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;28&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Combining Consistency and Confidentiality Requirements in First-Order Databases&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Joachim Biskup and Lena Wiese&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;29&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Analysis and Optimization of Cryptographically Generated Addresses&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Joppe Bos, Onur Ozen, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;33&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Hardware-Assisted Application-Level Access Control&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Yu-Yuan Chen and Ruby B. Lee&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;43&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Fair E-cash: Be Compact, Spend Faster&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sébastien Canard, Cécile Delerablée, Aline Gouget, Emeline Hufschmitt, Fabien Laguillaumie, Hervé Sibert, Jacques Traore, and Damien Vergnaud&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;53&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Structural Attacks on Two SHA-3 Candidates: Blender-n and DCH-n&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Mario Lamberger and Florian Mendel&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;54&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Security Analysis of the PACE Key-Agreement Protocol&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Jens Bender, Marc Fischlin, and Dennis Kuegler&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;64&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;A Storage Efficient Redactable Signature in the Standard Model&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Ryo Nojima, Jin Tamura, Youki Kadobayashi, and Hiroaki Kikuchi&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;68&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Towards Unifying Vulnerability Information for Attack Graph Construction&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sebastian Roschke, Feng Cheng, Robert Schuppenies, and Christoph Meinel&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;70&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;A New Approach to $\chi^2$ Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Jorge Nakahara Jr, Gautham Sekar, Daniel Santana de Freitas, Chang Chiann, Ramon Hugo de Souza, and Bart Preneel&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;73&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Efficient Conditional Proxy Re-Encryption with Chosen-Ciphertext Security&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Jian Weng,  Yanjiang Yang, Qiang Tang, Robert H. Deng, and Feng Bao&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;74&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Nonce Generators and the Nonce Reset Problem&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Erik Zenner&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;76&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;A New Construction of Boolean Functions with Maximum Algebraic Immunity&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Deshuai Dong, Shaojing Fu, Longjiang Qu, and Chao Li&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;80&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Automated Spyware Collection and Analysis&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Andreas Stamminger, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna, and Engin Kirda&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;81&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Peer-to-peer architecture for collaborative intrusion detection and malware analysis on a large scale&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Michele Colajanni, Mirco Marchetti, and Michele Messori&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;83&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;MAC Precomputation with Applications to Secure Memory&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Juan A. Garay, Vladimir Kolesnikov, and Rae McLellan&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;85&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Robust Authentication Using Physically Unclonable Functions&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Keith Frikken, Marina Blanton, and Mikhail Atallah&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;90&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;On Free-Start Collisions and Collisions for TIB3&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Florian Mendel and Martin Schläffer&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;92&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks Using Output Truncation in 3-Pass HAVAL&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Yu Sasaki&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;94&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;A2M: Access-Assured Mobile Desktop Computing&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Angelos Stavrou, Angelos Keromytis, and Jason Nieh&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;95&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Adding Trust to P2P Distribution of Paid Content&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Angelos Stavrou, Alex Sherman, Jason Nieh, and Angelos Keromytis&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;96&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Towards Trustworthy Delegation in Role-Based Access Control Models&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Manachai Toahchoodee, Xing Xie, and Indrakshi Ray&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;98&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;HMAC without the ``Second'' Key&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Kan Yasuda&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;101&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Risks of the CardSpace Protocol&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sebastian Gajek, Michael Steiner, Joerg Schwenk, and Chen Xuan&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;105&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Practical Algebraic Attacks on the Hitag2 Stream Cipher&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Nicolas T. courtois, Sean O'Neil, and Jean-Jacques Quisquater&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; &lt;/div&gt;  &lt;h4&gt;Short papers&lt;/h4&gt;   &lt;table&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;44&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;SISR - a New Model for Epidemic Spreading of Electronic Threats&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Boris Rozenberg, Ehud Gudes, and Yuval Elovici&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;51&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Cancelable Iris Biometrics using Block Re-mapping and Image Warping&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Elias Pschernig and Andreas Uhl&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;57&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Secure Interoperation in Multidomain Environments Based on UCON Model&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Jianfeng Lu, Ruixuan Li, Vijay Varadharajan, Zhengding Lu, and Xiaopu Ma&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;58&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Specification and Enforcement of Static Separation-of-Duty Policiesin Usage Control&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Jianfeng Lu, Ruixuan Li, Zhengding Lu, Jinwei Hu, and Xiaopu Ma&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;63&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Nonideal Iris Recognition based on Variational Level Set Method, Genetic Algorithms and Adaptive Asymmetrical SVMs&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Kaushik Roy and Prabir Bhattacharya&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;77&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Generic Construction of Stateful Identity Based Encryption&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Peng Yang, Rui Zhang, Kanta Matsuura, and Hideki Imai&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;88&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;A calculus to detect guessing attacks&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Bogdan Groza and Marius Minea&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;100&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Traitor Tracing without a priori bound on the Coalition Size&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Serdar Pehlivanoglu and Hongxia Jin&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;102&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt; - &lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Towards Security Notions for White-Box Cryptography&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;em&gt;Amitabh Saxena, Brecht Wyseur, and Bart Preneel&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-1057587101076478289?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/1057587101076478289/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=1057587101076478289' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/1057587101076478289'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/1057587101076478289'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/06/isc-09.html' title='ISC 09'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-7416519855174505451</id><published>2009-06-23T05:25:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-06-23T05:27:43.902-07:00</updated><title type='text'>SecureComm 2009</title><content type='html'>&lt;h2&gt;Full papers&lt;/h2&gt;  1. &lt;b&gt;Rogue Access Point Detection Using Innate Characteristics of the 802.11 MAC&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Aravind Venkataraman, Raheem A Beyah&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 2. &lt;b&gt;Ensemble: Community-based Anomaly Detection for Popular Applications&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Feng Qian, Zhiyun Qian, Zhuoqing Mao, Atul Prakash&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 3. &lt;b&gt;Multichannel Protocols for User-Friendly and Scalable Initialization of Sensor Networks&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Toni Perkovic, Ivo Stancic, Luka Malisa, Mario Cagalj&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 4. &lt;b&gt;Automated analysis of a contract signing protocol using colored petri nets&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;M. Magdalena Payeras-Capella&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 5. &lt;b&gt;An eavesdropping game with SINR as an object function&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Wade Trappe, Andrey Garnaev&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 6. &lt;b&gt;Towards Self-Organized Location Privacy in Mobile Networks&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Julien Freudiger, Raya Maxim, Jean-Pierre Hubaux&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 7. &lt;b&gt;A Novel Architecture for Secure and Scalable Multicast over IP Network&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yawen Wei, Zhen Yu, Yong Guan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 8. &lt;b&gt;Baiting Inside Attackers Using Decoy Documents&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Brian Bowen, Shlomo Herkshop, Angelos D Keromytis, Sal Stolfo&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 9. &lt;b&gt;On the Security of Bottleneck Bandwidth Estimation Techniques&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ghassan O. Karame, David Gubler, Sdrjan Capkun&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 10. &lt;b&gt;Aggregated Authentication (AMAC) using Universal Hash Functions&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Marine Minier, Wassim Znaidi, Cedric Lauradoux&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 11. &lt;b&gt;FIJI: Fighting Implicit Jamming In 802.11 WLANs&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ioannis Broustis, Konstantinos Pelechrinis, Dimitris Syrivelis, Srikanth Krishnamurthy, Leandros Tassiulas&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 12. &lt;b&gt;MULAN: Multi-Level Adaptive Network Filter&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Shimrit Tzur-David, Danny Dolev, Tal Anker&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 13. &lt;b&gt;User-centric identity using ePassports&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Martijn Oostdijk, Maarten Wegdam, Dirk-Jan van Dijk&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 14. &lt;b&gt;An Active Global Attack Model for Sensor Source Location Privacy:&lt;br /&gt; Analysis and Countermeasures&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yi Yang, Sencun Zhu, Guohong Cao, Thomas La Porta&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 15. &lt;b&gt;Sec-TMP: a Secure Topology Maintenance Protocol for Event Delivery Enforcement in WSN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Andrea Gabrielli, Mauro Conti, Roberto DiPietro, Luigi V. Mancini&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 16. &lt;b&gt;Defending Against Key Abuse Attacks in KP-ABE Enabled Broadcast Systems&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Shucheng Yu, Kui Ren, Wenjing Lou, Jin Li&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 17. &lt;b&gt;Dealing with Liars: Misbehavior Identification via Renyi-Ulam Games&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;William Jr. Kozma, Loukas Lazos&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 18. &lt;b&gt;Active Attacks Against Radiometric Identification&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Matthew J Edman, Bulent Yener&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 19. &lt;b&gt;Mitigating DoS attacks on the paging channel by efficient encoding in page messages&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Liang Cai, Gabriel Maganis, Hui Zang, Hao Chen&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 20. &lt;b&gt;Using Failure Information Analysis to Detect Enterprise Zombies&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Zhaosheng Zhu, Vinod Yegneswaran, Yan Chen&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;h2&gt;Short papers&lt;/h2&gt;  1. &lt;b&gt;The Frog-Boiling Attack: Limitations of Anomaly Detection for Secure Network Coordinate Systems&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Eric Chan-Tin, Nick Hopper, Yongdae Kim, Daniel Feldman&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 2. &lt;b&gt;Deny-by-Default Distributed Security Policy Enforcement in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mansoor Alicherry, Angelos Stavrou, Angelos D Keromytis&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 3. &lt;b&gt;Hierarchical Self-Healing Key Distribution for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yanjiang Yang, Jianying Zhou, Robert Deng, Bao Feng&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 4. &lt;b&gt;Use of ID-based Cryptography for the Efficient Verification of the Integrity and Authenticity of Web Resources &lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thanassis Tiropanis, Tassos Dimitriou&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 5. &lt;b&gt;Reliable Resource Searching in P2P Networks&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nikos Triandopoulos, Michael Goodrich, Roberto Tamassia, Jonathan Sun&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 6. &lt;b&gt;Breaking and Developing of Group Inside Signatures&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sree S Vivek, Sharmila Deva Selvi S, Gopi nath Sikha, C Pandu Rangan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; 7. &lt;b&gt;Automated Classification of Network Traffic Anomalies&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Philippe F Owezarski&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;http://www.securecomm.org/paperlist.shtml&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-7416519855174505451?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/7416519855174505451/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=7416519855174505451' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/7416519855174505451'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/7416519855174505451'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/06/securecomm-2009.html' title='SecureComm 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-1435660149228682561</id><published>2009-06-12T03:14:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-06-12T03:17:31.568-07:00</updated><title type='text'>CHES 09</title><content type='html'>&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;two Efficient Methods for Random Delay Generation in Embedded Software&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Jean-Sébastien Coron and Ilya Kizhvatov, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Hardware Accelerator for the Tate Pairing in Characteristic Three   Based on Karatsuba-Ofman Multipliers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Jean-Luc Beuchat, University of Tsukuba, Japan&lt;br /&gt;  Jérémie Detrey, INRIA, France&lt;br /&gt;  Nicolas Estibals, INRIA, France&lt;br /&gt;  Eiji Okamoto, University of Tsukuba, Japan&lt;br /&gt;  Francisco Rodríguez-Henríquez, CINVESTAV-IPN, Mexico&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Mutual Information Analysis: How, When and Why?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon and François-Xavier Standaert, UCL, Belgium&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Designing an ASIP for Cryptographic Pairings over Barreto-Naehrig Curves&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  David Kammler, RWTH Aachen University, Germany&lt;br /&gt;  Diandian Zhang, RWTH Aachen University, Germany&lt;br /&gt;  Peter Schwabe, Eindhoven University of Technology, Netherlands&lt;br /&gt;  Hanno Scharwaechter, RWTH Aachen University, Germany&lt;br /&gt;  Markus Langenberg, RWTH Aachen University, Germany&lt;br /&gt;  Dominik Auras, RWTH Aachen University, Germany&lt;br /&gt;  Gerd Ascheid, RWTH Aachen University, Germany&lt;br /&gt;  Rudolf Mathar, RWTH Aachen University, Germany&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Known-Plaintext-Only Attack on RSA-CRT with Montgomery Multiplication&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Martin Hlavac, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Practical Electromagnetic Template Attack on HMAC&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Pierre-Alain Fouque, École normale supérieure, France&lt;br /&gt;  Gaëtan Leurent, École normale supérieure, France&lt;br /&gt;  Denis Real, CELAR, France&lt;br /&gt;  Frédéric Valette, CELAR, France&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Faster F&lt;sub&gt;p&lt;/sub&gt;-arithmetic for Cryptographic Pairings on Barreto-Naehrig Curves&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Junfeng Fan and Frederik Vercauteren and Ingrid Verbauwhede, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;On Tamper-Resistance from a Theoretical Viewpoint&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Paulo Mateus, SQIG/IT and IST/TULisbon, Portugal    Serge Vaudenay, EPFL, Switzerland &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Low-Overhead Implementation of a Soft-Decision Helper Data Algorithm   for SRAM PUFs&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Roel Maes, Pim Tuyls and Ingrid Verbauwhede, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, and IBBT &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;A Design Methodology for a DPA-Resistant Cryptographic LSI with RSL   Techniques&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Minoru Saeki, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Japan&lt;br /&gt;  Daisuke Suzuki, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Japan&lt;br /&gt;  Koichi Shimizu, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Japan&lt;br /&gt;  Akashi Satoh, AIST, Japan&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks on the AES: Why Time also Matters in DPA&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Mathieu Renauld, François-Xavier Standaert and Nicolas Veyrat-  Charvillon, UCL, Belgium &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Accelerating AES with Vecter Permute Instructions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Mike Hamburg, Stanford University, USA&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Elliptic Curve Point Scalar Multiplication Combining Yao's Algorithm   and Double Bases&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Nicolas Méloni and M. Anwar Hasan, University of Waterloo, Canada &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Faster and Timing-Attack Resistant AES-GCM&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Emilia Käsper, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium&lt;br /&gt;  Peter Schwabe, Eindhoven University of Technology, Netherlands&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;A New Side-Channel Attack on RSA Prime Generation&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Thomas Finke, Max Gebhardt, and Werner Schindler, BSI, Germany&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Frequency Injection Attack on Ring-Oscillator-Based True Random   Number Generators&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  A. Theodore Markettos and Simon W. Moore, University of Cambridge, UK&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Combining Higher Order Masking and Shuffling to Protect Block Ciphers   Software Implementations&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Matthieu Rivain, Oberthur Technologies, France, and University of   Luxembourg, Luxembourg&lt;br /&gt;  Emmanuel Prouff, Oberthur Technologies, France&lt;br /&gt;  Julien Doget, Oberthur Technologies, France, UCL, Belgium, and   University of Paris 8, France &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KATAN &amp;amp; KTANTAN - A Family of Small and Efficient Hardware-Oriented   Block Ciphers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Christophe De Canniere, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium&lt;br /&gt;  Orr Dunkelman, Ecole normale supérieure, France&lt;br /&gt;  Miroslav Knezevic, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;MicroEliece: McEliece for Embedded Devices&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Thomas Eisenbarth, Tim Gueneysu, Stefan Heyse and Christof Paar, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;First-Order Side-Channel Attacks on the Permutation Tables   Countermeasure&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Emmanuel Prouff, Oberthur Technologies, France&lt;br /&gt;  Robert McEvoy, University College Cork, Ireland &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Differential Fault Analysis on DES Middle Rounds&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Matthieu Rivain, Oberthur Technologies, France and University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Runtime Programmable and Parallel ECC Coprocessor Architecture:   Tradeoffs between Area, Speed and Security&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Xu Guo, Virginia Tech, USA&lt;br /&gt;  Junfeng Fan, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium&lt;br /&gt;  Patrick Schaumont, Virginia Tech, USA&lt;br /&gt;  Ingrid Verbauwhede, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CDs Have Fingerprints Too&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Ghaith Hammouri, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, USA&lt;br /&gt;  Aykutlu Dana, Bilkent University, Turkey&lt;br /&gt;  Berk Sunar, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, USA &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;A Design Flow and Evaluation Framework for DPA-resistant Instruction   Set Extensions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Francesco Regazzoni, UCL, Belgium and ALaRI, Switzerland&lt;br /&gt;  Alessandro Cevrero, EPFL, Switzerland&lt;br /&gt;  François-Xavier Standaert, UCL, Belgium&lt;br /&gt;  Stephane Badel, EPFL, Switzerland&lt;br /&gt;  Theo Kluter, EPFL, Switzerland&lt;br /&gt;  Philip Brisk, EPFL, Switzerland&lt;br /&gt;  Yusuf Leblebici, EPFL, Switzerland&lt;br /&gt;  Paolo Ienne, EPFL, Switzerland &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;SSE Implementation of Multivariate PKCs on Modern x86 CPUs&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Anna Inn-Tung Chen, National Taiwan University, Taiwan&lt;br /&gt;  Ming-Shing Chen, Academia Sinica, Taiwan&lt;br /&gt;  Tien-Ren Chen, Academia Sinica, Taiwan&lt;br /&gt;  Chen-Mou Cheng, National Taiwan University, Taiwan&lt;br /&gt;  Jintai Ding, University of Cincinnati, USA&lt;br /&gt;  Eric Li-Hsiang Kuo, Academia Sinica, Taiwan&lt;br /&gt;  Frost Yu-Shuang Li, National Taiwan University, Taiwan&lt;br /&gt;  Bo-Yin Yang, Academia Sinica, Taiwan &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul id="accepted"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Trojan Side-Channels: Lightweight Hardware Trojans through Side-Channel Engineering&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;  Lang Lin, University of Massachusetts, USA&lt;br /&gt;  Markus Kasper, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany&lt;br /&gt;  Tim Güneysu, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany&lt;br /&gt;  Christof Paar, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany and University of  Massachusetts, USA&lt;br /&gt;  Wayne Burleson, University of Massachusetts, USA &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-1435660149228682561?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/1435660149228682561/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=1435660149228682561' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/1435660149228682561'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/1435660149228682561'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/06/ches-09.html' title='CHES 09'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-3190476292197078231</id><published>2009-06-12T02:30:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-06-12T03:07:25.068-07:00</updated><title type='text'>SECRYPT 09</title><content type='html'>&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;SECURITY PATTERNS, TOWARDS A FURTHER LEVEL&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Beatriz Gallego-Nicasio, Antonio Muñoz,&lt;br /&gt; Antonio Maña and Daniel Serrano&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;FAST RE-ESTABILISHMENT OF IKEV2 SECURITY &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ASSOCIATIONS FOR RECOVERY OF IPSEC GATEWAYS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;IN MOBILE NETWORK &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Peng Yang, Yuanchen Ma and Satoshi Yoshizawa&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ON THE NEED TO DIVIDE THE SIGNATURE&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;CREATION ENVIRONMENT&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Jorge L. Hernandez-Ardieta, Ana I. Gonzalez-Tablas,&lt;br /&gt;Benjamin Ramos and Arturo Ribagorda&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A SECURITY DESIGN PATTERN TAXONOMY&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; BASED ON ATTACK PATTERNS - Findings of a Systematic Literature Review&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Andreas Wiesauer and Johannes Sametinger&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; ITERATED TRANSFORMATIONS AND &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;QUANTITATIVE METRICS FOR SOFTWARE PROTECTION&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mariusz M. Jakubowski, Chit W. (Nick) Saw and Ramarathnam Venkatesan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;PHISHPIN: AN INTEGRATED, IDENTITY-BASED&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ANTI-PHISHING APPROACH &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hicham Tout&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH FOR FORMULA&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; MODELLING IN SECURITY METRICS &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Felipe Marques Pires, Leonardo de Sousa Mendes&lt;br /&gt;and Rodrigo Sanches Miani&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ON THE SECURITY OF TWO RING SIGNCRYPTION SCHEMES&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; S. Sree Vivek, Sharmila Deva Selvi S and Pandu Rangan C.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;MONITORING NODE SELECTION ALGORITHM&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; FOR INTRUSION DETECTION IN CONGESTED SENSOR NETWORK &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jaeun Choi, Myungjong Lee, Gisung Kim and Sehun Kim&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;MULTIPARTY COMPARISON - An Improved Multiparty Protocol&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; for Comparison of Secret-shared Values&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Tord Ingolf Reistad&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;THE DARK SIDE OF SECURITY BY OBSCURITY - &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;and Cloning MiFare Classic Rail and Building Passes, Anywhere, Anytime&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Nicolas T. Courtois&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;CLOUD COMPUTING - Fundamental Architecture &amp;amp; Future Applications &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Keynote Speaker:  Frank Leymann&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ONE-TOUCH FINANCIAL TRANSACTION AUTHENTICATION&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Daniel V. Bailey, John Brainard, Sebastian Rohde and Christof Paar&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;SERVICE AND TIMEFRAME DEPENDENT UNLINKABLE&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; ONE-TIME PSEUDONYMS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kristof Verslype and Bart De Decker&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;UNIVERSAL AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK - Requirements&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; and Phase Design&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Tomas Pelka, Jan Hajny and Petra Lambertova&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;   &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;EVALUATION OF QUALITY AND SECURITY OF&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; A VOIP NETWORK BASED ON ASTERISK AND OpenVPN&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Rodrigo S. Miani, Dherik Barison and Leonardo de Souza Mendes&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;FREE SECURITY SUITE 2 - Easy, Intuitive and Complete&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Free Security Suite with Web Browser Integration&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Javier Corral-García, Carlos-Jorge del Arco González,&lt;br /&gt; José Luis González-Sánchez and José Luis Redondo García&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;RESYNCHRONIZATION ATTACK ON STREAM CIPHERS FILTERED BY MAIORANA-MCFARLAND FUNCTIONS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Guanhan Chew, Aileen Zhang and Khoongming Khoo&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ADDING EXPERT KNOWLEDGE TO TAN-BASED&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;S. Benferhat, A. Boudjelida and H. Drias&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;PREVENTING WORMHOLE ATTACK IN WIRELESS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; AD HOC NETWORKS USING COST-BASED SCHEMES&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Marianne Amir Azer, Sherif Mohammed El-Kassas&lt;br /&gt; and Mady Saiid El-Soudani&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;AN OFFLINE PEER-TO-PEER BROADCASTING SCHEME&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; WITH ANONYMITY&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Shinsaku Kiyomoto, Kazuhide Fukushima and Keith M. Martin&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;NETWORK STACK OPTIMIZATION FOR IMPROVED&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; IPSEC PERFORMANCE ON LINUX &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Michael G. Iatrou, Artemios G. Voyiatzis and Dimitrios N. Serpanos&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;IMPLEMENTING TRUE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; IN FPGAS BY CHIP FILLING &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Octavian Cret, Radu Tudoran, Alin Suciu and Tamas Györfi&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;QUANTUM SECURE DIRECT COMMUNICATION &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;USING ENTANGLEMENT AND SUPER DENSE CODING &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ola M. Hegazy, Ayman M. Bahaa Eldin and Yasser H. Dakroury&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;AN EFFICIENT GROUP KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;FOR HETEROGENEOUS ENVIRONMENT &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mounita Saha and Dipanwita Roy Chowdhury&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;CERTIFIED PSEUDONYMS COLLIGATED WITH MASTER SECRET KEY&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Vijayakrishnan Pasupathinathan, Josef Pieprzyk and Huaxiong Wang&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;THE CHAMELEON CIPHER-192 (CC-192) - A Polymorphic Cipher &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Magdy Saeb&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A NEW ANALYSIS OF RC4 - A Data Mining Approach (J48)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Ali Movaghar and Mohsen HajSalehi Sichani&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ADAPTIVE ANTENNAS IN WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Keynote Speaker:  Blagovest Shishkov&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;PRACTICAL TRACEABLE ANONYMOUS IDENTIFICATION&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Daniel Slamanig, Peter Schartner and Christian Stingl&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;INFORMATION-THEORETICALLY SECURE &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;STRONG VERIFIABLE SECRET SHARING &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Changlu Lin, Lein Harn and Dingfeng Ye&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;SAFE REVERSE AUCTIONS PROTOCOL - Adding Treatment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Against Collusive Shill Bidding and Sniping Attacks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Guerra Ruy and Ribeiro Leonardo&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;PROTECTING INFORMATION PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC SOCIETY&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Keynote Speaker:  Pierangela Samarati&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;SIMULATION OF AN IDENTITY BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;SCHEME FOR AD HOC NETWORKS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Pura Mihai-Lica and al&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;BEHAVIOR BASED CLUSTERING FOR DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; FLASH CROWDS AND DDoS ATTACKS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Young Jun Heo and al&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;EFFICIENT TRAITOR TRACING FOR CONTENT PROTECTION&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hongxia Jin&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ATTACK GRAPH GENERATION WITH INFUSED FUZZY CLUSTERING&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sudip Mistra and al&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A SECOND PREIMAGE ATTACK ON THE MERKLE-DAMGARD &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;SCHEME WITH A PERMUTATION FOR HASH FUNCTIONS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Shiwei Chen and al&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ON THE SECURITY OF ADDING CONFIRMERS INTO DESIGNATED&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;  CONFIRMER SIGNATURES&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Wataru Senga and al&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ISEE : AN INFORMATION SECURITY ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENT&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jingde Cheng and al&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;TOOL SUPPORT FOR ACHIEVING QUALITATIVE SECURITY ASSESSMENTS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES - The ESSAF Framework for&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Structured Qualitative Analysis&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Nguyen Hanh Quyen, Köster Friedrich, Klaas Michael,&lt;br /&gt;Brenner Walter, Obermeier Sebastian and Brändle Markus&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;COLLABORATIVE SECURITY ASSESSMENTS IN EMBEDDED SYSTEMS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; DEVELOPMENT - The ESSAF Framework for Structured Qualitative Analysis&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Friedrich Köster, Michael Klaas, Hanh Quyen Nguyen,&lt;br /&gt;Walter Brenner, Markus Braendle and Sebastian Obermeier&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;AN APPROACH FOR DESIGNING OF ENTERPRISE IT LANDSCAPES &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;TO PERFORM QUANTITAVE INFORMATION SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Anton Romanov and Eiji Okamoto&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;IDENTIFYING SECURITY ELEMENTS FOR COOPERATIVE &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;INFORMATION SYSTEMS &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nathalie Dagorn&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;AN ANOMALY-BASED WEB APPLICATION FIREWALL &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alejandro Perez-Villegas and Gonzalo Alvarez&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;VISUAL PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;IN BUSINESS PROCESSES AS MODEL-DRIVEN SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Mirad Zadic and Andrea Nowak&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;FINGER VEIN VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY FOR MOBILE APPARATUS &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hideo Sato&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;EFFICIENT ALGORITHMS AND ABSTRACT DATA TYPES &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;FOR LOCAL INCONSISTENCY ISOLATION IN FIREWALL ACLS &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;S. Pozo, A. J. Varela-Vaca, R. M. Gasca and R. Ceballos&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;NMIX : AN IDEAL CANDIDATE FOR KEY MIXING&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Dipanwita Roy Chowdhury and al&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;RFID AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS BASED&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; ON ELLIPTIC CURVES - A Top-Down Evaluation Survey&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Michael Hutter&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;THROTTLING DDoS ATTACKS &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Saraiah Gujjunoori, Taqi Ali Syed, Madhu Babu J.,&lt;br /&gt; Avinash D., Radhesh Mohandas and Alwyn R. Pais&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ASSESSMENT OF MOBILE SECURITY PLATFORMS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Germán Retamosa and Jorge E. López de Vergara&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A CHAOS BASED ENCRYPTION METHOD USING&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS WITH STRANGE ATTRACTORS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Arash Sheikholeslam&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;MANAGING SECURITY OF GRID ARCHITECTURE &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;WITH A GRID SECURITY OPERATION CENTER &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Julien Bourgeois and Raheel Hassan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;INTERACTIVE SECRET SHARE MANAGEMENT&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Constantin Catalin Dragan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; A TRAFFIC COHERENCE ANALYSIS MODEL FOR DDOS ATTACK DETECTION&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Hamza Rahmani, Nabil Sahli and Farouk Kamoun&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;AD-HOC ON DEMAND AUTHENTICATION CHAIN PROTOCOL&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; - An Authentication Protocol for Ad-hoc Networks &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A. M. Hamad and W. I. Khedr&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;RESISTING IMPERSONATION ATTACKS IN CHAINING-BASED&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; PUBLIC-KEY MANAGEMENT ON MANETS - The Virtual&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Public-Key Management &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Renan Fischer e Silva, Eduardo da Silva and Luiz Carlos Pessoa Albini&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A NEW IMAGE ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM USING CELLULAR AUTOMATA&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;D. RoyChowdhury and Mayank Varshney&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;E-BUSINESS DESIGN - A Shift to Adaptability &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Keynote Speaker:  David Marca&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-3190476292197078231?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/3190476292197078231/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=3190476292197078231' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/3190476292197078231'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/3190476292197078231'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/06/secrypt-09.html' title='SECRYPT 09'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-6225979803252501551</id><published>2009-06-12T02:22:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-06-12T02:27:10.704-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Pairing 2009</title><content type='html'>Preliminary Program for Pairing 2009&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Boneh-Boyen signatures and the Strong Diffie-Hellman problem&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;David Jao and Kayo Yoshida&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Security of Verifiably Encrypted Signatures and a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Construction Without Random Oracles&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Markus Rückert and Dominique Schröder&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Multisignatures as Secure as the Diffie-Hellman Problem&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; in the Plain Public-Key Model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Duc-Phong Le, Alexis Bonnecaze, and Alban Gabillon&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Security of Pairing-Friendly Abelian Varieties&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; over Non-Prime Fields&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Naomi Benger, Manuel Charlemagne, and David Mandell Freeman&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Generating Pairing-Friendly Curves with the CM Equation of Degree 1&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hyang-Sook Lee and Cheol-Min Park&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Final Exponentiation for Calculating Pairings&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; on Ordinary Elliptic Curves&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Michael Scott, Naomi Benger, Manuel Charlemagne, Luis J. Dominguez Perez,&lt;br /&gt;and Ezekiel J. Kachisa&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Faster Pairings on Special Weierstrass Curves&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Craig Costello, Huseyin Hisil, Colin Boyd,&lt;br /&gt;Juan Gonzalez Nieto, and Kenneth Koon-Ho Wong&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Fast Hashing to G2 on Pairing Friendly Curves&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Michael Scott, Naomi Benger, Manuel Charlemagne,&lt;br /&gt;Luis J. Dominguez Perez, and Ezekiel J. Kachisa&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Compact E-Cash and Simulatable VRFs Revisited&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mira Belenkiy, Melissa Chase, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Anna Lysyanskaya&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Proofs on Encrypted Values in Bilinear Groups and&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; an Application to Anonymity of Signatures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Georg Fuchsbauer and David Pointcheval&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Identity Based Group Signatures from HIBE&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nigel P. Smart and Bogdan Warinschi&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Forward-Secure Group Signatures from Pairings&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Toru Nakanishi, Yuta Hira, and Nobuo Funabiki&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficient Traceable Signatures in the Standard Model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Benoît Libert and Moti Yung&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Strongly Secure Certificateless Key Agreement&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Georg Lippold, Colin Boyd, and Juan Gonzalez Nieto&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Universally Composable Adaptive Priced Oblivious Transfer&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alfredo Rial, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Bart Preneel&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Conjunctive Broadcast and Attribute-Based Encryption&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nuttapong Attrapadung and Hideki Imai&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-6225979803252501551?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/6225979803252501551/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=6225979803252501551' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/6225979803252501551'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/6225979803252501551'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/06/pairing-2009.html' title='Pairing 2009'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-7637108239356418769</id><published>2009-05-25T02:23:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-05-25T02:50:24.520-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Accepted papers CRYPTO 09</title><content type='html'>&lt;pre&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Linear Algebra with Sub-linear Zero-Knowledge Arguments&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jens Groth&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Position Based Cryptography&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nishanth Chandran, Vipul Goyal, Ryan Moriarty, Rafail Ostrovsky&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Short chosen-prefix collisions for MD5&lt;br /&gt;and the creation of a rogue&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; CA certificate&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Marc Stevens, Alex Sotirov, Jake Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra,&lt;br /&gt;David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, Benne de Weger&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On Bounded Distance Decoding, Unique Shortest Vectors,&lt;br /&gt;and the&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Minimum Distance Problem&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vadim Lyubashevsky, Daniele Micciancio&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Practical Cryptanalysis of ISO 9796-2 and&lt;br /&gt;Europay-Mastercard-Visa&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Signatures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jean-Sebastien Coron, David Naccache, Mehdi Tibouchi,&lt;br /&gt;Ralf-Philipp Weinmann&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;How to Hash onto Elliptic Curves&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thomas Icart&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Amortized Complexity of&lt;br /&gt;Zero-knowledge Protocols&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ronald Cramer, Ivan Damgard&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Utility Dependence in Correct and&lt;br /&gt;Fair Rational Secret Sharing &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Gilad Asharov, Yehuda Lindell&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Privacy-Enhancing Auctions&lt;br /&gt;Using Rational Cryptography&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Peter Bro Miltersen, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Nikos Triandopoulos&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Merkle Puzzles are Optimal&lt;br /&gt;- an O(n^2)-query attack on key exchange&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;from a random oracle&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Boaz Barak, Mohammad Mahmoody-Ghidary&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Asymptotically Good Ideal Linear Secret&lt;br /&gt;Sharing with Strong&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Multiplication over&lt;br /&gt;*Any* Fixed Finite Field&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ignacio Cascudo, Hao Chen, Ronald Cramer, Chaoping Xing&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Collusion-Free Multiparty Computation&lt;br /&gt;in the Mediated Model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Joel Alwen, Jonathan Katz, Yehuda Lindell, Giuseppe Persiano,&lt;br /&gt;Abhi Shelat, Ivan Visconti&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Somewhat Non-Committing Encryption&lt;br /&gt;and Efficient Adaptively Secure&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Oblivious Transfer&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Juan Garay, Daniel Wichs, Hong-Sheng Zhou&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Reconstructing RSA Private Keys&lt;br /&gt;from Random Key Bits&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Nadia Heninger, Hovav Shacham&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Public-Key Cryptosystems&lt;br /&gt;Resilient to Key Leakage&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Moni Naor, Gil Segev&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks&lt;br /&gt;Against Reduced SHA-0 and SHA-1&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kazumaro Aoki, Yu Sasaki&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Distinguisher and Related-Key Attack&lt;br /&gt;on the Full AES-256&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, Ivica Nikolic&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Solving Hidden Number Problem with&lt;br /&gt;One Bit Oracle and Advice&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Adi Akavia&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Probabilistically Checkable Arguments&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yael Tauman Kalai, Ran Raz&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Computational Indistinguishability&lt;br /&gt;Amplification: Tight Product&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Theorems for System Composition&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ueli Maurer, Stefano Tessaro&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Improving the Security of Quantum Protocols&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ivan Damgaard, Serge Fehr, Carolin Lunemann, Louis Salvail,&lt;br /&gt;Christian Schaffner&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Fast Circular-Secure Encryption&lt;br /&gt;Based on Hard Learning Problems&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Benny Applebaum, David Cash, Chris Peikert, Amit Sahai&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cryptanalysis of C2&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Julia Borghoff, Lars Knudsen, Gregor Leander, Krystian Matusiewicz&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Short and Stateless Signatures&lt;br /&gt;from the RSA Assumption&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Susan Hohenberger, Brent Waters&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Group of Signed Quadratic Residues&lt;br /&gt;and Applications&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Dennis Hofheinz, Eike Kiltz&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Message Authentication Codes&lt;br /&gt;from Unpredictable Block Ciphers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yevgeniy Dodis, John Steinberger&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Batch binary Edwards&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Daniel J. Bernstein&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The Round Complexity of&lt;br /&gt;Verifiable Secret Sharing Revisted&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Arpita Patra, Ashish Choudhary, Tal Rabin, Pandu Rangan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Composition of Public-Coin Zero Knowledge Protocols&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Rafael Pass, Wei-Lung Dustin Tseng, Douglas Wikstr\"om&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Dual System Encryption: Realizing Fully Secure IBE and HIBE&lt;br /&gt;under&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; Simple Assumptions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Brent Waters&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;How Risky is the Random-Oracle Model?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Gaetan Leurent, Phong Q. Nguyen&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;How to Encipher Messages on a Small Domain: Deterministic&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Encryption and the Thorp Shuffle&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ben Morris, Phillip Rogaway, Till Stegers&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;New Birthday Attacks on Some MACs Based on Block Ciphers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Zheng Yuan, Wei Wang, Keting Jia, Guangwu Xu, Xiaoyun Wang&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Computational Differential Privacy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ilya Mironov, Omkant Pandey, Omer Reingold, Salil Vadhan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Smooth Projective Hashing for Conditionally&lt;br /&gt;Extractable Commitments&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Michel Abdalla, Celine Chevalier, David Pointcheval&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Private Mutual Authentication and Conditional&lt;br /&gt;Oblivious Transfer&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Stanislaw Jarecki, Xiaomin Liu&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Randomizable Proofs and Delegatable Anonymous Credentials&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mira Belenkiy, Jan Camenisch, Melissa Chase, Markulf Kohlweiss,&lt;br /&gt;Anna Lysyanskaya, Hovav Shacham&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography&lt;br /&gt;in the Bounded-Retrieval Model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Joel Alwen, Yevgeniy Dodis, Daniel Wichs&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7164557100312430536-7637108239356418769?l=sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/feeds/7637108239356418769/comments/default' title='Publier les commentaires'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7164557100312430536&amp;postID=7637108239356418769' title='0 commentaires'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/7637108239356418769'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7164557100312430536/posts/default/7637108239356418769'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://sebastienaumonier.blogspot.com/2009/05/accepted-papers-crypto-09.html' title='Accepted papers CRYPTO 09'/><author><name>Sébastien Aumônier</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/12946527342666831420</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164557100312430536.post-6071168165896301872</id><published>2009-05-07T00:36:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2009-05-07T00:47:05.463-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Accepted Papers ACISP 2009</title><content type='html'>I&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;s the Information Security king naked?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Basie von Solms&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;University of Johannesburg&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Measurement Study on Malicious Web Servers in the .nz Domain&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Christian Seifert, Vipul Delwadia, Peter Komisarczuk, David Stirling and Ian Welch&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;School of Engineering and Computer Science, Victoria Univestity of Wellington, New Zealand&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;A Combinatorial  Approach for an Anonymity Metric&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Vinh Pham, Dogan Kesdogan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;University Siegen, Germany&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On improving the accuracy and performance of content-based file type identification&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Irfan Ahmed, Kyung-suk Lhee, Hyunjung Shin and ManPyo Hong&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ajou University, South Korea&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Attacking 9 and 10 Rounds of AES-256&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ewan Fleischmann and Michael Gorski and Stefan Lucks&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Bauhaus-University Weimar, Germany&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Cryptographic Properties and Application of a Generalized Unbalanced Feistel Network Structure&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jiali Choy, Guanhan Chew, Khoongming Khoo and Huihui Yap&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;DSO National Laboratories&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Lightweight Block Ciphers Revisited: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round PRESENT and HIGHT&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Onur Özen, Kerem Varıcı and Cihangir Tezcan and Çelebi Kocair&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;EPFL, K.U. Leuven, METU, METU&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Improved Cryptanalysis of the Common Scrambling Algorithm Stream Cipher&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Leonie Simpson, Matt Henricksen and Wun She Yap&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Queensland University of Technology, Australia and Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Testing Stream Ciphers by Finding the Longest Substring of a Given Density&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;S. Boztas, S.J. Puglisi and A.Turpin&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;School of Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences &amp;amp; School of CS&amp;amp;IT, RMIT University&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Analysis of Property-Preservation Capabilities of the ROX and ESh Hash Domain Extenders&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mohammad Reza Reyhanitabar, Willy Susilo and Yi Mu&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;University of Wollongong&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Characterizing Padding Rules of MD Hash Functions Preserving Collision Security&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mridul Nandi&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;National Institute of Standards and Technology&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Distinguishing Attack on the Secret-Prefix MAC based on the 39-step SHA-256&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Hongbo Yu and Xiaoyun Wang&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Center for Advanced Study, Tsinghua University&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Inside the Hypercube&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Eric Brier, Willi Meier, MarÌa Naya-Plasencia and Thomas Peyrin&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;FHNW, 5210 Windisch, Switzerland and Ingenico, France and FHNW, 5210 Windisch, Switzerland and INRIA, France and Ingenico, France&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;    &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks on Double-Branch Hash Functions: Application to RIPEMD and Others&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yu Sasaki and Kazumaro Aoki&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;NTT Corporation&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;On the Weak Ideal Compression Functions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Akira Numayama and keisuke Tanaka&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tokyo Institute of Technology&lt;br /&gt;   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;New Correlations of RC4 PRGA Using Nonzero-Bit Differences&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Atsuko Miyaji and Masahiro Sukegawa&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;JAIST&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Hardening the Network from The Friend Within&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;L. Jean Camp&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Indiana University&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Reducing the Complexity in the Distributed Computation of Private RSA Keys&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Peter Lory&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;University of Regensburg, D-93040 Regensburg, Germany&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Efficiency Bounds for Adversary Constructions in Black-Box Reductions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ahto Buldas,  Aivo Jürgenson and Margus Niitsoo&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Cybernetica AS,  University of Tartu and Elion Enterprises&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Building Key Private Public Key Encryption Schemes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kenneth G. Paterson and Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, UOL&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Multi-Recipient Public-Key Encryption from Simulators in Security Proofs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Harunaga Hiwatari, Keisuke Tanaka, Tomoyuki Asano, and Koichi Sakumoto&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Sony Corporation&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Fair Threshold Decryption with Semi-Trusted Third Parties&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jeongdae Hong, Jinil Kim, Jihye Kim, Matthew K. Franklin, 
